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Abstract 
Post-humanism is best understood as several overlapping and interrelated fields 
coming out of the traditions of anti-humanism, post-colonialism, and feminist 
discourse. But the term remains contested, both by those who wish to overturn, or 
even destroy, the ‘humanism’ after that decisive hyphen (post-humanists), and those 
engaged in the project of maximising their chance of merging with technologies, and 
reaching a supposed point of transition, when the current ‘human’ has been 
augmented, upgraded, and surpassed (transhumanists). For both those who wish to 
move beyond ‘humanism’, and those who wish to transcend ‘the human’, there 
remains a significant, shared, problem: the supposed originary separations, between 
information and matter, culture and nature, mankind and machine, singular and plural, 
that post-humanism seeks to problematise, and transhumanism often problematically 
ignores, lead to the delineation of ‘the human’ as a single, universalised figure. This 
universalism erases the pattern of difference, which post-humanists see as both the 
solution to, and the problem of, the human paradigm. This thesis recognises this 
problem as an ongoing one, and one which – for those who seek to establish 
posthumanism as a critical field of enquiry – can never be claimed to be finally 
overcome, lest the same problem of universalism rear its head again. 
To tackle this problem, this thesis also enters into the complex liminal space where the 
terms ‘human’ and ‘humanism’ confuse and interrupt one another, but rather than 
delineate the same boundaries (as transhumanists have done), or lay claim over 
certain territories of the discourse (as post-humanists have done), this thesis 
implicates itself, myself, and yourself in the relational becoming posthuman of which 
we, and it, are co-constituted. My claim being, that critical posthumanism must be the 
action it infers onto the world of which it is not only part, but in mutual co-constitution 
with.  
The Practice of Posthumanism claims that critical posthumanism must be enacted in 
practice, and stages itself as an example of that process, through a hybrid theoretical 
and practice-based becoming. It argues that posthumanism is necessarily a vibrant, 
lively process being undergone, and as such, that it cannot be narrativized or referred 
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to discursively without collapsing that process back into a static, universalised 
delineation once again. It must remain in practice, and as such, this thesis enacts the 
process of which it itself is a principle paradigm.  
After establishing the critical field termed ‘posthumanism’ through analyses of 
associated discourses such as humanism and transhumanism, each of the four written 
chapters and hybrid conclusion/portfolio of work is enacted through a ‘figure’ which 
speaks to certain monstrous dilemmas posed by thinkers of the posthuman. These five 
figures are: The Phantom Zone, Crusoe’s Island, The Thing, The Collapse of The Hoard, 
and The 3D Printer (#Additivism). Each figure – echoing Donna Haraway – ‘resets the 
stage for possible pasts and futures’ by calling into question the fictional/theoretical 
ground upon which it is predicated. Considered together, the dissertation and 
conclusion/portfolio of work, position critical posthumanism as a hybrid ‘other’, my 
claim being that only through representing the human as and through an ongoing 
process (ontogenesis rather than ontology) can posthumanism re-conceptualise the 
‘norms’ deeply embedded within the fields it confronts.  
The practice of critical posthumanism this thesis undertakes is inherently a political 
project, displacing and disrupting the power dynamics which are co-opted in the 
hierarchical structuring of individuals within ‘society’, of categories within ‘nature’, of 
differences which are universalised in the name of the ‘human’, as well as the ways in 
which theory delineates itself into rigid fields of study. By confounding articulations of 
the human in fiction, theory, science, media, and art, this practice in practice enacts its 
own ongoing, ontogenetic becoming; the continual changing of itself, necessary to 
avoid a collapse into new absolutes and universals.  
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This is no fantasy... no careless product of wild imagination.  
No, my good friends. 
 
The opening lines of Superman, 1978 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Richard Donner, Superman, Film (Warner Bros., 1978). 
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 Introduction   
Those who theorise the posthuman, post/human, or post-humanism – to name but 
three of its designations – enter into a complicated relationship with the concept they 
confront. Post-humanism is best understood as several overlapping and interrelated 
fields coming out of the traditions of anti-humanism, post-colonialism, and feminist 
discourse. But the term remains contested, both by those who wish to overturn, or 
even destroy, the ‘humanism’ after that decisive hyphen, and those who are too busy 
engaging in maximising their chance of merging with technologies, and becoming 
‘post’, to spend time questioning how the ‘human’ of humanism is constituted in the 
first place. This thesis also enters into the complex liminal space where the terms 
‘human’ and ‘humanism’ confuse and interrupt one another, but rather than delineate 
the same boundaries, or lay claim over certain territories of the discourse, I intend for 
this text to implicate itself, myself, and yourself (the reader) in the relational becoming 
post-human of which we, and it, are co-constituted.  
This thesis stages itself as an example of posthumanism in practice. It argues that 
posthumanism is necessarily a vibrant, lively process being undergone, and as such, 
that it cannot be narrativized or referred to without collapsing that process back into a 
static, universalised delineation once again. It must remain in practice, and as such, 
this thesis enacts the process of which it itself is the primary paradigm. But here I am 
getting ahead of myself. In order to understand the territories this thesis will cross 
into, I must first lay out a series of terms, and more importantly, ways of relating those 
terms in order for the critical stance I take towards posthumanism and its precursors 
to become clear. This introduction retains a more discursive mode of address than the 
proceeding chapters, relying on referring to key concepts, thinkers, and questions of 
which the remaining thesis will approach more intimately. There are contradictions at 
play in this approach, which I argue are also inherent in many of the posthumanist 
texts I converse with. It is important once again to re-iterate the key research question 
of this thesis as situated somewhat between the ‘vibrant’ process I argue 
posthumanism must be, and the detached, epistemologically normative critical mode 
the writing this introduction takes. For my argument is that critical posthumanism ‘in 
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practice’ must be the action it infers onto the world of which it is not only part, but in 
mutual co-constitution with. I work from the basis of R.L. Rutsky’s claim that 
posthumanism is ‘a kind of permanent cultural revolution, a performative process that 
continually re-conceptualizes, or changes, itself.’ 2 This thesis proposes itself as a 
principle example of the mode of practice by which posthumanism must be, not only 
understood, but acted, entered into, and self-reflective of. This practice in practice 
enacts the ongoing, ontogenetic becoming; the changing of itself, necessary to avoid a 
collapse into new absolutes and universals. 
Firstly, I will map the critical territory of posthumanism as I approach it, engaging along 
the way with the practice of posthumanism undertaken by some of its associates. I will 
segue into a discussion on what is not posthumanism, dragging the figure of ‘the 
human’ across the divides as I write and begin to blur them. Finally, for this 
introduction, I will give an overview of the following chapters as well as the figures 
they contend with.  
Human(ism) Remains 
In her influential book How We Became Posthuman (1999), N. Katherine Hayles lays 
out a course from a ‘nightmare… culture inhabited by posthumans who regard their 
bodies as fashion accessories,’ to her ideal version of the posthuman, ‘that recognizes 
and celebrates finitude as a condition of human being, and that understands human 
life is embedded in a material world of great complexity.’ 3 Hayles begins by aligning 
the term ‘posthuman’ with what I would call ‘transhumanism’ or what was not so long 
ago more commonly referred to as ‘extropianism’, defined by Eugene Thacker as 
‘theoretical-technical inquir[y] into the next phase of the human condition through 
advances in science and technology.’ 4 The ‘extropy’ of extropianism refers to the 
human capacity for improvement, and the ‘trans’ of transhumanism to the transition 
                                                     
2 R.L. Rutsky, ‘Mutation, History, and Fantasy in the Posthuman.’, Subject Matters: A Journal of 
Communications and the Self 3.2/4.1 (2007): 101. 
3 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and 
Informatics (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 5. 
4 Eugene Thacker, ‘Data Made Flesh: Biotechnology and the Discourse of the Posthuman’, Cultural 
Critique 53, no. 1 (2003): 73. 
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those who ascribe to these ideologies believe humans currently find ourselves in, 
towards a final goal of self-perfection. ‘The overall goal,’ a 1994 Wired article on the 
extropian movement explains, ‘is to become more than human… possessed of 
drastically augmented intellects, memories, and physical powers.’ 5 Since human 
beings have always already augmented themselves with technology – a humble length 
of knotted string arguably extends our intellects and memories; the slingshot and the 
unicycle increase our physical powers – the transhuman imperative must separate 
what it considers the essential features of the human, from those that they believe 
merely frame/scaffold/bolster our being. An example of this line of reasoning can 
clearly be seen in an article penned by outspoken transhumanist Zoltan Istvan 
following a 2015 legal ruling. The ‘non-human’ is not asserted or denied in Istvan’s 
argument, but appears obliquely once the doctrines of transhumanism – and as I will 
argue its proxy, humanism – are invoked. 
Described as ‘a landmark’ case 6 in support of the disabled community, a lawsuit was 
settled in March 2015 ordering Los Angeles council to spend over $1.3 billion repairing 
the city’s ‘dilapidated network of sidewalks and access ways.’ 7 Shortly after the ruling 
Zoltan Istvan penned a comment piece for website Motherboard indicating the further 
billions of dollars this precedent might cost other American cities forced to respond to 
it. Rather than fixing sidewalks and redesigning the city streets for better access, Istvan 
argues, the money would be better spent on exoskeleton suits for wheelchair users, 
the obese, elderly and infirm, ‘that [would] allow them to run, jump, and play active 
sports.’ 8 The image Istvan conjures up, of augmented human bodies ‘running over’ 
crumbling sidewalks ‘at 15 miles per hour while jogging’ 9 would be comical, were it 
not padded with so many other harmful caricatures. Istvan begins by critiquing the 
                                                     
5 Ed Regis, ‘Meet the Extropians’, WIRED, 10 January 1994, 
http://www.wired.com/1994/10/extropians/. 
6 Alpert Reyes Emily, ‘L.A. Agrees to Spend $1.3 Billion to Fix Sidewalks in ADA Case’, latimes.com, 1 April 
2015, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lawsuit-broken-sidewalks-20150331-story.html. 
7 Zoltan Istvan, ‘In the Transhumanist Age, We Should Be Repairing Disabilities, Not Sidewalks’, 
Motherboard, 3 April 2015, http://motherboard.vice.com/read/in-the-transhumanist-age-we-should-
be-repairing-disabilities-not-sidewalks. 
8 Istvan. 
9 Istvan. 
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role of the Americans with Disability Act, ‘It's great to have a law that protects against 
discrimination, but in the transhumanist age we also need a law that insists on 
eliminating disability via technology and modern medicine.’ And rounds off his 
argument by appealing to the reader’s economic sensibilities: 
With millions of people in the US suffering from mobility issues, it would be far 
more lucrative for the country to have its people with disabilities employed, 
rather than giving them level sidewalks. 10 
The backlash to the article was swift, and uncompromising. In a piece for Huffington 
Post entitled I Don’t Need Fixing… Lauren West asserted the need for ‘inclusive’ design 
and legislation, reminding Istvan that accessibility and usability are standards of city 
planning that encompass ‘all members of society,’ 11 whatever their embodied status. 
In another Motherboard piece, disabled rights activist Emily Ladau attacked Istvan’s 
discriminatory ignorance arguing that, ‘no legislative action truly eradicates or fixes the 
stigmatizing attitudes that are the real barriers for disabled people.’ 12 Zoltan Istvan’s 
response to these criticisms exhibits an apparent inclusivity, predicated on what he 
deems to be common: ‘Transhumanists believe everyone can be improved and should 
be improved if they want.’ 13 Here he makes an appeal to human universality, founded 
on the notion that ‘everyone’ not only has the capacity, but the right to treat each of 
our ‘faulty’ bodies as substrates to be augmented and upgraded. Furthermore, since 
we already have access to these technologies of improvement it would be morally 
wrong to delay using them right away: ‘The transhumanist believes we should 
                                                     
10 Istvan. 
11 Lauren West, ‘I Don’t Need Fixing...’, The Huffington Post UK, 21 April 2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/laurenwest1/i-dont-need-fixing_b_7086086.html. 
12 Ladou Emily, ‘Fix Discriminatory Attitudes and Broken Sidewalks, Not Humans’, Motherboard, 8 April 
2015, http://motherboard.vice.com/read/fix-discriminatory-attitudes-and-broken-sidewalks-not-
humans. 
13 Anthony Cuthbertson, ‘Exoskeletons v Wheelchairs: Disability Advocates Clash with Futurists over 
“offensive” Solution’, International Business Times UK, 14 April 2015, 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/exoskeletons-vs-wheel-chairs-disability-advocates-clash-futurists-over-
offensive-solution-1496178. 
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immediately work to improve ourselves via enhancing the human body and eliminating 
its weak points.’ 14 
Human autonomy is invoked as an absolute and a right, but it is only wielded here 
once a canon has been asserted, marking out ‘otherness’ not only in the bodies of the 
infirm, obese, or less able, but also in any individual who does not demand the human 
right to raise ourselves through a series of technologically mediated steps towards 
perfection. By appealing to a ‘universal rationality, and self-regulating ethical 
behaviour’ 15 in his proclamations, Istvan reduces those he denounces to what Rosi 
Braidotti has called ‘the less than human status of disposable bodies.’ 16 The appeal to 
inclusivity – in virtue of human autonomy and (self-)regulation – therefore instates 
those of ‘normal’ body, race, sex, or genome as exclusive harbingers of that-which-is-
to-inevitably-come. A process that Braidotti refers to as a ‘dialectics of otherness’ 
which ‘assigns difference on a hierarchical scale as a tool of governance.’ 17 
The universal human subject is an unquestioned feature of many transhumanist 
proclamations, the most prominent of which may be the myth of the Technological 
Singularity, espoused by futurist and inventor Ray Kurzweil. 18 As technological change 
accelerates, according to Kurzweil, so it pulls us upwards in its wake. Kurzweil argues 
that as the curve of change reaches an infinite gradient, reality itself will be brought 
into question. Like a Black Hole in space-time, subjects travelling toward this spike will 
find it impossible to turn around, to escape its pull. A transformed posthuman reality 
awaits us on the other side of the Technological Singularity. A reality Kurzweil and his 
ilk believe ‘we’ will inevitably pass into in the coming decades. The transhumanist 
exonerates a type of futurism which demands that the complexities of human life, ‘the 
varied and contradictory impulses and appetites of most humans and the historically 
                                                     
14 Zoltan Istvan, ‘Transhumanism and Our Outdated Biology’, The Huffington Post, 21 April 2016, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zoltan-istvan/transhumanism-and-our-out_b_9749138.html. 
15 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman, 2013, 15. 
16 Braidotti, 15. 
17 Braidotti, 66. 
18 The term ‘Technological Singularity’ has a long history, but most link it back to science fiction writer 
Vernor Vinge, whose coinage in a 1993 essay (‘Vernor Vinge on the Singularity’, accessed 23 March 
2017, http://mindstalk.net/vinge/vinge-sing.html.) was later taken up by futurist Ray Kurzweil, most 
prominently in his book The Singularity Is Near (London: Duckworth, 2005). 
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diverse and tenacious character of institutions are simply dissolved into the imaginary.’ 
19 Their predictions and solutions necessarily posit an ideal – calm and flattened – 
landscape, outside of history. A place beyond real political factors of class, status and 
power; where difference is presumed not to exist – and this or that technology will get 
‘us’ there – without ever really defining who ‘us’ might or might not include – beyond 
the close by, and tantalizing, event horizon. 
In a 2007 paper entitled Droppin' Science Fiction, Darryl A. Smith explores the 
singularity through African American and Afrofuturist science fiction. He notes that the 
promise of runaway change positions those subject to it in the place of Sisyphus, the 
figure of Greek myth condemned to push a stone up a hill forever. For Sisyphus to 
progress he has to fight gravity as it conspires with the stone to pull him back to the 
bottom of the slope. The singularity in science fiction from black authors such as W. E. 
B. Du Bois, Derrick Bell, and Amiri Baraka focusses on this potential fall, rather than the 
ascent: 
Here, in the geometrics of spacetime, the Spike lies not at the highest point on 
an infinite curve but at the lowest. The entelechy defined by the slope of that 
curve and transcending humanity at its absolute apex becomes, rather, the 
slope slipping into the Spike's domain of collapsed rational reality… Far from 
being the shift into a posthumanity, the Negative Spike is understood… as an 
infinite collapsing and, thus, negation of reality. Escape from such a region thus 
requires an opposing infinite movement. 20 
The image of a collective ‘push’ of the stone of progress up the slope necessarily posits 
a universal human subject, resisting the pull of gravity back down the slope. A 
universal human subject who passes victorious to the other side of the event horizon. 
It is no coincidence that ‘singularity’ is often used as a term to indicate human finitude. 
Self-same subjects existing at particular points in time, embedded within particular 
contexts, told through a singular history or single potential future. The metaphor of 
                                                     
19 James W. Carey, Communication as Culture, Revised Edition: Essays on Media and Society (Routledge, 
2008), 153. 
20 Darryl A. Smith, ‘Droppin’ Science Fiction: Signification and Singularity in the Metapocalypse of Du 
Bois, Baraka, and Bell’, Science Fiction Studies 34, no. 2 (2007): 207–8. 
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the transformative singularity signals not one reality ‘to come’, nor even two realities – 
one moved from and one towards – but of many, all dependant on who the subject of 
the singularity is and how much autonomy they are ascribed. 
The implication of the supposed technological singularity – that our technologies are 
the primary ‘writer’ of the now, inscribing our subjectivities as ‘we’ march with them 
to the posthuman future – exposes a common tendency to espouse transhumanist 
ways of thinking. As Stefan Herbrechter and Ivan Callus make clear: 
[T]he proper medium of the transhuman is the human itself as that which must 
be written upon, worked upon, in its status as incomplete state or intermediate 
stage to something more “finished” in its “seamless articulation” with 
technology as prosthesis. 21 
Transhumanism is the ‘seamless’ successor to humanism not only because of its 
insistence on a set of common, essential features that define the human, but also in 
the belief that human agency can be accelerated through technologies in order to 
enhance or at least maintain those essential features as ‘we’ – apparently liberated 
from our weak biological bodies – move forward. This is not to say that humanism has 
not also continually renewed and revised its boundaries. Indeed, people once 
considered too wretched to warrant humane treatment, such as the enslaved and 
colonised, women, people of colour, the disabled and less able, and those people 
identifying as lesbian/gay/bi/trans/queer, have been incorporated into the sphere of 
humanity and human rights in an ongoing project of collective redefinition. For anti-
humanists such as Rosi Braidotti, the human of humanism continually ‘spells out a 
systematized standard of recognisability – of Sameness.’ 22 These systems of 
normativity do not necessarily depend on direct comparisons of ‘better’ and ‘worse’ 
for their power. As the case of Zoltan Istvan shows, humanism can sneak ‘otherness’ 
into ethical proclamations by appealing to a universal humanity, bound by a shared 
desire to exert ‘our’ autonomy in pursuit of improving our selves. These arguments 
often contain the hidden premise that disagreeing with this universality would, in 
                                                     
21 Stefan Herbrechter and Ivan Callus, ‘What’s Wrong With Posthumanism?’, Rhizomes, no. 7 (Fall 2003), 
http://www.rhizomes.net/issue7/callus.htm. 
22 Braidotti, The Posthuman, 26. 
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itself, be an admission of one’s disregard for the suffering that is part of the human 
condition, a suffering transhumanists believe technological augmentation will 
alleviate, avoid, or cure entirely. 
Just as an understanding of the human of each particular humanism can only come 
from assessing the ‘outside’ or ‘others’ of that field, so it pays to contrast 
posthumanism with the transhumanist ideology which appears to share many of its 
tenets, but which under closer examination actually reintroduces the non-human 
‘other’ in its appeal to human universality and transcendence. Returning to N. 
Katherine Hayles’ assertions on what she calls posthumanism, transhumanists think of 
‘the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate.’ 23 Yet the image this 
conveys, of cyborg adaptations jutting out of our flesh at obtuse angles belies the 
deeper distinction transhumanists must make between the ‘informational patterns’ 
that they believe encode and constitute the central, privileged homunculus of human 
being, and the substrate of our bodies, a biological ‘accident of history rather than an 
inevitability of life.’ 24 What is important to note is the reintroduction transhumanism 
makes of a categorical, ontological boundary between human ‘being’ and our 
biologically constituted bodies. Hayles treats the term ‘posthuman’ as a catch-all 
category for a wide set of techno-derivative reappraisals of the human, but throws 
praise on those discourses and figurations that, as Elaine L. Graham puts it, confound 
‘but also [hold] up to scrutiny the terms on which the quintessentially human will be 
conceived.’ 25 I will call these practices and expositions what Jill Didur has termed, 
critical posthumanism. 26 Indeed, this is the very brand of discourse Hayles herself 
introduces in her endeavour to ‘show what has been elided, suppressed, and forgotten 
[in transhumanism] to make information lose its body.’ 27 It is these originary 
separations, between information and matter, culture and nature, mankind and 
                                                     
23 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 2. 
24 Hayles, 3. 
25 Elaine Graham, Representations of the Post Human : Monsters, Aliens, and Others in Popular Culture 
(New Brunswick  N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 11. 
26 Jill Didur, ‘Re-Embodying Technoscientific Fantasies: Posthumanism, Genetically Modified Foods, and 
the Colonization of Life’, Cultural Critique 53, no. 1 (2003): 98–115. 
27 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 13. 
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machine, singular and plural that both humanism and posthumanism seek out in their 
delineation of the human. But whereas humanism – and its seamless successor, 
transhumanism – then suppress, or attempt to undermine these distinctions in pursuit 
of some fundamental, universal principle of humanity, critical posthumanism as Didur 
defines it, ‘questions the view that there was ever an originary divide between these 
things in the first place.’ 28 Posthumanism may then better reassess the human and 
humanism not through a ‘description of essences, but via the delineation of 
boundaries.’ 29  
Boundary Claims 
In fictions, and through figures, boundaries are sought by writers and theorists who 
seek to encapsulate the ‘post’ of the posthuman as it reveals the ‘human’ that is 
(apparently) under threat of being replaced. In her 2002 book Representations of the 
Post/Human, Elaine L. Graham turns to the first film in the Terminator franchise, after 
a close reading of Donna Haraway’s Manifesto for Cyborgs (1984), in order to stage the 
terrifying Hollywood cyborg as such a liminal entity. For Graham, the hypermasculinity 
of Arnold Schwarzenegger, the actor who plays the Terminator, is itself a kind of 
artifice that aligns with that of the machinic cyborg. Schwarzenegger is already a 
superhuman creature, she suggests, ‘pure body… artificially enhanced in a way that 
puts him on a different plane to ordinary organic humanity.’ 30 His steroid-augmented 
muscles and cold exterior betray a tension between his human and technological 
features, for both Schwarzenegger and the cyborg Terminator he plays exhibit 
machinelike bodies which originate in corporeal flesh and blood. 31  
In the Terminator films, machines pursue humans in lieu of their extinction, but it is 
perhaps the figure of the machine which is most threatened as the fiction unfolds. 
Inevitably it is always humans whose essences remain intact – or are even enhanced – 
at the end of such fantasies, whilst the non-human hybrid creatures they confront are 
                                                     
28 Didur, ‘Re-Embodying Technoscientific Fantasies’, 101–2. 
29 Graham, Representations of the Post Human : Monsters, Aliens, and Others in Popular Culture, 11. 
30 Graham, 208. 
31 Graham, 208. 
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ultimately defeated by their inability to match up to the adaptable, variant humanity 
of their precursors. In the same text that espouses the blur of boundaries, from 
machine-like humans to human-like machines, scientific through to mythical 
discourses, and holds up hybridity itself as the most ‘post’ of posthuman traits, 
Graham’s Representations of the Post/Human grapples with the acerbic, techno-
macho frame of the Terminator at multiple levels, from the fiction itself to the cultural 
accumulations which enable that fiction to do the critical work through her writing. 
The Terminator is mobilised as a ‘figure’ by Graham, building on work undertaken by 
Donna Haraway to depict the ‘florid machinic, organic, and textual entities with which 
we share the earth and our flesh.’ 32 The Terminator is an example of a feminist 
figuration in its capacity to highlight the different power dynamics associated with its 
masculine embodied and machinic qualities, whilst at the same time mobilising a 
further critical posthumanist turn, which seeks to undermine and overturn those 
dualisms in themselves.  
In her work on figuration, philosopher Rosi Braidotti recognises this dynamism of the 
figural not only as an aspect of rational enquiry, but as a bodily and emotional one as 
well: 
A figuration renders our image in terms of a decentred and multi-layered vision 
of the subject as a dynamic and changing entity… We live in permanent 
processes of transition, hybridization and nomadization, and these in-between 
states and stages defy the established modes of theoretical representation. 33 
To recognise the embodied – or material – aspects of our own situation is, for 
Braidotti, Haraway, and other feminists who deal in figurations, a relational mode of 
thinking theoretically, which maintains its shape-shifting characteristics as a 
fundamental part of its process. Once refigured, the cyborg does not express some 
totalizing ‘truth’ about male power and female subjugation, or the machinic 
efficiencies of war perpetuated through that simulacra, but flows dynamically into a 
                                                     
32 Donna Haraway, The Haraway Reader (Psychology Press, 2004), 1. 
33 Rosi Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, 
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whole host of social, political, and material questions about the human situation 
shown to be interrelational.  
As Rosi Braidotti suggests, ‘the human’ is itself a figural construction, left over from the 
cartographies of Enlightenment thought, ‘the Cartesian subject of the cogito, the 
Kantian “community of reasonable beings”, or, in more sociological terms, the subject 
as citizen, rights-holder, property-owner, and so on.’ 34 As I showed in relation to 
Transhumanism, ‘humanism’ tends to universalise this problematic construction, 
presupposing ‘human’ subjects as autonomous agents, capable of rational control over 
a world of which they themselves are the only benefactors. In the introduction to 
What is Posthumanism? (2010), Carey Wolfe expands on this, turning to Michel 
Foucault to mark ‘the difference between humanism and Enlightenment thought.’ 35 
For Foucault, humanism was defined by its appeal to anthropological universality, a 
dogma for which the Enlightenment ‘should have no patience,’ 36 since the spirit of 
rational inquiry ‘stops short of applying its own protocols and commitments to itself.’ 
37 Having evacuated God from the centre of their ethical and ontological traditions 
humanists have continued to establish their particular definitions of the human as the 
central pivot of a whole series of philosophical solar systems, around which non-
human things are forced to revolve. Accordingly humanism, ‘posits the power of 
transcendence as its distinctive characteristic and humanistic universalism as its 
particularity.’ 38 In other words: there are many humanisms, but each must appeal to 
the same doctrine of universality to lift its particular brand above its others. 
Philosopher David Roden defines the humanist as one who ‘believes that humans are 
importantly distinct from non-humans and supports this distinctiveness claim with a 
philosophical anthropology.’ 39 What is left over from these definitions is an 
understanding of what constitutes the so-called ‘non-human’, for to trace the outline 
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of this eclectic category, in its many shifts, is often also to follow the trail of cruelties 
that have been perpetuated against those entities which have fallen outside the 
demarcated space of the human or humane. As part of his lucid account of humanism, 
Tony Davies expounds a similar point: 
All Humanisms, until now, have been imperial. They speak of the human in the 
accents and the interests of a class, a sex, a race, a genome. Their embrace 
suffocates those whom it does not ignore… It is almost impossible to think of a 
crime that has not been committed in the name of humanity. 40  
Haraway argues that privileged ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomies are harmful even when 
they are wielded from within a philosophy that appeals to their erasure. She extends 
her critique across a range of other humanisms, including certain schools of feminism 
driven by the ‘ironic dream of a common language’ 41 which it was hoped would unite 
all women under the rubric of shared, universal experience. As Haraway succinctly 
reminds her readers, ‘figures help us avoid the fantasy of “the one true meaning,”’ 42 
in their capacity to remain dynamic and, like Elaine L. Graham’s operation on the 
Terminator, expose the ‘fabricated character of all things, by virtue of the boundaries 
they cross and the limits they unsettle.’ 43 
This process of exposing, or bringing forth is related to the etymology of the 
monstrous, or monstrum, in its ‘simultaneous demonstration and destabilization of the 
demarcations by which cultures have separated nature from artifice, human from non-
human, normal from pathology.’ 44 In an interview on the use of the horror genre in 
speculative thought Eugene Thacker builds on this definition: 
A monster is never just a monster, never just a physical or biological anomaly. It 
is always accompanied by an interpretive framework within which the monster 
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is able to be monstrum, literally “to show” or “to warn.” Monsters are always a 
matter of interpretation. 45 
The monstrum can be thought of as revealing how a norm is constituted in the first 
place. According to Colin N. Milburn, Jacques Derrida employed ‘the figure of the 
monster [to embody] a means of thinking otherwise – a means of passing ‘beyond man 
and humanism’ and reaching for other posthuman futures’. 46 So figures of the human 
and its (monstrous) ‘others’ are sought out and taken advantage of in writing on the 
posthuman. In critical posthumanist writings, cyborgs are adjoined by a zoo of hybrid 
figures: from the monsters of myth and cheap B-movies, to Artificial Intelligence, alien 
slimes, and toxic oozes, or chimeras like GM crops and synthetic organs plucked from 
the headlines of popular science magazines. These representations are what Rosi 
Braidotti refers to as ‘processes without a stable object’, 47 staging ontological 
instabilities that Elaine L. Graham suggests ‘straddl[le] the boundaries of fiction and 
scientific taxonomy.’ 48 Here is a telling appeal to another important threshold for 
posthumanist practice, this time between the frontiers of theory and fiction, ‘the one 
space… invad[ing] the other.’ 49 
As Graham attests, ‘we can no longer rely [on categorical] distinctions to demarcate 
the normatively “human” as an enclave against the non-human.’ 50 The non-human is 
already always imbricated with the human and its apparent others, or, to hijack the 
terms under which Alan Bourassa examines this relation: 
[T]he three great figures of the non-human: the animal, the machine and the 
divinity… are not, of course, essentially non-human. They are, at best, 
accidentally non-human. The non-human, as something that can be spoken of, 
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that can act and appear, is caught within the disjunction of the three, the 
empty space created and enclosed (but not occupied) by their imperfect 
overlap. 51 
Thus posthumanism turns to monstrous, hydrid figures because they problematize the 
category of ‘the human’ whilst simultaneously staging the type of vibrant, transitory 
displacements new forms of theory must undertake if they are to retain their capacity 
to confound. The ‘post’ prefix – given also to terms such as structuralism, modernity, 
colonialism, and even internet once the desire to define their transition arose – is 
significant here: a shifting and mutating from a future anterior. For the will have been 
undergone of the term ‘human’ has always remained in flux with the non-human 
world it contaminates/which contaminates it. Posthumanism registers boundary-
confusions that are material, categorical and temporal, probing through the complex 
social, political, and technological shifts which stimulate the ‘empty space’ into which 
the non-human ‘accidentally’ falls to continually change its shape. This shape-shifting 
is a significant quality of posthumanism: being sought out and prized as a characteristic 
of fictional creatures and figures; being exposed in the rhetoric imposed on cultural 
and scientific events and entities; being made manifest in the kind of writing critical 
posthumanist thinkers argue must now be undertaken in the pursuit of ‘new ways of 
relating.’ 52  
This pursuit of a writerly mode which undergoes the very changes it seeks, partly 
emerges from the principle of situating knowledge in the material. Haraway herself 
refers to this as the ‘belly of the monster’, 53 of which we are always inside. There is no 
outside from which to comfortably survey our situation. The god-trick of an all-
pervading vision, attached to a ‘faceless, bodiless and contextless knower, who can 
detach her/himself from the world and the objects of study’ is an illusion, given to us 
by Enlightenment, positivist epistemologies, 54 and continued in moralistic, 
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Transhumanist thought experiments. Since writing has long been a tool of control, 
aligned with the rational, detached perspective Haraway moves against, then 
‘releasing the play of writing is [a] deadly serious,’ refiguring mode for feminist, 
posthumanist practitioners, ‘seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as 
other.’ 55  
Breakdown 
In seeking to explore the field of posthumanism, I stage a shape-shifting theoretical 
enquiry through the enactment of what I term a posthumanist (writing) practice. If 
posthumanist practice seeks to distort the perspectival limits it turns to fictions and 
figures to register, then posthumanist theory itself must rely on what Braidotti calls 
the ‘transit’ between and across such boundaries: 
Theory today happens 'in transit', moving on, passing through, creating 
connections where things were previously disconnected or seemed unrelated, 
where there seemed to be 'nothing to see'. In transit, moving, displacing also 
implies the effort to move on to the invention of new ways of relating, of 
building footbridges between notions. 56 
The practice of critical posthumanism I undertake is inherently a political project, 
displacing and disrupting the power dynamics which are co-opted in the hierarchical 
structuring of individuals within society, of categories within nature, of differences 
which are universalised in the name of the ‘human’, as well as the ways in which 
theory delineates itself into rigid fields of study. As R.L. Rutsky suggests, 
posthumanism is ‘a kind of permanent cultural revolution, a performative process that 
continually re-conceptualizes, or changes, itself.’ 57 Critical posthumanism can be 
envisaged as a monstrous hybrid other, threatening at all times to rise up and expose 
the ‘norms’ embedded deep within the critical and cultural fields it confronts. But just 
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as Michel Foucault poured scorn on humanism as a form of Enlightenment thinking 
because it ‘stop[ped] short of applying its own protocols and commitments to itself,’ 58 
so it is crucial that the monster of posthumanism continually expose and threaten its 
own boundaries.  
In their text Posthuman Bodies (1995) Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston allude to 
other demarcations posthumanism must constantly hold to account: 
The posthuman does not necessitate the obsolescence of the human; it does 
not represent an evolution or devolution of the human. Rather it participates in 
re-distributions of difference and identity. The human functions to domesticate 
and hierarchize difference within the human (whether according to race, class, 
gender) and to absolutize difference between the human and nonhuman. The 
posthuman does not reduce difference-from-others to difference-from-self, but 
rather emerges in the pattern of resonance and interference between the two. 
59 
For Rosi Braidotti difference ‘is both the problem and the solution’ of posthumanism. 
60 Pejorative differences between ‘sexualized and racialized human “others”’ 61 have 
been, and still are being, confronted and confounded through critical and social 
movements such as intersectional feminism and decolonialism. But this does not mean 
the ‘crisis’ of humanism is over. It passes through feminist and decolonialist theory, its 
outsides resituated in a host of ‘naturalized others’ such as ‘animals, insects, plants 
and the environment, in fact the planet and the cosmos as a whole.’ 62 The monsters 
of technological, naturalised, and cosmic ‘others’ are joined in more recent 
posthumanist theory by the haunting spectre of ‘the Anthropocene’: a monstrous form 
of geological inscription at deep temporal scales no human has a chance of witnessing. 
Just as N. Katherine Hayles argues for new ways of relating information with 
materiality in order to counter the transcendental teleology of transhumanism, so Rosi 
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Braidotti affirms being ‘part of nature’ as an inherently embodied and materially 
embedded pragmatism. Posthumanism seeks to reconcile this materialist awareness 
with the task of critical thought by striking ‘an alliance with the productive and 
immanent force of zoe, or life in its non-human aspects. This requires a mutation of 
our shared understanding of what it means to think at all, let alone think critically.’ 63 
As according to Jean Baudrillard, ‘It is not enough for theory to describe and analyse, it 
must be itself an event in the universe it describes,’ 64 I maintain critical posthumanism 
should not be considered as merely a field of study, or a set of answers to 
epistemological questions about the world, but as a monstrous event only conceivable 
in practice. 
In his 1999 study of techno-cultural aesthetics, R.L. Rutsky unpacks the figure of ‘the 
other’ with reference to Donna Haraway’s cyborg, and further bio-machinic, fictional 
and mythical entities. Unlike Haraway and writers like Braidotti, who segue through 
technologically constituted figures such as the cyborg in search of a widened discourse 
for feminism and its derivative (post)humanisms, Rutsky’s focus is partly reversed, 
leading a path through the feminism of Haraway and her critical peers towards a 
conception of the human under constant renewal through techno-cultural and 
aesthetic interventions. Both approaches are concerned with registering the position 
from which the human subject looks out upon a set of ‘different differences’ that 
change and unfurl the human as a figure, and thus also, constantly remap the position 
from which the figure perceives those changes taking place. Rutsky’s account is useful 
because of his concentration on the ‘mutation’ of becoming posthuman. The term 
flickers between inside and outside; between natural and technological; between the 
sovereign subject and its perceived ‘other’. To address this flickering: 
[a] posthuman subject position would… acknowledge the otherness that is part 
of us. It would involve opening the boundaries of individual and collective 
identity, changing the relations that have distinguished between subject and 
object, self and other, us and them. This change is itself a mutational process 
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that cannot be rationally predicted or controlled; it can only be imagined, 
figured… 65 
Rather than merely turning to fictions and figures that contain and perform mutations 
to express the anxieties bound up with these posthuman times, this thesis stages itself 
as a shape-shifting body undergoing mutation. At one time the word ‘contagion’ was 
understood as a touching, the point at which two distinct surfaces or types met. In 
time, contagion came to mean the thing being transferred, the seed of an invasion, 
and ultimately contamination, moving between entities; bodies; organs. This thesis 
stages a third mode of understanding for the human contagion, where the transitional 
meeting between essentialised mankind and machine, nature and culture, theory and 
fiction, gives way to the assemblage of these apparently opposed categories into a 
shape-shifting body, through which the figure of the posthuman is incessantly 
(re)articulated. To rely on this shape-shifting metaphor,; to make of posthumanist 
theory a phantasmagorical, mutating and ill-defined conglomerate body is already to 
perform one of the central claims of this thesis, a claim predicated on defining and 
redefining a set of boundaries which, as this introduction makes clear, also themselves 
must always remain in process.  
This thesis poses the practice of critical posthumanism through four central figures in 
the following chapters, each of which establishes itself in and through a vibrant 
displacement of its own boundaries. It is my claim that these chapters do this in a 
writerly mode which continually threatens the more established discursive writing of a 
PhD thesis, in favour of embedding the reader inside the figure which is undergoing 
transformation. As a practice-based undertaking, this thesis considers the work of each 
chapter to be both an explication of the historical and critical background to the field 
of posthumanism, whilst also performing, working through, and confronting the claims 
it makes about how the field is to be understood now, and taken onward, as a function 
of its own re-conceptualisation. The thesis is composed of four chapters and a 
portfolio of work that I claim as the conclusion to the main body of the thesis. The 
portfolio of work explicates the claims of this thesis beyond mere reference to itself 
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and, I argue, fulfils the requirements I set in place on deriving critical posthumanist 
forms of practice, in practice. The combination of the thesis and my practice position 
critical posthumanism as a hybrid ‘other’, my claim being that only through 
representing the human as and through an ongoing process (ontogenesis rather than 
ontology) can posthumanism re-conceptualise the ‘norms’ deeply embedded within 
the fields it confronts. I maintain that, although the results of this mutation are a 
consequence of error, those errors are necessarily distinct from humanist conceptions 
of autonomy. 
To understand how each chapter operates it pays at this point to partly de-hybridise 
my methodology, pointing out some of the working principles inherent across the 
chapters, and re-establishing at least some of the theoretical, cultural and thematic 
boundaries I spend the majority of the thesis attempting to blur and mutate. Across 
and throughout each of the chapters a number of themes relating to posthumanism 
are regularly explored, including the concept of ‘the other’, ‘the outside’, error, 
autonomy, life or the living, Man, as well as a certain degree of overlap across chapters 
of the fields, principles and terms outlined in this introduction. The recurrence of these 
themes is performed as part of the ongoing ‘mutation’ the thesis makes of itself, and 
in the following breakdown of each chapter I have tried to make more explicit the 
function each of these themes has on each underlying figure.  
Chapter One: The Phantom Zone 
What is it to relate to the world through technologies which co-constitute us, 
becoming the very means of remaking the world of which we are mutually part? 
Introducing the The Phantom Zone, taken from the mythos of the Superman franchise, 
this chapter figures this fictional account of a place beyond and outside space-time 
through the various media technologies which have depicted it in comic books, 
television, and film over the decades. To do this, the chapter introduces a key 
methodology of the thesis, realised through what I term, after Giorgio Agamben, a 
series of paradigmatic operations; conjoining fabulated and critical elements into a 
hybrid ensemble. This chapter introduces the paradigmatic method as a function of 
the very argument it sets in place, becoming the principle example of the methodology 
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it introduces for the remainder of the thesis. In order that The Phantom Zone retain its 
figural power as a space ‘beyond’ the confines of human reality, the fictional account 
of The Phantom Zone has chased and conjured up new ‘outsides’ just beyond the 
scope of human sensorial, physiological experience as a function of a media materiality 
‘to-come’. The Phantom Zone is then paradigmatic of the capacity of media 
technologies – and arguably all technologies in general – to enter into mutual 
reconstitution of the humans that look upon them for new means of representing 
themselves and their supposed posthuman antecedents. The account this chapter 
makes is rooted in a material understanding of media, and as such, a 
phenomenological account of the human bodies co-constituted by, and through, the 
material world of which the media and the human are both part. The chapter functions 
as a non-teleological media history concerned with how and where the ‘post’, the to-
come, of the posthuman is expressed. It sets up the paradigmatic relationship as a 
non-hierarchical form of mutual relationality, neither privileging human nor machinic 
autonomy. 
Chapter Two: Crusoe’s Island 
Is it possible for the figure of the ‘other’ – whether a colonised subject, or a person 
subjugated because of their gender, sexuality, ethnicity or otherwise – to be invited 
into/included within the definition of ‘the human’, without further subjugating or 
fetishizing their difference to a new universal? This chapter assesses Robinson Crusoe 
as one of the central figures of Enlightenment humanism, problematizing both the 
fictional account of Crusoe, and the critical, theoretical paradigms concerned with his 
story over the centuries. The chapter makes of Crusoe’s isolation on the island a series 
of paradigmatic operations, establishing a working definition of ‘Man’ through, and 
against, the power differentials established by the imperialist regimes of 
Enlightenment humanism, Western colonialist practices, as well as scientific principles 
emerging out of the development of the theory of thermodynamics. The chapter is 
concerned with the imperialising mechanism of an established position from which 
both the colonial subject and the principles of thermodynamics have been, and most 
importantly, continue to be, established. The chapter introduces a key 
reconceptualization of the term ‘mutation’, arguing how it needs to be understood in 
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critical posthumanist discourse and practice, which do not depend on a singular 
‘human’ perspective to be conceived. As with other chapters, this chapter undergoes 
these operations paradigmatically, through a critical writing which hybridises accounts 
of fiction with post-colonialist and feminist theory to refigure the entire ensemble. This 
chapter asks how posthumanism can be expressed so as not to repeat the tendency of 
humanism – and other imperialisms – to recast ‘the other’ as a mere explication of the 
subject position predetermined by the ‘norm’ it sits in opposition to. 
Chapter Three: The Thing 
How can theory be understood as a practice, one which continually mutates, 
countering itself as a monstrous event in the ‘world’ of which it is part? This chapter 
introduces the alien creature ‘the Thing’ as a figure of embodied heteropatriarchal 
monstrosity. Playing out various conceits of the Thing’s transformation of male flesh, 
the chapter is concerned with what a world completely reconstituted as ‘other’ might 
look and act like, and reflects the process of ‘othering’ back onto the men who fight to 
retain their individuality. The Thing is both a process that exposes the unthinkability of 
(human) life ‘in’ the world, whilst also addressing Rosi Braidotti’s call for forms of, 
what I term, Thingly theory that ‘learn to think about processes and not only 
concepts… [that] represent in-between zones and areas of experience or perception.’ 
66 The ability to perform self-effacement and subsequent renewal at every moment is 
the Thingly’s most enduring quality, a quality this chapter argues critical 
posthumanism must embrace if it is to out-manoeuvre the constant desire to remain 
individuated; to ‘become’ the monstrum of Man under refreshed circumstances. 
Building on the work of chapter two, the Thing performs how a critical posthumanist 
practice should function, one in which the ‘other’ is not merely explicated from an 
inside or outside, but is imminent with the mutation posthumanism undergoes.  
Chapter Four: The Collapse of the Hoard & Portfolio of Work / Conclusion 
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This chapter introduces Philip K. Dick’s concept of ‘kipple’ to establish a material 
relationality between the hoarder and their hoard at the moment of its collapse. The 
moment of collapse marks an apocalyptic becoming that ‘weaves all beings into the 
interdependent context of the manifest world.’ 67 Chapter four tackles the problem of 
a ‘flat ontology’ which emerges out of aligning the human with the vibrant material 
world. After staging the ‘collapse’ of the elements I paradigmatically assemble, chapter 
four segues into a conclusion by way of the portfolio of work: The 3D Additivist 
Manifesto. I argue that the Manifesto is a principle example of the kind of 
posthumanist practice I argue for in this thesis, in that it enters into the composition of 
its own collapse, engendering a ‘Thingly’ discourse as a fundamental part of a critical 
stance against itself. The dissertation text and portfolio of work make a whole which 
can be considered the thesis. The portfolio of work stands alone, but the work should 
also be considered as the ‘conclusion’ to the thesis. My portfolio of art work 
underscores the critical posthumanist practice my dissertation argues for, wavering on 
the boundary between a critical posthumanist practice and practice-based research. 
The 3D Additivist Manifesto is a critical posthumanist work in its own right, it is a call 
for others to submit posthumanist works to a larger collective, and it also stands as the 
culmination of the work of this thesis. The hybrid conclusion and portfolio of work 
explicates the claims of this thesis beyond mere reference to itself, setting the 
conditions for a range of critical posthumanist works created by a growing, mutating 
community of others. This outward gesture fulfils the requirements I set in place on 
deriving critical posthumanist forms of practice, in practice. Considered together, the 
dissertation and conclusion/portfolio of work position critical posthumanism as a 
hybrid ‘other’, my claim being that only through representing the human as and 
through an ongoing process (ontogenesis rather than ontology) can posthumanism re-
conceptualise the ‘norms’ deeply embedded within the fields it confronts. 
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Chapter One: The Phantom Zone 
“the world of visual objects can point to the invisible domain of  
pure being only by obsessively pointing to itself” 
Paraspace 
In a 1950 film serial entitled Atom Man vs Superman, television executive and evil 
genius Lex Luthor transmits Superman into a ghostly limbo he calls ‘The Empty Doom.’ 
68 Trapped in this Twilight Dimension 69 Superman's boundless powers are rendered 
useless, for although he can still see and hear the ‘real’ world his ability to interact 
with it has all but disappeared. Over the following decades The Empty Doom 
reappeared in the Superman mythos in various forms. Eventually dubbed ‘The 
Phantom Zone’ its back story was reworked substantially, until by the mid-1960s it had 
become a parallel dimension discovered by Superman's father, Jor El. In a comic book 
from 1982 Jor El demonstrates the potential of The Phantom Zone to the elders of 
Planet Krypton by temporarily using it on Lara, his partner and mother of their son, 
Superman: 
Lara is with us in this room, at this moment she hears every word we speak, 
sees everything we do. She is a wraith, unable to affect the material world in 
any manner. Nor can it affect her. In The Phantom Zone, she feels no hunger, 
requires no sleep – does not age. She can neither touch nor be touched. She 
can only think – as our criminals will be forced to contemplate the folly of their 
crimes. 70 
In comic after comic The Phantom Zone was used by Jor El to incarcerate Krypton's 
most unsavoury characters, sealing them off from the eventual destruction of their 
home world. In tales told across the mythos, the Super-evil inhabitants of The 
Phantom Zone would eventually find a way to escape, raining down their revenge onto 
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Superman’s adopted home: Earth. Beginning its life as an empty doom, The Phantom 
Zone was soon filled with terrors prolific enough to make even The Man of Steel fear 
its existence. 
Overseen by story editor Mortimer Weisinger and the unfortunately named artist 
Wayne Boring, the late 50s and early 60s were a strange time in the Superman 
universe. The comics suddenly became filled with mutated variants of kryptonite that 
gave Superman the head of an ant or the ability to read thoughts; with miniature 
Supermen arriving seconds before their namesake to save the day and steal his 
thunder; with vast universes of time caught fast in single comic book panels. It was an 
era of narrative excess wrapped by a tight, meticulous yet repressed aesthetic. In the 
words of Grant Morrison: 
Centuries of epic time could pass in a single caption. Synasties fell between 
balloons, and the sun could grow old and die on the turn of a page. It was a toy 
world, too, observed through the wrong end of a telescope. Boring made 
eternity tiny, capable of being held in two small hands. He reduced the infinite 
to fit in a cameo. 71 
The Phantom Zone is one of the less bizarre of the narrative concepts which emerged 
during what is now known as The Silver Age of D.C. Comics. It could be readily 
understood on a narrative level, and it had a figural potential as well, one that made 
conceivable the depths contained in Superman's vast, but ultimately manipulable 
universe. The Phantom Zone was usually portrayed on a television screen kept safe in 
one of the many rooms of the League of Justice headquarters. Staring into the screen, 
Superman and his Super companions observed past terrors it was their duty to protect 
the future from. The image on the League of Justice television inscribed back onto the 
material universe those bodies which had been banished from it. As this narrative 
expediency developed, The Phantom Zone was also wielded as a weapon and fired 
from a portable projection device – the cold, harsh infinity of The Empty Doom blazing 
into Superman's world long enough to ensnare any body caught in its rays.  
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The Phantom Zone was a device of containment, and in turn was itself contained. 
When it was portrayed as a surface, bodies were marked onto it. When it was used as 
a projection weapon The Phantom Zone enfolded the surface of the focal figure, 
transposing any bodily presence into an immediate absence. Exhibited via an image 
medium, The Phantom Zone also emphasised whatever image medium carried, 
sheltered and simultaneously exposed it to the reader or viewer. 72 Whether rendered 
as faux moving image or via projection, The Phantom Zone was offered up as a 
contradictory unity of a universe and its beyond. A gesture that made demonstrable 
the indeterminate membranes of the page and the screen, heightening the sense that 
every ‘outside’ is merely part of a larger heterarchy of worlds.  
In order to narrate an invisible, absent, other space, each medium must first produce 
in the viewer an awareness of a visible given space: both that which can be seen and 
that which makes possible the conditions of being seen. In comic books, the panel or 
frame can be considered as a constituent element of both kinds of space. Each page of 
a comic book is a frame which itself frames a series of frames, so that by altering each 
panel's size, bleed or aesthetic variety, narrative time and space can be made elastic. 
Weisinger and Boring's Phantom Zone took this mechanism further, behaving like a 
weaponised frame free to roam within the comic book universe. The Phantom Zone 
opened out onto the existence of invisible dimensions that language and comic book 
stills found difficult to express. It was a device that bled beyond the edge of the page, 
out into a world in which comic book space-times were experienced not in isolation, 
but in parallel with the onscreen space-times of the cinema and the television. As Scott 
Bukatman notes: 
Umberto Eco finds ‘a kind of oneiric climate’ in the way each Superman story 
existed utterly apart from all the others; nothing that happened in one had any 
effect on another. Scratch the surface even a little bit, and superhero comics 
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can be seen to exemplify Bachelard’s irreality function, the creative imagination 
that liberates us from the strictures and logics of the real. 73 
As the oneiric ‘dream-space’ 74 of The Phantom Zone developed, it sustained this 
‘irreal’ logic across the entire Superman mythos, providing the world some cohesion as 
it mutated from film serial to comic and back again, via radio drama, television and big-
budget cinema. It was a parallel space that had its own origin story, a story that was 
used to patch up and make somewhat sensible a universe written and re-written over 
many decades by a myriad of authors. The planet Krypton was destroyed not once, but 
countless times, in numerous ways over the decades. But always ‘before’ its 
destruction, the same stock of evil Super-villains were cast into The Phantom Zone, 
only to re-emerge later as a supernatural reminder of the failures of Superman’s home 
world. Banishment to The Phantom Zone did not mean bodily destruction. On the 
contrary. Characters that were merely a nuisance on Superman’s home world, 
Krypton, before it was destroyed, flickered and shimmered on the technologized 
surface as an intensified impression of mediated dread. 
Author Samuel Delany, writing about the cyberpunk literature of the 1980s, coined the 
term ‘paraspace’ to denote ‘an alternate space, sometimes largely mental, but always 
materially manifested, that sits beside the real world, and within which language is 
raised to an extraordinarily lyric level.’ 75 In the work of Weisinger and Boring, the 
lyricism of the descripted paraspace is heightened by a range of visual denouements 
concerned with the problem of representing this crisis of representation. A material, 
technological substrate is always called upon to found the ‘other’ space, and so, in 
accordance with Delany’s definition of paraspace, the rhetorical and visual Phantom 
Zone allegorises technology itself. 76 The comic book medium can herald the 
contradictory paraspace only by turning to the visual technologies that effectively 
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signify the comic’s own obsolescence; its outside; its death. In ordinary spaces 
‘characters are likely to forget... technological contouring, just as characters, 
enmeshed in ordinary language are likely to lose the sense of rhetoricity.’ 77 A 
successful paraspace obfuscates this, foregrounding technology fundamentally as a 
form of estrangement.  
According to Samuel Delany’s definition, the science fictional ‘cyberspace’ depicted in 
William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984) is paraspatial because it does not become 
subordinated to the plot of the novel. Furthermore, many other kinds of science 
fictional space are not paraspatial because they are merely instrumental, advancing 
the requirements of the plot for the plot’s sake. Characters need only pass through a 
Star Wars style hyperspace ‘in order to bridge great’ physical – and narrative – 
distances. 78 Hyperspace’s own ontological consistency is secondary to that of the 
space where the action unfolds, indeed, one need not describe what goes on ‘in’ 
hyperspace in any terms other than how it impacts on the superseding narrative. 
Counter to a hyperspace, paraspaces do not exist in a hierarchical relation to ‘real’ 
space, instead: 
the plot is shaped, as it were, to them. And inside them, the language itself 
undergoes changes – the language the writer uses to describe what happens in 
it is always shifted, is always rotated, is always aspiring toward the lyric. 79 
Gibson’s ‘lyrically heightened’ cyberspace offers its inhabitants ‘the only vantage point 
from which the world makes sense,’ 80 revealing ‘important elements in [themselves] 
to be profoundly undecidable.’ 81 As Steven Shaviro remarks, when confronting 
radically new technologies that ‘force us to redefine’ the most basic notions of what it 
is to be embodied, mortal human beings, ‘[a]esthetics precedes cognition… because 
we are dealing with practices that can only be comprehended through the new 
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categories that they themselves create.’ 82 As from the Greek root aisthanesthai – ‘to 
perceive’ – the aesthetic conditions through which The Phantom Zone have been 
translated therefore frame far more than a fictional void.  
Called upon to indicate an invisible, absolute outside – the unfathomable infinity of 
another, ghostly, parallel universe beside or beyond time and space – The Phantom 
Zone simultaneously reiterates the short-lived potency of (new) visual technologies in 
their capacity to mediate categories beyond human perception. On The Phantom 
Zone’s soon to be outmoded media surface flicker ‘ancestral ghosts haunt[ing] our 
machines.’ 83 Future foundations of thinking that humans do not yet have access to 
must be figured from within the paraspatial as a banished, repressed, technological 
instability. But that does not undermine the significance of what takes place ‘within’ 
the paraspace on the status of the humans that gaze upon it. Indeed, it is from 
confronting the depicted ‘absence’ that those humans come to comprehend their own 
ongoing instabilities. To maintain the potent ‘shock’ of the spectral Phantom Zone, its 
very incommunicability is what must be communicated by each fictional iteration. Like 
any archival technology, the spectre of this incommunicability is bound to the inherent 
iterability and repeatability of the medium via which The Phantom Zone is expressed. 
”Your disappearance is already here,“ The Phantom Zone calls out, ”a mode of 
perception that will eventually constitute the human remains absent to you now. By 
the time you become this, the you that you are now will long since be dead, and this 
absence, this outside, will have to become incommunicable in some other way.“ 84 
Paradigm 
Paraspatial relations demonstrate a mutual interchangeabilty – what I will refer to as 
‘fungibility’ 85 – that is not dependant on two hierarchically arranged spaces touching 
one another – or crucially of even being capable of touching one another. Nonetheless, 
                                                     
82 Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics (MIT Press, 2012), 15. 
83 Sean Cubitt, ‘Supernatural Futures: Theses on Digital Aesthetics’, in FutureNatural: Nature, Science, 
Culture, ed. George Robertson et al. (Psychology Press, 1996), 238. 
84 This ‘voice’ of The Phantom Zone should be considered a spectral taunt of what is yet to come in this 
chapter. 
85 I use fungible to mean mutually interchangeable elements with no hierarchy. 
 
36 
 
what takes place in one rewrites the other, and is in turn rewritten by that other. A 
truly ‘parallel’ space never intersects with its neighbour, as the two planes would 
stretch off alongside one another indefinitely. 86 For paraspatial relations it is perhaps 
better to consider the parallels as containing troubling, undecidable supplementary 
elements, or as functioning across fungible interrelations. As according to Samuel 
Delany: 
What goes on in one subverts the other; what goes on in the other subverts the 
one. They change their weights all the time, throughout their stories. So calling 
it a subspace – with the prefix's strong suggestion of subordination – is wrong. 
A paraspace, or even an alternative space, with its much weaker – and more 
problematic – question of position and troubling supplementarity, is more to 
the point. 87  
Paraspaces exemplify a paradigmatic relation with the ‘established’ spaces from which 
they are apparently conceived, viewed or accessed. A relation which, according to 
Giorgio Agamben’s definition of the paradigm, ‘makes intelligible a new ensemble, 
whose homogeneity it itself constitutes’. 88 Agamben goes on to explain the 
paradigmatic relation: 
[I]n the paradigm it is a matter not of corroborating a certain sensible likeness 
but of producing it by means of an operation. For this reason, the paradigm is 
never already given, but is generated and produced by ‘placing alongside,’ 
‘conjoining together,’ and above all by ‘showing’ and ‘exposing.’ 89 [my 
emphasis] 
A paradigm is generated by the placing of two or more elements alongside one 
another. A likeness between those elements exposes a corroborating principle that 
does not supersede, but rather re-constitutes the previously distinct elements within a 
new – homogeneous – intelligibility. The paradigmatic relations explored in this 
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chapter, through The Phantom Zone, almost always exemplify gaps and supplements 
in the mode of representing the figure of the posthuman. As I will show, exemplifying a 
‘gap’ in the capacity of a technological substrate to narratively or figuratively represent 
the human ‘to-come’, is precisely how the figure of the posthuman is most successfully 
produced. 
The best way to express the paradigmatic is to perform it, or to carry out the operation 
as an exemplification of the method itself. The paradigmatic elements of the 1950 film 
serial Atom Man vs Superman can be highlighted by examining director Spencer 
Gordon Bennet’s attempt to render Superman distinct from the world the film 
generates. Trapped in The Empty Doom, viewers see a ghostly para-Superman overlaid 
onto the film stock. He swoops down to save a policeman from being robbed, swiping 
at the air in his vain attempt to capture the assailant. The film reminds the viewer in 
episode after episode of Lex Luther’s role as a television executive, hell bent on 
controlling the masses through this new – apparently unworthy – technology. Here an 
‘operation’ carried from the film serial, through its technical limitations, to its apparent 
aesthetic realisation, ‘exposes’ the significance of The Phantom Zone (Empty Doom) as 
a metonym for the wider relationship between the embodied and the technological 
apparatus. Luther banishes Superman to a realm of images that the film serial 
struggles to frame as different from its own, and the infinite terror of a paraspace – a 
thing beyond space, time and human imaginings – is rendered at the not-too-distant 
‘cutting-edge’ of moving image reproduction.  
The Phantom Zone exemplifies a form of narrative continuity that does not result from 
sequences of events, leading from an originary instance and laid one after the other 
along a single, linear temporal axis. Rather, patterns of fungibility can be noted across 
and throughout the entire Superman mythos, across countless media forms and 
narrative iterations. The Phantom Zone functions to interlink these elements, just as it 
conjoins and conditions the parallel spaces inside and outside its frame. Significantly 
for this chapter, The Phantom Zone also exemplifies the paradigmatic method of which 
it is itself the principle example. To pursue its reiterations through the Superman 
mythos is not to trace a teleology of technological or media progress. Rather, the 
relation is one in which the spectral past is conjured up on the surface of fictional 
technologies that can only ever be reminiscent of the future. The wraith Super-villains 
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of Krypton’s past remain frozen as paraspatial images, heightened in their intensity by 
branding an idea of radical ‘newness’ onto the (fictional) interfaces that disclose them.  
For the purposes of this chapter, I wish not only to generate this paradigm of fictional 
technological estrangement, but also to exemplify the method by which the 
paradigmatic relationship is itself constituted. In this sense, each explication of The 
Phantom Zone not only produces the paradigm of value to the claims of this chapter, 
but exemplifies itself paradigmatically as the very principle of the paradigmatic 
method. Each element I operate on on one side of a paradigm – i.e. banishment to a 
paraspace; the demi-God-like facets of Superman – lead us to further operations on 
the ‘conjoining’ elements – e.g. the inherent instability of the cinematic image; the 
contradictory figure of ‘the posthuman’. This is both the subject of this text and the 
means of its constellation. The Phantom Zone is paradigmatic of the task this thesis 
attempts to render these gaps, making them intelligible without collapsing them back 
to poor, parochial stand-ins. R.L. Rutsky names this as a fundamental principle of 
posthuman becoming, a principle he terms as a ‘mutation in the conception of the 
human’: 
[I]f the concept of mutation is to be taken seriously, it cannot be reduced 
simply to a narrative of passage, shift, or break. Mutation implies a randomness 
that cannot be narrativized or, more precisely, that can be narrativized only by 
subordinating its unpredictability to a human perspective, as exemplified in 
fantasies of superhuman enhancement. 90 
The paradigmatic begins to eat itself with recourse to these posthuman potentialities 
by always maintaining the instability between what is and what is proffered to come. 
To simply refer to the inability, or difficulty, of representing the ‘post’ of the human 
will always collapse the posthuman back into a set of merely descriptive principles 
which cannot – by definition – represent the posthuman. The paradigmatic relation 
works such that neither related element becomes subordinate to the other. In the 
paradigmatic example of The Phantom Zone represents a relation between human and 
technology which does not subordinate one to the other, but poetically enters into the 
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mutual reconstitution of each by each. As Delany notes of writers such as Gibson, who 
heighten the lyricism of their work to describe what takes place inside a paraspace, the 
paradigm of the posthuman is best generated through a kind of lyrical, poetic 
assembling of elements alongside one another. In the following section I turn my close 
attention to the technology of cinema in order to address the corroborating shifts in 
the mode via which The Phantom Zone has been represented as a place beyond time 
and space. 
The Postnatural 
In a 1996 paper entitled Supernatural Futures: Theses on Digital Aesthetics Sean Cubitt 
marks the divide between what he calls the antinatural and the cybernatural – 
respectively, ‘the triumph of technology over nature, and the creation of artificial life’ 
91 – with a third, prescient supernatural force, that marks the ‘precocious existence of 
the future in the present.’ 92 These ‘postnatures’, Cubitt argues, are entangled in a 
complex relationship that rather than supersceding or sublating one another, ‘co-exist 
in the ways we think about the digital domain.’ 93 By invoking the digital as a kind of 
meta-order heterarchical space, Cubitt prefigures his own later work in The Cinema 
Effect (2004), a move which neatly echoes his own sentiments on the supernatural. 
Just as the moving-image haunts the comic book from within as the paraspatial 
absence that will eventually win out, so the digital domain conjures up the threat of 
the analogue filmic medium’s limits and inevitable death. 94 The digital is not the only 
‘outside’ of film, rather, film is an image technology that relies on absences built into 
the medium. In its most common rendition these absences arise almost as regularly as 
individual still frames, for within each second of screen time are packed 24 frames 
separated by 23 absences: 
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Nothing comes first in the beginnings of cinema: zero is the nonidentity out of 
which the image arises, the difference that surrounds, supports, and activates 
apparent motion, the instability of the unmoving still image between what it 
was and what it will become. 95 
This zone of instability between unmoving stills is where cinematic images reside. A 
literal space out of which figural movement is maintained; where liveliness becomes. 
Cinema carries within itself its own non-identity, and banishing media bodies such as 
Superman’s is tenable only with reference to this absence that makes possible the 
appearance of presence. The exposition of a paraspace from ‘within’ the technology of 
moving images acts to remind the viewer that although Superman may be Godly, his 
vision of the cosmos is inevitably distended and disjointed by the light speed 
movements his body must make through, around and (when he finds himself ‘in’ The 
Phantom Zone) above it. Superman is an ode to the antinatural, seeming to bend the 
laws of nature to his whim, but is paradigmatically a cybernatural being: the life force 
he exhibits is an extension of the technologies that make the depiction of that life 
possible. In that depiction Superman also attains supernatural status: he is a creature 
‘post’ the natural, given a ‘precocious’ presence by the clattering mechanisms of the 
cinematic apparatus. 
In the film serial Atom Man Vs Superman the Phantom, ‘wraith’ Superman appears to 
float free from the underlying image. Expanding Cubitt’s postnatural categories, 
Catherine Waldby designates the cybernatural as ‘any practice which uses the space of 
the virtual screen as a space of ”second nature” through a conflation of information 
with vitality.’ 96 At this stage in this paradigmatic operation ‘information’ can be 
thought of as relating to the unmoving, still images of cinema. The apparent indexical 
relationship between each film still and the event that unfolded in front of the lens; 
the apparent indexical relationship between the body that is banished to The Phantom 
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Zone, and the body that was caught by the projection weapon. 97 Vitality is movement, 
is life; the liveliness of the cinematic image. As Giorgio Abamben suggests, making use 
of Walter Benjamin’s conception of the ‘dialectical image… the life of images consists 
neither of simple immobility nor of the subsequent return to motion but of a pause 
highly charged with tension between the two.’ 98 The dialectical image is defined at 
the very moment of its stillstand, a middle zone of indifference that is ‘neither A nor 
B,’ but an immobile constellation between them ‘charged with tensions.’ 99 The 
cybernatural therefore marks a productive conflation between information and 
vitality, in that the tension produces the condition of artificiality. As on The Phantom 
Zone’s surface Superman beholds ‘an instant from the past in relation to the present,’ 
100 so viewers, through film, contemplate artificial images that emerge from similar 
thresholds of time, space, identity, and meaning that are made possible by the filmic 
stillstand.  
For Walter Benjamin, rather than allowing us to attain mastery over nature, 
technologies such as cinema give us a heightened awareness of our relationship with 
our own nature through the processes of ‘material complexification.’ 101 For Benjamin, 
this training is akin to the relationship between factory workers and the production 
line, where the ratchet of the gears and conveyors program the workers’ bodies, fusing 
them together into a larger assemblage. The successive frames of film, made to spool 
through the mechanism one after the other at imperceptible speed, create an illusion 
of temporal and spatial fluidity that shock us into an awareness of the complex 
relation between our psychic and physiological realities. As R.L. Rutsky lucidly explains, 
‘this scattered, interrupted filmic reception becomes part of the human sensorium or 
body… a body that is no longer distanced from – or entirely separate from – the 
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images and shocks that it comes into contact with.’ 102 Walter Benjamin believed the 
ability of the cinema screen to frame discontinuous times and spaces presented a 
profound ‘truth’ beyond the scope of individual experience. Delivered by 
cinema, Benjamin argued, mechanically disseminated images were actually fracturing 
the limits of perception, training ‘human beings in the apperceptions and reactions 
needed to deal with a vast apparatus whose role in their lives is expanding almost 
daily.’ 103 The cinema screen offered audiences who were confined to finite bodies that 
had never before experienced such juxtapositions an apparently shared experience of 
illuminated consciousness. Via the ‘shock-character’ of montage, cinema broke 
through the mirage of proletarian experience, nourishing an awareness of a ‘new 
nature’ that included, according to Susan Buck-Morss, ‘[n]ot just industrial technology, 
but the entire world of matter (including human beings) as it has been transformed by 
that technology.’ 104 
In The Work of Art Benjamin argues that these changes in the mode of exhibition 
figured a crisis of representation. Constructed of zooms, pan shots, close-ups, slow 
motion and other means of spatial and temporal montage, cinema delivers an optical 
unconscious that allows humans to ‘step-out’ of their ordinary apperceptions. A 
relationship of nonidentical, self-othering that is possible perhaps because the medium 
of film is a technology of stillstands, where frames do not touch, and are not capable 
of touching one another, but where images nonetheless spring up out of the divide. As 
Sean Cubitt remarks: 
The cinematic image is nonidentical in the sense that events inside the frame 
are not only incomplete in time but fragmentary as percepts, so that each 
event of projection evokes a new assemblage of focalized and marginal 
imagery. 105 
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Cinema exhibits the paraspatial through the succession of frames and absences, 
supplementary components that create the illusion of fungibility as the film reel spools 
through the mechanism. Gilles Deleuze, writing in the early 1980s, cites the ontological 
potential of cinema in this dividual quality of the cinematographic image. For Deleuze, 
the montage produced an image of time itself, giving ‘common standard of 
measurement to things which do not have one,’ framing ‘long shots of countryside and 
close-ups of the face, an astronomical system and a single drop of water’ 106 within a 
single perceptual apparatus. In an interview on the subject, Deleuze proudly declared, 
‘[w]hat I call Ideas are images that make one think… and in each case the thoughts are 
inseparable from the images; they are completely immanent to the images.’ 107 For 
Deleuze, cinema was less a technology than an evolving mode of machinic thought, 
what D.N. Rodowick calls, ‘a foundation of thinking in the form of time.’ 108 
Furthermore, according to Rodowick, ‘what film helps us to understand is how we 
think in and through time in a situation where time passes in us and divides us from 
ourselves.’ 109 The development of cinema can therefore be understood as a two way 
process between viewer acuity and technology’s capacity to mediate perception. Even 
before viewers expect narratives to emerge from the discontinuous stills made to reel 
before their eyes, cinema is a philosophical ‘Idea… a massive decentering of the 
psyche’ 110 in which subjectivity is made relative and dispersed ‘across a duration not 
wholly its own.’ 111 This emphasis on the temporal components of montage is crucial in 
understanding what Lev Manovich argues is the ‘dominant paradigm’ of filmic 
simulation, ‘creating an effect of presence in a virtual world by joining different images 
of time.’ 112  
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The relationship between the ‘virtual world’ of cinema and the ‘reality’ of the viewer is 
paradigmatic, in that, the moving image stands-in for reality, frames the perception of 
it, and in some sense supersedes the audience’s (mutual) comprehension in it. As 
Steven Shaviro emphasises, ‘[c]inema is at once a form of perception and a material 
perceived, a new way of encountering reality and a part of the reality thereby 
discovered.’ 113 The Ideas of cinema, to use Deleuze’s term, or the language of cinema, 
to return to Samuel Delany’s description of paraspace, is delivered at ‘an 
extraordinarily lyric level’ 114 in relation to lived, daily experience. But once that 
language becomes integrated into the ‘apperceptions’ of the cinema viewer it 
supplements daily experience, and as such renders a new ‘postnature’ out of the 
ongoing, mutually supplementary recombination of human and machine perception. 
To return to Deleuze, it is now ‘we who are internal to time, not the other way round.’ 
115  
Giles Deleuze considered philosophy itself as intrinsically cinematic, opening ‘us up to 
the inhuman and the superhuman durations (durations which are inferior or superior 
to our own), to go beyond the human condition.’ 116 The human eye is not capable of 
perceiving the gaps between filmic frames that create the image of time that exists in 
feedback with our embodied perceptions. The stillstand of cinema therefore offers us 
a paradigmatic condition for (re)thinking the tricky break between the human and the 
posthuman, without sublating the one to the other. To exhibit the absence of The 
Phantom Zone in cinema is to operate through the ‘inhuman and superhuman’ 
durations made possible by the technological substrate. But for our purposes The 
Phantom Zone is a paradigmatic mode for staging the paraspatial relation as one 
necessary for humans to consider the image of the posthuman at all. It is this 
confrontation with the human/posthuman relation that interests us here, and segues 
into the topics of further chapters.  
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In his original description of paraspace, Samuel Delany states that ‘conflicts that begin 
in ordinary space are resolved in [the] linguistically intensified paraspace.’ 117 The 
conflict staged (though perhaps not quite ‘resolved’) in this chapter is the 
supplementary relationship between those ‘outside’ the paraspace and the 
Superhuman wraiths it harbours. This supplementary, paradigmatic relation is alluded 
to by Geoffrey O’Brien in his book on the history of mass-market cinema, 
serendipitously titled The Phantom Empire: 
Upon the motion picture – the most alluring mechanism of the age of 
mechanical reproduction – would devolve the task of reconstructing the 
imaginary worlds it had helped to dismantle. 118 
To put it another way, as consensual reality became more and more a phantom image 
of the cinematic, so cinema became geared with the task of representing its own 
perceptual status as part of itself. Further scrutiny of the mechanisms of these 
paraspatial events is, again, not a pursuit of some teleological principle of media. 
Rather, this chapter is concerned with the mutual constitution of a ‘second nature’ in 
the cinematic and human assemblage, and the ways in which the posthuman spectre 
conjured up in that relation consists of a necessary self-estrangement that must 
remain estranging. From the Greek para: ‘to be beside,’ the paraspace is also therefore 
a paranoid space, where meaningful events are constituted that estrange or alienate 
the human figures that gaze upon them. The more inhuman the technological 
estrangement is, the more the humans who gaze upon it are reflected back in their 
paranoia. There is no escaping the ‘technological contouring’ of a paraspace, because 
there is no escaping the alienating, impossible feeling of being human that persists in 
the confrontation with such expansive, posthuman imaginaries. 119 For The Phantom 
Zone to continue functioning successfully as a space-time that ‘transcend[s] the 
descriptive’ qualities of Superman’s universe, its mode of representation has had to 
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change along with – or always just ahead of – the perceived ‘leading-edge’ of the 
medium (or media) through which the Superman mythos has been rendered. A waltz 
between the human and its posthuman estrangement formed in the ‘oscillation 
between self-formation and self-destruction.’ 120  
Post Production 
For his 1978 big-budget movie version of Superman 121 director Richard Donner – 
consciously or otherwise – cunningly translated The Phantom Zone into something 
resembling a weaponised cinema screen. In the last days of the planet Krypton, 
disbelief in the ruling elite’s capabilities fuels an uprising of civil disorder and 
disobedience. As the planet enters its final stages of existence, the leaders of Krypton 
bicker amongst themselves, delivering quick justice to any dissidents. In the film's 
opening sequence a screen-like crystal surface swoops down from the immense 
backdrop of space, rendering the despicable General Zod and his cronies two-
dimensional as it imprisons them. Moments later, viewers watch the planet Krypton 
explode into fragments, and The Phantom Zone audio-visual crystal carried into space 
on the resulting cosmic wind of change. 122 
In the documentary The Magic Behind the Cape, 123 bundled with the DVD release of 
Superman in 2001, an insight is given into the technical prowess behind this Phantom 
Zone produced for the cinema. The actors are made to simulate existential terror 
against the black void of the studio, pressed up against translucent, flesh-like 
membranes and physically rotated out of sync with the gaze of the camera. Rendering 
the faux two-dimensional surface of Richard Donner's Phantom Zone believable 
required all manner of human dimensions to be framed out of the final production. 
With its reliance on post-produced visual effects, Donner’s Phantom Zone sequence 
represents an intermediary stage in the gradual removal of sets, locations, and any 
                                                     
120 Colebrook, 229. 
121 Donner, Superman. 
122 The similarities here with Walter Benjamin’s Angel of History are many, but unlike Benjamin’s Angel, 
The Phantom Zone’s devilish inhabitants push helplessly at the membrane between realities, seeing 
neither the fragmented past nor the future towards which ‘progress’ propels them. 
123 Michael Thau, The Magic Behind the Cape, Film Documentary (Warner Bros., 2001). 
47 
 
'actual' spatial depths from the film production process. Today, actors address their 
humanity to green voids post-produced with CGI, and the indexical relationship once 
argued to exist between the film image and the events unfolding in front of the lens is 
now unquestioned in its absence. Just as The Phantom Zone of the comic book 
heralded televisual modes of attention, Richard Donner’s Phantom Zone marked a 
perceptual regime in which the cinematic image was increasingly sealed off from 
reality by synthetic visual effects.  
Cinema goers experience paraspace through special effects that continue to fracture 
the framing devices of the visual medium into more discrete elements. Individual film 
stills, that have a particular presence in the time and space of the editing suite and the 
projection reel, are enjoined by further abstracted, post-produced stills that are folded 
into place at increasing temporal distance from the moment the camera captures the 
image of the actor. The dispersal of frames and durations in cinema can be considered 
as constitutive of ‘the time-image’ – as Deleuze uses the term – which bleeds across 
and beyond the individual stills that constitute cinematic subjectivity. With post-
produced special effects, this dispersion carries the psyche further, and must be 
considered from the moment of filming through to the acts of cutting, editing, 
remixing and layering each of the images ‘that makes one think.’ 124 It is not 
coincidental that the noun ‘frame’ and the verb ‘to frame’ coincide so readily in 
cinema. Whether manifest as a physical, material gap between frames, as post-
produced, layered special effects, or as cuts, zooms, montage, sound-effects and other 
devices that refer to events happening ‘over time’ (diachrony) and/or ‘off-screen’ 
(synchrony), cinema is by definition an oneiric, paraspatial technology of framing. 
Framing is the language of the filmic, and framing is perhaps the largest philosophical 
idea that cinema has enabled in the perceptions of its audience, perceptions that 
Walter Benjamin argued were intimately bound up with the technologies of 
reproducibility. 125 The cinema frames the disparity of the individual, even as it frames 
the apparent collectivity of the audience. Framing brings discrete times and spaces 
together on the cinema screen, and in doing so makes its audience aware that they 
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themselves – as subjects; as bodies – are constituted of similarly disparate moments 
and materials. According to R.L. Rutsky: 
[N]ot only do the processes of technological reproduction, exemplified in 
cinema, enable images to be ‘torn apart,’ dispersed and exhibited in different 
places and times, they also seem to have a similar effect on human beings, on 
the mass public. 126 
And so the public begins to appreciate the phantasmagoria of itself through a 
paraspatial relation, such that ‘[t]he phenomenon, exposed in the medium of its 
knowability, shows the whole of which it is the paradigm.’ 127 For Benjamin, 
configuration is regarded as the primary condition of this knowability. Correspondence 
can be found not only in spatial but also temporal similitude between patterns. 128 As 
Benjamin scholar Howard Caygill argues:  
Space and time which feature as the givens of transcendental philosophy 
become modes of configuration which can be understood speculatively as 
providing the contours of but one among many possible configurations of 
experience. 129 
If time, perhaps the time humans suppose themselves to inhabit, is a movement from 
past to future, then cinema is a linear stream of stills made to fluctuate through the 
present. Passing out into a timeless dimension, cinema becomes a grid, of what Sean 
Cubitt calls ‘pixels’, 130 that any omniscient entity would regard simultaneously, as if on 
a flat plane. Because the omniscient God is co-present at all points in space-time, They 
could not experience the ‘nothing’ of cinema. The radical difference between frames 
can only be experienced by an entity whose identity is ‘incomplete and othered’ a 
mortal being who ‘can inhabit time rather than regard it.’ 131 The character Superman 
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is caught halfway between an ‘incomplete and othered’ being, and an omniscient, co-
present God. To again take advantage of the words of Gilles Deleuze: 
What is the superman? It is the formal compound of the forces within man and 
these new forces… As Foucault would say, the superman is much less than the 
disappearance of living men, and much more than a change of concept: it is the 
advent of a new form that is neither God nor man and which, it is hoped, will 
not prove worse than its two previous forms. 132 
Deleuze here is not talking specifically of the character of Superman, but rather the 
coming into being of a radically new concept of human being: ‘the folding in of the 
outside as the constitution of a veritable inner universe.’ 133 As according to Agamben, 
this middle-point between two terms is necessarily ambiguous, ‘an unresolved 
oscillation between estrangement and a new event of meaning… A dialectic whose 
mechanism is not logical… but analogical and paradigmatic.’ 134 The Phantom Zone 
performs this mutation of concept: the correlation between visual technologies and 
their capacity to render the posthuman is itself (at) a stillstand.  
Image Things 
Observing the relation between representation and visibility, Jens Andermann 
observes that: 
truth, the truth of representation, crucially depends on the clear-cut separation 
between the visible and the invisible, the non-objectness of the latter. Truth is 
the effect of what we could call the catachretic nature of visuality, the way in 
which the world of visual objects can point to the invisible domain of pure 
being only by obsessively pointing to itself. 135 
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Catachresis can be considered as a kind of ‘improper metaphor’ 136 which, according to 
Vivian Sobchack, ‘functions neither as metaphor nor as figure,’ 137 and furthermore, 
quoting Richard Shiff, ‘accomplishes precisely this: it applies a figurative sense as a 
literal one, while yet retaining the look or feel of figurality.’ 138 Sobchack marks this as 
a fundamental characteristic of cinema, the way in which images on screen parallel the 
qualities of the cinematic apparatus itself, without recourse to mere illustration. Long 
have Superhero bodies been fetishized, fantasized, mutated and manipulated in 
narratives that ‘incorporate (incarnate) aggrandizement and anxiety, mastery, and 
trauma.’ 139 Richard Donner’s version of Superman can be read catachretically for the 
systems of image reproduction into which corporeal bodies have been increasingly cut, 
folded, and (re)dispersed, signalling the ongoing mutation in the material conditioning 
of the human. The cinema screen is a paraspatial divide onto which bodies made of 
light, shone through acetate or stored on silicon crystals frame oneiric visions of our all 
too parochial human fantasies and fetishes. Donner’s cinematic Phantom Zone 
allegorises the endlessly transformative posthuman body evoked by each new 
assemblage of percepts. A body not simply ‘affected by moving images, but a truly 
cinematic body in which, or through which, images move.’ 140 
In Walter Benjamin’s era, actors performed in front of the movie camera, the 
microphone, and ‘the glare of arc lamps’, all the while attempting to ‘preserve [their] 
humanity in the face of the apparatus.’ 141 Today, actors react to causes generated 
beyond the studio space, the director's commands, or the camera's gaze. They twist 
and recoil from transformations still to occur in post-production. In a sense, actors 
behave as bodies that are already images as they regard the green absence of each 
chroma key studio backdrop. In a 1995 lecture on the film work of Guy Debord, Giorgio 
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Agamben posited mankind as ‘an animal who is interested in images when he has 
recognised them as such… after he has recognised that they are not real beings.’ 142 
Today, almost 20 years later, Agamben’s comment on the ‘real’ status of the image 
needs amending. Images collaged from the mediascape serve – to hijack the words of 
Scott Bukatman – ‘as the partial and fragmented representations that they are.’ 143 
Whereas actors’ autonomy has been increasingly called into question by oneiric 
technical tricks, their images have attained a new level of malleability in the move 
from production to post-production and onwards to the era of digital images copied, 
remixed and dispersed with vertiginous intensity. Writing in 2010 about the music 
video for David Bowie’s Heroes (1977) Hito Steyerl explores this shift through the 
formulation of a new kind of Hero:  
[T]he clip shows Bowie singing to himself from three simultaneous angles, with 
layering techniques tripling his image; not only has Bowie’s hero been cloned, 
he has above all become an image that can be reproduced, multiplied, and 
copied, a riff that travels effortlessly through commercials for almost anything, 
a fetish that packages Bowie’s glamorous and unfazed postgender look as 
product. Bowie’s hero is no longer a larger-than-life human being carrying out 
exemplary and sensational exploits, and he is not even an icon, but a shiny 
product endowed with posthuman beauty: an image and nothing but an image. 
144 
I consider the Hero becoming ‘an image and nothing but an image’ 145 as something 
other than a metaphoric turn, something other, moreover, than Donna Haraway’s 
vision for the cyborg, identified in her Manifesto for Cyborgs as ‘a fiction mapping our 
social and bodily reality.’ 146 Hito Steyerl points out the literal truth performed in the 
                                                     
142 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Difference and Repetition: On Guy Debord’s Films’, in Art and the Moving Image: 
A Critical Reader, ed. Tanya Leighton and Charles Esche (London : New York: Tate Publishing in 
association with Afterall, 2007), 314. 
143 Bukatman, Terminal Identity, 40. [my emphasis] 
144 Hito Steyerl, ‘Hito Steyerl, A Thing Like You and Me / e-Flux’, no. 15 (April 2010), http://www.e-
flux.com/journal/view/134. 
145 Steyerl. 
146 Haraway, ‘A Manifesto For Cyborgs: Science, Technology, And Socialist Feminism In The 1980s’, 8. 
[my emphasis] 
 
52 
 
multiplication of David Bowie’s body: his body is an ‘improper metaphor’ for the image 
that it actually is. The video for Heroes splices and dices contiguous images of Bowie, 
producing a unique paraspatial configuration of catachretic associations, rather than a 
continuous narrative about Bowie the hero. Viewers aspire no longer to the glory of 
popstars or actors who perform their mastery to camera, rather their Heroes’ images 
are the Things that matter. Utterly freed from the shackle of apparent indexicality, 
disseminated and dispersed at light speed, the ‘image Thing’ seems considerably more 
liberated than the ‘illusory totality’ 147 of the (Super)hero. An image Thing, Steyerl goes 
on, whose ‘immortality no longer originates in the strength to survive all possible 
ordeals, but from its ability to be xeroxed, recycled, and reincarnated.’ 148 For as 
Bowie’s cybernatural identity is enabled by the moving image apparatus, so that 
apparatus is itself exposed as a material substrate allowing the boundless malleability 
of the images it propagates. Totality is an illusion humans confer on their own 
subjectivity. Images are considerably more liberated. To contend with Agamben’s 
definition, and using the work of Steyerl, I claim images as real beings precisely 
because they can be recognised as images. 
With similar appeals to post-gender, post-icon, posthuman identities, Dara Birnbaum’s 
celebrated video work Technology/Transformation: Wonderwoman, produced in the 
same year as Richard Donner’s Superman (1978), and a year after the video for David 
Bowie’s Heroes (1977), manipulates its protagonist at the material strata that makes 
possible the image of her corporeal body. Through cutting and folding videotape in 
physical space, Birnbaum effects a mastery over the moment Wonderwoman 
transforms between her mild-mannered and Superhuman forms, celebrating that 
moment with loops that wind meaningfully upon themselves. As Sarah Kember and 
Joanna Zylinska note in Life After New Media (2012), one of the principle ways in which 
humans engage with matter is through the cut: 
Cutting reality into smaller pieces – with our eyes, our bodily and cognitive 
apparatus, our language, our memory, and our technologies – we enact 
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separation and relationality as the two dominant aspects of material 
locatedness in time. 149 
The videotape mechanism, ‘cut-up’ and exposed by Birnbaum in order to create the 
work, relinquishes the ‘image of woman as spectacle’ 150 transforming the mythical 
Amazon Goddess from object of sexual desire to an image Thing; an exemplification of 
the process of transformation itself. 151 Kember and Zylinska, reflecting on both 
Deleuze and Bergson’s work on cinema, mark out this relationship between ‘flux and 
stasis, between duration and the cut’ 152 as ontologically significant in regards human 
‘becoming-with-the-world as well as becoming-different-from-the-world’. 153 Like the 
dialectic gap Kember and Zylinska indicate, Wonder Woman’s transformation becomes 
– through Birnbaum’s acts of cutting, splicing and repeating – paradigmatic of the 
relationship it shares with the image medium that makes that transformation possible. 
As with our second nature – of what Mark Hansen calls ‘the mechanosphere’ 154 – 
these correspondences are material, and sensuous. Our receptivity to images is 
physiological, our bodies are shared, and our memories – dependent on the ‘alien 
rhythms’ 155 of montage – have become intricately woven into the machine as images. 
In turn, as noted by Arthur Kroker, ‘the image machine is haunted by memories of the 
body,’ 156 bodies that mutually depend on the fidelity, malleability and repeatability of 
the cut-up medium for their existence. In regards film and videotape it is physical, 
embodied space in which cuts are enacted, but other substrates, such as audiotape or 
the printed page, are also worth examining.  
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In The Electronic Revolution (1970), published 25 years after he murdered his wife Joan 
Vollmer, William Burroughs asked his readers to ‘consider the human body and 
nervous system as unscrambling devices.’ 157 Cutting into media broadcasts, 
newspaper headlines or snippets of audio caught fast in the magnetised tape of his 
reel-to-reel, Burroughs sought to expose the language virus to a dose of its own 
terrible potential. When Burroughs tells a parable where a man’s asshole begins to 
talk, all literal and figural possibilities of the image should be considered. To 
unquestioningly communicate using a language whose meaning was dictated by 
corporate bodies, political bodies or media conglomerates was, for Burroughs, 
tantamount to living as the embodiment of pure excretion. Writing on the cuts that 
constitute William Burrough’s text Naked Lunch (1959), N. Katherine Hayles argues 
that the textual corpus and the narrative cybernetic body are shown to be 
correspondent in the act of cutting, for they are each ‘as artificial, heterogeneous’ 158 
and malleable as each other. Each specific arrangement of a text on a page is but one 
configuration amongst many, a spatial relationship that is paradigmatic of the 
posthuman identities Burroughs’ writing describes. In regards a cut-up text work, reel-
to-reel audio tape, film, or videotape it is physical, human space in which cuts are 
enacted and new constellations arranged. A space that shares the same sensuous 
reality of the human body, even if the timescales depicted by various media are 
significantly distinct in their breadth and scales. But whereas cuts and recombinations 
in physical media lend themselves to the spatial scale of the human body, and rely on 
what Sean Cubitt called the perceptions of ‘mortal’ beings who ‘can inhabit time’, 159 
with the cuts that constitute digital images, the human body is arguably no longer a 
sufficient framing device. A new paradigm may be necessary when humans aspire to 
the freedom of Heroes constituted of ethereal waves and distributed at the speed of 
light as a plethora of discrete numerical abstractions. 
At the end of his book, Cinema II: The Time-Image (1985), Giles Deleuze warned of a 
forthcoming ‘New Electronic Automatism’, which threatened ‘to dissolve the cinematic 
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inspiration of dreams and mystery into the neutral zone of random information bits 
indiscriminately traversing the wired membrane of gawkers and insomniacs.’ 160 In this 
apocalypse for cinema, and the philosophical Idea it enabled, the random bits of 
electronic transmission and dissemination would remain as discrete fragments. 
Representations distributed through a thousand channels, emerging as what Deleuze 
calls ‘a table of information, an opaque surface on which are inscribed “data”’ in which 
‘a new image can arise from any point whatsoever of the preceding image.’ 161 For 
Deleuze, the cinematographic image had always been dividual, but whereas filmic 
modes of practice brought a paradigmatic line of flight to the irrational cuts between 
incommensurate images, 162 with the numerical, or digital image, there was – Deleuze 
argued – only the promise of more complexification, dictated by the logic of silicon 
chips, abstract interfaces, and network protocols. Although Deleuze warned that the 
numerical image may mark the death of the Time Image manifest in cinema, he also 
expressed hope that from that death could come transformation. A ‘will to art’ that 
must ascertain the fundamental qualities of the digital image, its absolute 
constituents, in order to build a new image of our time.  
The Datamosh 
The General Zod ‘warning’ trailer 163 for Man of Steel (2013) was distributed on 
YouTube as an online ‘viral’ event in the months leading up to the release of the latest 
addition to the Superman film franchise. The trailer begins with a static rift that breaks 
into a visual and audial disarrangement of the phrase, ‘You are not alone’. General 
Zod's masked face materializes, blended with a pixelated, glitchy digital miasma: a 
painterly 3D effect that highlights the inherent ‘otherness' of where his message 
originates. The aesthetic is unsettling in as much as it is recognisable. Viewers of this 
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'viral' dispatch have no doubt as to the narrative meaning of what they are witnessing, 
namely, a datastream compressed and distributed from a paraspace by an entity very 
much unlike us. The uncanny significance of the trailer stems more from how 
very normal the digital miasma feels; from how apprehensible the barrage of noise 
is. Indeed, it is ‘other', but its otherness is also somehow routine, foreseeable. The 
pathogen here is not Zod's message, it is digital technology itself. The glitched 
aesthetic of the trailer expresses a habitual sensibility, heralding the passing of digital 
materiality into the background of viewer awareness. Its mode of dissemination, via 
the Trojan Horse of YouTube, just as unvisible in the shift between ‘online’ and ‘offline’ 
modes of communication. The surface of this Phantom Zone very much interfaces with 
the material world, even if the message it impresses upon its viewers aches to be 
composed of an alien, postnatural substance. 
In her essay, In Defense of the Poor Image (2009), Hito Steyerl explicitly confronts the 
aesthetic conditions of digital images, defining an image's value by its ease of flow and 
distribution. The highly compressed, deteriorated ‘poor image… mocks the promises of 
digital technology. Not only is it often degraded to the point of being just a hurried 
blur, one even doubts whether it could be called an image at all.’ 164 As Olga Goriunova 
and Alexei Shulgin have suggested, ‘computers do not have a recognizable or 
significant aesthetic that possesses some kind of authenticity and completeness,’ 165 
but that very lack is not an absence, for the digital is anything it can be made to stand 
in for. The aesthetic affect of digital images thus stands in metonymically for the 
networks they navigate and the means by which those networks are exposed. Hito 
Steyerl offers the poor image as a figure of dissemination itself. The human capacity to 
wallow in images is bolstered by those images being dilapidated and bruised, forced 
through bandwidths far slighter than their display potential would seem to allow, but 
arriving with a clarity dictated by abundance and accessibility, rather than authority 
and verisimilitude. In Walter Benjamin's The Work of Art, mechanization and mass 
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production began at the ‘original’ and worked to distance the commodity from the 
form captured by each iteration. For Benjamin, copies must be distinguished from the 
aura of the original, but as poor images propagate, not only does their aura remain 
intact, 166 that aura is actually heightened in a system of ever poorer repetitions and 
redisplays. The internet exemplifies its own democratic potential because every bit 
and byte are treated equally by the TCP I IP protocols that drive its traffic. Thus, slick 
HD advertisements fall short of the potential of lossy JPEG spam to be seen, and 
government propaganda is drowned out by the shout of viral videos. Messages from 
the perverted environs of culture make their way to our eyes and ears more readily as 
wrecked and ruined impressions, their signifiers flickering with each act of 
recompression, copy, and display. Digital image Things are not valuable because they 
act like the memory of an origin, instead it is their transience, the increased likelihood 
they will be copied and re-disseminated in ever-mutating forms, which marks them out 
as significant. Copies, being copied, forever copying, exert an unruly behaviour that 
exposes the material world. Coming towards viewers soars a new mode of machinic 
thought; a Phantom Zone of unparalleled depth and aesthetic complexity that opens 
onto a new new – digital – nature.  
Much contemporary digital video does the work of representation via a series of 
algorithms called codecs that compress the amount of information needed to produce 
a moving image. Rather than store the information necessary to re-present each pixel 
in each frame of the video, compression codecs such as the DivX or Mp4 standard 
begin by establishing a set of ‘key’ frames throughout the length of a video. Each key 
frame is a more or less fully constituted and encoded image, and acts as the template 
for the sequence proceeding it. Compression codecs analyse each ‘key’ frame, and 
through a process of copying, moving, and repeating fractal segments determine the 
minimum of information necessary to transpose each of the proceeding ‘reference’ 
frames. In this way the information necessary to encode an image can be vastly 
reduced. Rather than the individual frames of film, each as visually rich and total as the 
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last, in a codec only the difference between frames need be encoded, making each 
frame ‘more like a set of movement instructions than an image.’ 167  
Using the right piece of video software, or by manipulating video codecs with a hex 
editor, a collapse between key (image) and reference (difference) frames can be 
enacted at the status of encoding. By a method of cutting, repeating or glitching of key 
and reference frames, visual representations can be made to blend into one another; 
space becomes difference and time becomes image. Present instructions for 
movement are co-opted by past image events, moulding a novel future presence. This 
process – known as ‘datamoshing’ – has its origins in glitch art, a form of media 
manipulation predicated on those minute moments when an image or sound cracks 
open, catachretically indicating some aspect of its coding mechanism in a flurry of 
aesthetic disarray. Datamoshing breaks the notion of separation between image and 
movement, indeed, it creates a new merging reference between the two. In the 
datamoshed video, image and movement are blended, even paraspatially 
interchanged for one another. Each unique image in the datamoshed video becomes a 
token of movement within a frame that extends far beyond the isolated/compressed 
moment. In a datamoshed video an image from frame 16 of the video can leak, corrupt 
and interface with an image in frame 187. What's more, the movement information 
exchanged between contiguous frames can jump ahead, can blend with a previous 
image or be removed completely. To the datamosher, time and image become a 
delicious paint pallet expressing in motion. To the datamosher, a series of frames, or 
even a series of videos, can be tempted to break their boundaries and merge, forging 
brand new steps in a whirling datamosh-dance. 
In a period of work stretching between 2005 and 2007 artist Takeshi Murata made a 
series of high definition digital video works augmenting the datamoshing method with 
more ‘standard’ software editing techniques. In an early sequence of Murata’s 2007 
work Untitled (Pink Dot), action hero Rambo fires his rocket launcher ‘towards’ the 
screen, but as the resulting explosion rips across the frames his image is datamoshed 
into the fire, leaving a remnant of his figure to merge with the resulting miasma. 
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Murata makes extensive use of image layers in his production process to establish the 
pulsating pink dot at the heart of the video. As it unfolds, the pink dot exists as a layer 
behind the Rambo footage, and then it becomes datamoshed into the footage, and 
then it is a layer in front of it, and then the datamosh tears into it and the dot become 
part of the Rambo miasma, and then the dot comes back as a surface again. 
Throughout this interplay, the pink dot throbs in time with an ascending pulsing 
soundtrack, always drawing viewer attention back to the centre of the frame. The pink 
dot, surely a stand-in for the viewing, perceiving subject, is blended, symbiotically, 
with the datamoshed miasma. The viewer still perceives the figure of Rambo, of the 
flash of the machine-gun pulse, but as the explosive fire tears through the pink dot it is 
as if their mind has been melted through too. In Untitled (Pink Dot) the Hero of Rambo 
appears infinitely flat in comparison to the depth and multidimensionality of the 
pulsating pink dot. Rambo is nothing but an image; an image Thing that transcends 
traditional figurations of time and space, achieving material equality with the digital 
miasma that exposes it as such. Murata’s work is as much ‘about’ its own production 
process as any story it is capable of telling. It stands in catachrestically for the 
posthuman realm its cut-paste/moshed digital assemblage makes possible.  
Marking digital video's move from convenient means of dissemination, to palpable 
aesthetic (i.e. perceptual) and cultural influence, the datamoshing technique was 
homaged/appropriated for the production of the General Zod trailer in 2013. In the 
actual movie, Man of Steel, 168 Zod's video message is transposed in its entirety to the 
fictional planet Earth. The viral component of its movement around the web is entirely 
absent: its apparent digitality, therefore, remains somewhat intact, but only as a mere 
surface appearance. This time around, the message shattering through The Phantom 
Zone is completely devoid of affective power: it frames nothing but its existence as a 
narrative device. The filmmakers rely on a series of ‘taking over the world’ tropes to 
set the stage for General Zod's Earth-shaking proclamation. TV sets in stereotypical, 
‘exotic’, locales flicker into life, all broadcasting the same thing. Electronic billboards 
light up, loudspeakers blare, mobile phones rumble in pockets, indeed, all imaging 
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technologies suddenly take on the role of a prostheses for a single, datamoshed 
stream. In one – particularly sincere and ridiculous – moment of the montage, a 
faceless character clutches a Nokia brand smartphone in the centre of shot and 
exclaims, ’It's coming through the RSS feeds!’ This surface, this Phantom Zone, frames 
an apparatus far vaster than a glitchy image; an apparatus apparently impossible to 
represent through the medium of cinema. The surface appearance of the original viral 
trailer distributed on YouTube is only a small component of what constitutes the image 
Thing it conveys, and thus, of the image it frames of this time. Digital materiality shows 
itself via poorly compressed video clips arriving through streams of overburdened 
bandwidth. An understanding of what constitutes a digital image must then, according 
to Mark Hansen, ‘be extended to encompass the entire process by which information 
is made perceivable.’ 169 
In its cinematic and comic book guises, The Phantom Zone was depicted as ‘a kind of 
membrane dividing yet connecting two worlds that are alien to and also dependent 
upon each other’. 170 The success of the datamoshed trailer as a YouTube viral 
expression comes from the way it broke through that interface, its visual surface 
bubbling with a new kind of viral, digital, potential that encompasses and exposes the 
material engaged in its delivery. As a cinematographic subjects, I have an integral 
understanding of the materiality of film. Although I know that the frames of cinema 
are separate I still crave the illusion of movement, and the image of time, they create. 
The ‘viral' datamoshed message corrupts this separation between image and 
movement, the viewer and the viewed. Not only does General Zod seem to push out, 
from inside the numerical image, it is as if the viewing subject, enraptured by the 
digital event, has been consumed by its flow. The datamoshed Phantom Zone trailer 
takes the one last, brave, step beyond the apparatus of image production. Not only is 
the studio, the actor, and even the slick appeal of CGI framed out of its mode of 
delivery, arriving through a network that holds its viewers complicit, this Phantom 
Zone frames the 'real' world in its entirety, making even the fictional world it appeals 
to devoid of affective impact.  
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Once again, The Phantom Zone highlights the material mode of its delivery with 
uncanny exactness. Unlike Deleuze’s ‘time-image’, formed by a linear stream of film 
frames made to flicker before our eyes, the digital event is at a stillstand in multiple 
dimensions allowing ‘a new image [to] arise from any point whatsoever of the 
preceding image.’ 171 Humans are now surrounded by images that supersede mere 
visual appearance: they generate and are generated by every Thing the digital touches, 
including the digital, ever emerging, posthuman subject: the most important 
component of General Zod's 'viral' diffusion. The digital Phantom Zone extends 
to both sides of the flickering screen. 
In chapter one, the representation of The Phantom Zone as a kind of future anterior 
for an outside ‘to-come’, is shown to be undermined by digitally constituted media 
technologies. As a singular modality with material consequences that stretch out from 
users, through screens, machines, and infrastructure, the separation human beings 
make of themselves and their technologies breaks down, framing an entire world – 
paradoxically – as its own outside. In chapter two, the figural Crusoe constantly self-
affirms a world with no outside, or makes of any outside which creeps into his world 
something already always about himself. By mapping this imperialist tendency 
paradigmatically onto the theory of mutation which came out of the science of 
thermodynamics, chapter two figures the autonomy of mutation as equally 
problematic as Crusoe’s auto appellative ordering of his island Empire. Mutation – as 
posthumanist theory employs it – must be imminent in the material processes of 
which ‘we’ are mutually co-constitutive.  
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Chapter Two: Crusoe’s Island 
“what is important is not the other side of the frontier,  
it is that both sides are already posited, composed in one and the same world” 
Auto-Appellation  
Daniel Defoe’s 1719 novel Robinson Crusoe centres on the shipwreck and isolation of 
its protagonist on a deserted isle – perhaps the most famous island in all of fiction. The 
life Crusoe knew beyond this shore was fashioned by ships sent to conquer a New 
World, and a political will fostered on slavery and imperial demand. In writing about 
his experiences Crusoe orders his journal, not by the passing of time, but by the 
objects produced in the division of his own labour. A tame herd of goats bred from 
wild, a musket and gunpowder rescued from the skeleton of his ship, sheaves of wheat 
fashioned into bread, and a shelter hand carved from rock with all the trappings of a 
King’s castle. As the objects proliferate and are organised, Crusoe shapes his own 
Empire. A microcosm of the domineering civilisation his island removes him from, but 
with a crucial difference: no potential for exchange with the outside. 
Crusoe structures the tedium of island life by gathering and fabricating items that exist 
solely for his own use: 172 
I had never handled a tool in my life, and yet in time, by labour, application, 
and contrivance, I found at last that I wanted nothing but I could have made it, 
especially if I had had tools. 173 
The island is an unmarked paradise, and it will take a store of labour, gleaned from the 
ship that brought him here to inscribe it with the marks of (Western) culture and 
civilisation. Crusoe’s appraisal of his labour, his apparent ingenuity and steadfast 
ability to make good any situation which faces him, lend the novel a register that 
                                                     
172 Susan Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection 
(Duke University Press, 1993), 15. 
173 Daniel Defoe, The Life and Adventures of Robinson Crusoe (1808) (Gutenberg.org, 2004), 68–69, 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/12623/12623-h/12623-h.htm. 
63 
 
privileges Crusoe’s cultural mastery over the ‘natural’, disorderly island. But as 
Stephen Hymer suggests, this self-appraisal thinly veils a much less noble, but much 
more telling imperialist truth: 
The key factors in Robinson Crusoe’s survival and prosperity on his island in the 
sun are not his ingenuity and resourcefulness but the pleasant climate and the 
large store of embodied labor he starts out with. 174 
Using ink salvaged from the shipwreck, Crusoe’s obsessively produced stock-books are 
a record of his own subjectivity. Indeed, the very instantiation of his labour in the form 
of writing establishes the kind of subject Crusoe becomes. As Eric Jager attests, ‘in 
writing (considered as both act and product), [Crusoe] achieves a durable self-
representation requiring him to face himself and his situation.’ 175 Crusoe’s inner 
narrative rebounds on pages of paper, enclosed in vellum, so that each system is 
transfigured by another: the island prison, surrounded by an impenetrable ocean; the 
apparent limit of the physical book, ‘where reading takes place in time across marks 
which have been made in space’; 176 the central narrative of the protagonist, mirroring 
a self-similar inner-narrative of the reader. Defined as what Mikhail Bakhtin called, ‘the 
polyphonic novel,’ Robinson Crusoe is composed of many distinct or overlapping 
registers, which ‘could have been realised only in the capitalist epoch.’ 177 The 
autobiographical ‘I’ of Crusoe’s diary is bolstered and given form by the log book 
entries that are nestled inside it, speaking to 18th century readers whose own 
experience was rooted in the scriptural economy necessary for capitalism to function. 
Bakhtin’s ‘polyphonic’ is therefore not a particularly diverse array of subjectivities, 
experiences and different modes of being, for every voice is bound to a universalised 
scriptural subject produced by the creation and assimilation of writing: 
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These novelistic or iconic fictions tell us that there is no entry or exit for writing, 
but only the endless play of its fabrications… Writing has become an 
“inscription island”… a laborious dream, occupied by this “impossible” to which 
or about which it thinks it “speaks.” 178 
According to Michel Certeau, writing is, ‘the concrete activity that consists in 
constructing, on its own blank space (un espace propre) – the page – a text that has 
power over the exteriority from which it has first been isolated.’ 179 This exteriority is 
predetermined by the goods Crusoe salvages from the shipwreck, including a Bible, 
blank stock-book and ink through which he converses with his religious and imperial 
heritage, 180 and – as this chapter will show – begins to inscribe the origin myth of his 
own sovereignty. The scriptural enterprise utilises the accumulated past in order to 
mould the ‘alterity of the universe’ 181 into a new world – a ‘scriptural island’ that one 
‘can edit, revise, interpret, and reinterpret’. 182 Jacques Derrida refers to ‘the book 
entitled Robinson Crusoe’ 183 itself as an object which affects an erasure of its origins. 
The book ‘speaks of [Crusoe] without him, according to a trick that constructs and 
leaves in the world an artefact that speaks all alone and calls the author by his name, 
renames him in his renown without the author needing to do anything else, not even 
be alive.’ 184 In this way Crusoe fabricates artefacts throughout the book, the grandest 
of which may be the island itself, bearing the inscriptions and products of his labour 
and as such becoming indistinguishable from its imperial master throughout time and 
space.  
For Michel Certeau, the island of the blank page is the definitive metaphor of 
capitalism, both at the level of the subject in relation to the given world, and also ‘at 
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the level of an entire society seeking to constitute itself as a blank page with respect to 
the past.’ 185 Science and industry ‘are governed by the same schema,’ as is the 
modern city: 186 apparently closed systems which master their outside in a kind of self-
naming, or auto-appellation. What Karl Marx called ‘Ursprüngliche Akkumulation,’ the 
‘original’ or ‘primary’ accumulation of labour expropriated from agricultural, enslaved, 
and colonised people, became the given of a blank page upon which capitalism wrote 
its own origin myth. 187 This auto-appellation is intimate to an understanding of how 
imperialism functions: a mastering of (often distant) territories not just through the 
expropriation of labour, property, and land, but also of social, sacred, and embodied 
realities. With knowing irony, Marx called the era of primary accumulation ‘the rosy 
dawn of the era of capitalist production,’ 188 referring to the division of labour 
instigated by capitalism being hidden by its own historical myth. To overcome the 
division of the world intrinsic to capitalism, Marx argued, labour itself must be made 
whole again, a situation he played out by retelling the tale of Crusoe’s shipwreck and 
isolation on the island. Marx’s capitalist subject finds origin and can only be 
maintained through material activity, but ‘without someone else’s labour to control, 
the capitalist’s value system vanished.’ 189 Unable to exchange the products of his 
labour with others, Marx argues, Crusoe’s individuality as a producer is the self-same 
individuality he exhibits; a perfect metaphor for a new kind of subject which could only 
emerge, Marx believed, once the frenzy of capitalism had dissipated.  
For Karl Marx, the intimacy Crusoe achieves with his own labour – the material 
conditions of his being in the world – determines the type of consciousness he has. 
Daniel Defoe constituted Crusoe allegorically, figuring through him a fable of 
objectification and ‘exploitation… by the bourgeoisie’ in the protocapitalist Britain of 
which Defoe was a subject. 190 According to Marx’s reading, the eventual imposition of 
‘others’ on Crusoe’s island marks the coming back into being of the capitalist subject, 
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played out most distinctly through the paradigmatic arrival of Friday, the ‘noble 
savage’ who Crusoe ‘saves’ from cannibalisation and eventually tutors to become the 
subject of his Empire. Before any such ‘other’ is written into Crusoe’s pristine isle, the 
signs of auto appellation – of the rendering blank of the page of Crusoe as subject, and 
island as Empire – are already apparent. To take an example of this that cuts through 
the entire novel, Crusoe considers the tobacco he cultivates and smokes on the island 
as one of the most significant indications of his enlightened status. But tobacco is a 
product of what Walter Mignolo refers to as ‘colonial semiosis,’ in which a particular – 
often exterior – cultural sign is dissolved into a ‘wider’ imperial sphere. 191 Tobacco is a 
New World resource, fashioned into a mark of Old World en(lighten/title)ment. 
Tobacco, along with resources like coffee from Ethiopia, and tea from China, were 
considered ‘stimulants of the senses as well as the spirits’ by those Westerners who 
ingested them. 192 Whilst Europeans considered tobacco a symbol of a deviant, or 
ungodly behaviour for the ‘savages’ who originally cultivated it, once it had been 
subjugated, tobacco came to symbolise the increasingly enlightened status of its 
European consumers. The imperialist is ambivalent in relation to the exterior – 
whether it is geographic, cultural, temporal, embodied or otherwise – so long as what 
is received is contrived into a product and named as an artefact of self-mastery. Daniel 
Defoe wrote tobacco into Crusoe’s island paradise, and Crusoe cultivates and smokes 
it. This mastering of the sign of tobacco effectively erases its origin, having already 
always been integrated into the imperial sphere as product and indication of 
(Western) civilisation. Being but a small token of the impact of colonisation on the 
native peoples from whom it was expropriated, tobacco – and other ‘stimulants’ like it 
– nonetheless gesture to the complex social, material and spiritual web which 
imperialist intercourse infects.  
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In his critical text Summa Technologiae (1964) 193 science fiction writer Stanislaw Lem 
makes an analogy of Robinson Crusoe in his examination of the negative ‘aspects of 
progress.’ 194 Lem argues that Robinson’s ability to maintain a relative stasis to his 
island life comes from ‘his having been “preprogrammed” on the level of information 
by his civilization, before he became an “isolated element” on a desert island.’ 195 As I 
have shown, Crusoe’s island exists in a relatively homeostatic state, and the exterior 
needed to maintain this apparent stasis is a temporal and temporary one, and can 
always be traced back to the tools and labour that came with Robinson on his ship, 
were deposited there by previous colonists – unnamed and unknown – were 
appropriated from others, by Crusoe, during his time on the island, or ambivalently 
written into being by Daniel Defoe. 196 Accordingly, homeostasis – whether of any 
singularity from the size of an Empire down to that of a microorganism – is defined by 
Stanislaw Lem as ‘an increase in insensitivity to an external perturbation,’ as well as, 
‘an increase in sensitivity to an inner perturbation, that is, one caused by a disturbance 
within the system (organism) itself.’ 197 For Lem, Crusoe’s island homeostasis is a 
perfect analogy for the runaway capacities of technological civilisation. Crusoe’s 
shipwreck caused his isolation, but brought with it the seeds of his survival. Neither 
one of these should be considered more implicated in his predicament. Crusoe’s ship 
smashed its hull to pieces on the rocks of this deserted isle, but its cargo was plentiful, 
and its sole survivor driven enough, to carry that violence onto its shores. As long as 
the cycles of his labour managed to maintain the momentum of the shipwreck 
Robinson will survive, but in turn, his destiny is entangled with that store of civilisation 
so closely, that should any one of his labours fail the outcome will be his end.  
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In Luis Buñuel’s 1954 film version of Defoe’s tale 198 Robinson Crusoe’s assertion of his 
sovereignty, through his constant battle with the processes of entropy, is given comic 
expression. Swathed in gentlemanly attire, made exclusively from the hide of his goats, 
Crusoe spends entire scenes flâneuring along the island’s outer perimeter. With his 
goat-skin hat and goat-skin umbrella held aloft, Robinson may very well be marking 
the circumference of imperial Great Britain. Repeating his efforts over many years, 
Crusoe’s catalogue of objects tends to oblivion. Goat-skin umbrellas and hats bleach in 
the sun and need to be replaced; cycles of spring and winter demand that Crusoe set 
aside a portion of his crop for replanting each year. In one frantic section of the novel, 
Crusoe’s hand-carved fortress crumbles inwards upon its single inhabitant. In another, 
Crusoe’s ink begins to run out, ‘the last of which he “eek’d out with water a little and a 
little, till it was so pale it scarce left any appearance of black upon the paper.”’ 199 
Entropy constantly nips at Crusoe’s heels, however resourceful and intense a state his 
labour reaches. Only two outcomes appear available for Crusoe’s continued existence 
on the island: retain the homeostasis of his Empire through the continual subjugation 
of peoples, animals, or resources from ‘outside’ the system, or accept that a 
fundamental change in the nature of the system – and therefore of Crusoe himself – 
must take place. 
The Shipwreck of Enlightenment 
Daniel Defoe’s novel offers us a rich catalogue of boundary moments in which 
Robinson Crusoe is forced to confront the principles which define him and, as is the 
imperialist way, thus rewrite the conditions of his self-same world. In each, Crusoe’s 
own homeostasis is perturbed. In each, Crusoe redresses the balance of an ‘inside’ and 
an ‘outside’ through a new act of ambivalence. The first of these events I will address 
is Crusoe’s ‘shipwreck’, a common paradigmatic figure which Hans Blumenberg studies 
at length in his book Shipwreck with Spectator: Paradigm of a Metaphor for Existence 
(1997). Describing the ‘cosmic exoticism’ of writers such as Fontenelle, for whom 
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shipwreck was a metaphor of perspective, Blumenberg compounds the event of 
shipwreck with the Enlightenment principle: 
that reason might be better represented on the moon or in another alien world 
than it is on earth and by men. The imagination was then bound to be 
continually stimulated to picture how the earth would be seen from the point 
of view of such a higher rationality. 200 
In this paradigm, Crusoe’s shipwreck and isolation stands in for the apparently God-like 
perspective of rational man. As Susan Stewart suggests in her reading of Robinson 
Crusoe, ‘in allegory the vision of the reader is larger than the vision of the text; the 
reader dreams to an excess, to an overabundance.’ 201 Stewart’s use of the metaphor 
of vision is not insignificant when reading and interpreting the shipwreck Crusoe 
suffers. The master of the island may take control of his own passions, whilst able to 
view from afar the ‘unenlightened’ as if they were objects to be studied, 
contemplated, and ultimately subjugated in lieu of his reason. But so too is the 
scriptural subject – the reader and purveyor of Crusoe’s island – determined to 
entertain their vision as if of a Godly nature. One may think of this ‘separation’ as 
referred to by Donna Haraway as ‘the god-trick’: ‘a faceless, bodiless and contextless 
knower,’ conjured by scientific epistemology, ‘who can detach her/himself from the 
world and the objects of study, and then from an aloof and elevated position of 
surveillance can produce objective knowledge.’ 202 The ‘blank slate’ of Crusoe’s island 
and its subsequent ‘conquering’ by its single, shipwrecked subject, has often been 
considered as the myth of origins for the modern, enlightened man. 203 As Michel 
Certeau suggests in his examination of Crusoe:  
A new king comes into being: the individual subject, an imperceptible master. 
The privilege of being himself the god that was formerly “separated” from his 
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creation and defined by a genesis is transferred to the man shaped by 
enlightened culture. 204 
Crusoe’s shipwreck performs the separation not only between the deity previously 
considered to hold that ‘privilege’ and the activities of the new master – Man – but 
also another separation that enlightened man must go through every time his mastery 
is applied. As Karen Armstrong remarks, a myth ‘is an event that – in some sense – 
happened once, but which also happens all the time.’ 205 The myth of enlightenment is 
that of separation between the chaotic ocean and the Man that sails his boat aloft it; 
between the ‘natural’ island and the Man contriving tools to ‘world’ it: 
Like Crusoe cast adrift upon an indifferent nature by an oppressive society and 
an absentee Creator, enlightened Man, the only subject in a universe of 
objects, contemplates himself in the majestic solitude of his sovereign 
rationality, and broods upon the new world that awaits its creation. 206 
The myth of the enlightened man is separated from history, from heritage, from 
nature and God alike through the very act of exerting mastery over those ‘exterior’ 
forces. In a sense, enlightened man conjures his own myth as the wonder that justifies, 
and acts as, the pivot of his own existence. Like God Himself, before whom there was 
no time, nor space, enlightened Man looks only to Himself as his own singularity, 
emerging from a point which will forever be considered His beginning. As with 
Crusoe’s ‘rebirth’ on the lonely island, the myth can be traced through another of Hans 
Blumenberg’s shipwreck paradigms, back to when seafaring was considered a 
transgressive act likely to result in the admonishment of those who undertook it: 
What drives man to cross the high seas is at the same time the crossing of the 
boundary of his natural needs… it will be one of the fundamental ideas of the 
Enlightenment that shipwreck is the price that must be paid in order to avoid 
that complete calming of the sea winds that would make all worldly commerce 
impossible. 207 
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Here the boundary of human knowledge is surrounded by a perilous ocean that is at 
one and the same time a metonym for nature and a metaphor for the capacity to sail 
beyond it. The logic of imperialism is determined at the meeting point of these 
shipwreck paradigms. The appeal, above all, to a rationality exercised by masters of 
their own perspective; men (as, according to the myth, it is always men) able to take 
advantage of the wild riches of nature because their own passions have been 
envisaged and ordered, but not tamed entirely. Exteriority becomes the means for 
further growth of the enlightened, since from the exterior is derived the disorder 
which enlightened Man is in the process of fashioning into order. This myth of self-
mastery is a form of knowledge that begins and ends with the subject at its perceived 
centre. Those subjects who lie outside become objects of fascination, disgust, 
dehumanisation, ambivalence and – ultimately – subjugation. Their passions are raw, 
and primal: their exteriority must be maintained in order for the enlightened Man to 
grow and progress. But as another infamous sequence in Robinson Crusoe suggests, 
for the enlightened, exteriority itself is always also transfigured into something about 
the subject who perceives it as such: 
It happened one day about noon, going towards my boat, I was exceedingly 
surprised with the print of a man's naked foot on the shore, which was very 
plain to be seen in the sand: I stood like one thunder-struck, or as if I had seen 
an apparition; I listened, I looked round me, I could hear nothing, nor see any 
thing; I went up to a rising ground to look farther: I went up the shore, and 
down the shore, but it was all one, I could see no other impression but that 
one; I went to it again to see if there were any more, and to observe if it might 
not be my fancy; but there was no room for that, for there was exactly the very 
print of a foot, toes, heel, and every part of a foot; how it came thither I knew 
not, nor could in the least imagine. 208 
The events which follow the appearance, and discovery, of the footprint on Crusoe’s 
island are allegorically rich. In Luis Buñuel’s 1954 film adaptation, Robinson Crusoe’s 
regular flâneurie of the island perimeter is interrupted by the exceptional appearance 
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of a footprint in the sand. Robinson’s feet are at first framed in time with his pace 
along the beach. Suddenly Robinson ceases, yet the frame quickens, moving off on his 
predicted path, it passes over a footprint marked in the sand and stops. The abstract 
frame of pristine, crystal sand is figuratively and aesthetically marked by a dark 
impression, which passes into the centre of the frame as it passes into the perception 
of the viewer and, as the rising musical score signifies, Robinson’s awareness as well. 
Mise en scene obfuscates Robinson and the viewers’ revelations into a single jolt of 
the improbable. Sequence has been broken. A boundary breached once is a boundary 
breached forever: someone other than Robinson has imprinted the island. The non-
repeatability of the footprint as event, its isolation and the collapse of the closure it 
indicates all constituent its improbability. A long boundary between wet and dry sand 
snakes along the beach, indicating another closure. Buñuel shows the single footprint 
facing outwards, towards the impenetrable ocean. The interrupted flow of cinematic 
sequence highlights, what is for the novel, its hapax legomenon. 209 
Metaphoric thunder strikes Crusoe; the ground beneath his feet loses all feeling. 
Having become attuned to, what Susan Stewart calls, ‘the signature of change’ 210 on 
the island, Crusoe and his self-same Empire now splinter. For Crusoe, a true 
‘overabundance’ would be an outside to his Kingdom, would be a figure entering and 
exiting his Empire without leaving a proper vestige of that sequence of events. Like 
Robinson, the reader must traipse to a higher vantage point in order to comprehend 
the consequence of that mark. As Crusoe narrates the excess he flees to the mountain 
top, and traipses wither and thither along the shore, seeing ‘no other impression but 
that one.’ 211  
What Buñuel chooses to show in a breach of cinematic sequence, the novel plays out 
in Crusoe’s inner narrative. The footprint is alone, none before it and certainly none 
after it. A human being would be indicated by a sequential lineage of footsteps, 
leading from the past (from the island’s interior), to the future (and the harsh ocean 
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beyond). Crusoe, the sovereign subject of all he purveys, ponders on that mark over 
the space of the island, and also through time. In the novel it is only on the third day 
that he re-visits the site to compare his own foot with the print. The footprint is an 
inscription in a substrate which is heterogeneous 212 and unable to sustain the marks it 
bears for long. The liquid, entropic flow of sand should be at odds with the marks 
inscribed in Robinson’s log books, for instance. Ink evokes the surface of the page, but 
it is within the tempered fibres of the paper that it remains. ‘To inscribe is,’ Marcos 
Novak suggests, ‘to write in, to place the mark of one thing within the fabric of 
another.’ 213 But against all odds the footprint is still there on the beach after three 
days and nights, a footprint Crusoe now admits is definitely not his own. At first, the 
footprint terrifies him as the mark of the outsider. Soon though, realising what this 
outsider might mean for the totality of his Empire, Robinson begins the process of 
pulling the mark inside his conceptions: 
Sometimes I fancied it must be the devil; and reason joined in with me upon 
this supposition. For how should any other thing in human shape come into the 
place? Where was the vessel that brought them? What marks were there 
of any other footsteps? And how was it possible a man should come there? 214 
Crusoe’s distancing of the mark from the human ‘others’ necessary to make it has 
allegorical significance. The narrative performs Haraway’s ‘god-trick’, an inherently 
imperialistic act, centring the entire island, and even the possibility of its outside, back 
onto Crusoe himself. Crusoe’s sovereignty indicates a demon, for how should such a 
single mark of the human come to stand alone? A demon must have chosen to play 
tricks on him. It is, Robinson exclaims, the only reasonable explanation. In his short 
study of demonology, Eugene Thacker recognises that the figure of the demon should 
be contemplated as inseparable from the process of demonization: 
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Here the political aspects of the demon, as the stand-in for a threatening 
Other, come to the fore. The demon becomes a name, a placeholder, a 
designation that signifies at once that which is outside and, because of this, 
that which is a threat. 215 
Although conjured from supernatural lore, the demon is more of ‘an anthropological 
motif,’ 216 demonstrating how Crusoe relates – ontologically – to the world he inhabits. 
Even as Crusoe moves on from his supposition, the figure of the demon remains 
allegorically significant for a long swathe of the novel. For in the years following the 
discovery of that footprint, Robinson concentrates solely on activities designed to 
avoid the invasion, possession, and metamorphosis of his island – all happenings 
associated with demonic influence. The first indication of an ‘outside’ to Crusoe’s 
Kingdom marks the beginning of the novel’s fortress phase. ‘Possessed by fear,’ 
Robinson first decides to ‘turn all my tame cattle into the woods, that the enemy might 
not find them… to [dig] up my two corn fields… [and] demolish my bower and tent,’ 217 
so that no vestige of his labour nor habitation remain. But instead of casting his efforts 
to the wind, Robinson doubles down, building stronger fortifications, planting muskets 
in defensive position in readiness for attack, and secreting his flock of goats deeper in 
a wooden glade to protect them from observation. The sovereign Crusoe constitutes 
himself by continually recomposing the island. Crusoe’s fear comes from the 
realisation that the outsiders may have been here all along, that in all the 20 years of 
his isolation those ‘savages of the main land’ 218 may have visited his island time and 
again. It is not an outside ‘other’ that disturbs and reorganises Crusoe’s Kingdom. A 
more perverse logic is at work here, and once again the way Crusoe restructures his 
imperial order from the inside out is paradigmatically suggestive. 
An outsider must have caused the footprint, but Crusoe is only capable of reading in 
the mark something about himself. The evocation of a demon, then, is Crusoe’s way of 
re-totalising his Empire, of removing the ‘other’ from his self-subjective identification 
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with the island; of converting ‘other’ equivocally into a condition of same. According to 
Crusoe, the demon of his imagination fully intended to confuse and terrify him. To be 
‘rationally’ possible, the footprint without sequence cannot be a mere haptic trace. In 
this proclamation, not only does Crusoe solve the problem of a singular footprint, he 
also returns his island to its absolute state of closure. The membrane has not been 
breached, just as long as Crusoe believes the footprint was placed there deliberately 
by a creature whose very existence revolves around the island’s single inhabitant. 
The shipwreck and footprint are significant events in the constitution of Crusoe, 
providing resting points from which to assess the allegorical composition of this 
chapter. They mark points at which Crusoe’s subject is reset; the making blank of the 
island page onto which Crusoe apparently writes himself anew. To return to a 
canonical text such as Robinson Crusoe is to reflect on what the text meant in its 
original context, whilst also grappling with the many contexts and critical frameworks 
in which it has been located since. In the case of Defoe’s novel, it is the figure of 
‘enlightened Man’ which interests me, and provides this chapter with its paradigmatic 
backbone. Defoe’s account of Crusoe’s shipwreck, isolation, and eventual ascension to 
master of his island provides a framework, not only for considering the historical-
critical inauguration of ‘the’ figure of enlightened Man, but also of the myth of Man as 
it continues to be inaugurated and critiqued. That is, to re-present Robinson Crusoe 
through what Susan Stewart calls an allegorical excess and overabundance 219 is to re-
consider the mythic event of enlightened Man – to repeat Karen Armstrong’s insight – 
in its happening once, but also in its happening at all times. 220 
Whether this text explicitly references Crusoe the novel, Crusoe the character, Crusoe 
the figure of enlightened Man, or Crusoe as imperialist figure, the questions raised are 
intended to operate paradigmatically across the entire ensemble. As with other 
chapters in this thesis, the ‘work’ of this chapter is intentionally distributed across 
several sites of disposal. I am interested not only in each particular case I address, but 
more significantly – and, returning briefly to Giorgio Agamben’s definition of the 
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paradigm – in the general rule which each case makes intelligible. 221 Crusoe is 
therefore both the particular and general case of enlightened Man, and the work 
undertaken to expose how Crusoe’s imperialistic logic plays out in his island Empire is 
intended to affectan understanding of both the particular case and the general case of 
which Crusoe is the principle example. This general/particular practice, as Rosi 
Braidotti argues in her book The Posthuman, is inherent to what constitutes ‘the 
human of Humanism’ in the first place, ‘transposing a specific mode of being human 
into a generalized standard.’ 222 The figure of Crusoe is therefore also paradigmatic of 
the process of normalcy and normativity which has comprised, and continues to 
comprise, the human of Humanism, at least since the era of peak imperialist rule and 
Euro-centric Enlightenment in the midst of which Daniel Defoe wrote the eponymous 
novel Robinson Crusoe. If other chapters in this thesis deal more explicitly with the 
trouble of understanding or representing the transformation of ‘human’ into 
‘posthuman’ in an ongoing deferral of the (post)human-to-come, then this chapter 
deals in Crusoe’s maintenance of his own singularity, even and especially when its 
outside is transformed by Crusoe and his exploits into the singularity of which he is 
constitutive.  
To pause and unpack the relation Crusoe exhibits to his own imperialist sovereignty is, 
therefore, of wider significance to the figure of ‘Man’ I wish to examine. Since the 
majority of this chapter deals in allusions to various modes of imperialism, it is now 
necessary to reflect on the rich swathe of discourse on colonialism, post-colonialism 
and the ongoing necessity of decolonisation. This may seem to allow a momentary 
‘stepping out’ of the discourse, but, as I wish to show further, and in line with 
Haraway’s insistence of ‘situated’ knowledge, 223 I also want to maintain and return to 
my own position and pivot as writer and thinker of these thoughts; as a subject 
grappling with, and engaged in co-producing, the perturbed and perturbing space of a 
critical posthumanist writing. 
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Colonial Equivocation 
In her 1999 book Decolonizing Methodologies, Linda Tuhiwai Smith separates 
imperialism into four strands before emphasising that these strands are tightly 
interwoven. They are: 
(1) imperialism as economic expansion; (2) imperialism as the subjugation of 
'others'; (3) imperialism as an idea or spirit with many forms of realization; and 
(4) imperialism as a discursive field of knowledge. 224 
Whereas Smith’s first three forms of imperialism, related to the promotion of ‘science, 
economic expansion and political practices… have reflected a view from the imperial 
centre of Europe’ 225 the fourth use of the term Smith outlines was generated by 
writers who themselves experienced colonisation from ‘within’. As ‘a discursive field of 
knowledge,’ imperialism recognises that dehumanisation has often been disguised by 
the ideologies of humanism and liberalism, enterprises founded on an appeal to a 
universal human subject that – as I showed earlier – is itself merely a product of auto 
appellative, imperialist ordering. Smith argues that the stance towards the universal 
subject should itself be considered a form of colonialist oppression, compelling 
colonised people to ‘define what it means to be human’ through ‘the language, the 
economy, social relations and the cultural life’ imposed on them by imperialist systems 
of control and order. 226 Smith argues, after Ashis Nandy, that the ‘code’ or ‘grammar’ 
of imperialism is the very principle of order: 
The principles of order provides the underlying connection between such 
things as the nature of imperial social relations, the activities of Western 
science, the establishment of trade; the appropriation of sovereignty; the 
establishment of law. 
To return to the example of colonial semiosis signified by Crusoe’s tobacco, the first 
three levels of Smith’s definition of imperialism are inherent as principles of order on 
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the part of the colonialist force. (1) To expand and conquer a New World. (2) To 
appropriate its resources and put its people to work maintaining those resources on 
behalf of the Empire. (3) To claim that not only does tobacco engender a spiritual 
clarity in those who smoke it, but that this kind of self-mastery was previously 
unavailable to the recently ‘civilised’ natives who now slave over its cultivation. Many 
such examples can thus be made to clarify the fourth definition of imperialism not as 
one of order, but of disorder on the bodies, cultures and spirits of the colonised. As 
Frantz Fanon expressed it, speaking of Europe’s crimes against subjugated colonised 
and enslaved people, ‘the most heinous of which have been committed at the very 
heart of man.’ 227 
‘Colonial domination,’ according to Homi K. Bhabha, ‘is achieved through a process of 
disavowal that denies the chaos of its intervention;’ 228 the authority of the colonisers 
being preserved through teleological narratives that reduce all difference, and even 
the possibility of difference, to an expression of predetermined order. Bhabha turns to 
the imposition of ‘the book’ in his exposition, a scenario he traces through various 
examples of colonialist literature, in which the introduction of the book upon colonised 
subjects, again and again, is told as a myth of an origin that transcends both the 
colonised and the colonisers:  
The discovery of the book installs the signs of appropriate representation: the 
word of God, truth, art creates the conditions for the beginning, a practice of 
history and narrative. But the institution of the Word in the wilds is also an 
Entstellung, a process of displacement, distortion, dislocation, repetitions – the 
dazzling light of literature sheds only areas of darkness. 229 
Both the book and tobacco are ‘signs taken for wonders.’ 230 Tobacco being taken and 
rewritten into the ongoing project of a higher order enlightenment, and the book 
being imposed in the name of a meta order that governs all things (for instance, God, 
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the monarch, country, capitalism etc.). The book, tobacco, and any number of 
imperialising surfaces or cultural signs, stabilise ‘the agonistic colonial space’. 231  
Through the work of Linda Tuhiwai Smith and Homi K. Bhabha it becomes apparent 
that Karl Marx’s identification of capitalism’s origins in Ursprüngliche Akkumulation is 
at odds with his attempt to read Robinson Crusoe as a figure of post-capitalist 
enlightenment. The problem of an exteriority from which capitalism plunders before 
resetting the myth of itself is similar in kind to the colonial semiosis through which 
Defoe continually renews Crusoe’s status as Emperor of his isle. But this is also the 
logic which Marx himself undertakes, showing an ambivalence to the plethora of 
‘outsides’ which Crusoe brought with him in the first place. Every tool Crusoe fishes 
out of the shipwreck, every animal he captures and domesticates, and most 
significantly for this chapter, any ostensible person whose footprint marks the island, 
becomes nothing more than a writing mechanism in the further appellation of Crusoe; 
in the further ordering of his imperialist principality. The island Empire has its 
geographic, cultural, and spiritual boundaries breached several times during 
Robinson’s adventures, but in each of these instances a ‘wonder’ is conjured that – to 
repeat a phrase Bhabha echoes from Michel Foucault – has the effect of a finalisation, 
relative to the objective 232 of Crusoe’s self-mastery. Bhabha establishes this mode of 
mastery as one that functions in spite of – and often, in league with – ambivalence. 
Donna Haraway, along with theorists such as Rosi Braidotti, use the term ‘imperialism’ 
to refer to the way in which certain fields of knowledge and modes of representation 
separate themselves like colonial Empires. This mode of separation can be seen in 
Marx’s affirmation of a particular post-capitalist subject, ambivalent to its constitution 
in the capitalist system he wishes to critique. It is also inherent in Michel De Certeau’s 
annotation of the scriptural enterprise, through which capitalism formulates itself as a 
blank page that maintains absolute power and separation from history. It becomes 
apparent through what Walter Mignolo terms ‘colonial semiosis’, where external 
cultural signs are dissolved into the origin myth of the imperialist. And so too I note it 
in the self-affirming myth of enlightened man, underscored through both the 
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metonym and metaphor of shipwreck. J. K. Noyes turns to Jean-Francois Lyotard to 
clarify this renewed, ongoing, ambivalent separation as it relates to the inscription of 
enlightenment knowledge, stating that: 
every limit is constantly transgressed… what is important is not the other side 
of the frontier, it is that both sides are already posited, composed in one and 
the same world. 233 
Again, the imperialist is ambivalent in regards the relation between the two sites of 
semiosis. The conjured wonder, according to Bhabha, ‘regulates the ambivalence 
between origin and displacement, discipline and desire, mimesis and repetition.’ 234 In 
other words, the imperialist is ambivalent to historical contingencies, to the role of 
power as an ordering or disordering mechanism and, most importantly for this 
chapter, to the positioning of the colonised as ‘other’. What matters to the imperialist 
is that there is one ‘world’ and that only they and their ilk have the capability to see it 
as objectively so. Their ambivalence should not be considered a passive undertaking. 
The imperialist engages in a fixing of their world; of the pivot of themself around which 
that world moves. Bhabha writes of ‘two sites of disposal’ between the coloniser and 
the colonised. The frame of reference (disposal) and a mental inclination (disposition) 
is governed via an act of what Bhabha terms ‘equivocation’, allowing ‘neither an 
equivalence of the two sites of disposal nor their division as self/other, subject/object.’ 
235 From the Latin ‘aequivocare’, for ‘called by the same name’, to equivocate is to use 
language ambiguously to conceal a truth or avoid commitment to a single meaning. In 
regards the relation Bhabha outlines, equivocation is a mechanism of governance 
inherent in the relation between the coloniser (the addresser) and the colonised (the 
addressee). Equivocation maintains external energies such as ‘otherness’ as merely a 
condition of the mastery of the coloniser, rendering the ‘colonised as a fixed reality 
which is at once an “other” and yet entirely knowable and visible.’ 236 The primary 
operation of imperialism is the maintenance of its central figure, and in this instance, 
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Robinson Crusoe exhibits the paradigmatic case of which he himself is the principle 
example. Robinson Crusoe embodies Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s first three orders of 
imperialism in his manufacture, maintenance and protection of his island Empire, but 
so too must all Empires be ruled over with an imperialist sensibility. Crusoe again and 
again enacts a governance of the outside relative to the objective of maintaining the 
singularity of himself.  
As with the event of the shipwreck and the footprint in the sand, the configuration of 
‘other’ not only stands out against the particular background of the novel Robinson 
Crusoe, but has also been read as an event significant enough to mark the appearance 
of the Modern era; of Modern Man. In the final passages of The Order of Things (1966) 
Michel Foucault proclaimed that, ‘man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps 
nearing its end.’ 237 Treating the whole of mankind figuratively in this way, Foucault 
describes a human ‘face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea’ being erased as the 
ground of Modern thought finally crumbles. 238 Positioning himself between the 
Modern ‘appearance’ of the figure of Man, and its proposed end, Foucault’s 
metaphors are underpinned by material, entropic imagery that echo those which 
govern so many of Crusoe’s island misadventures. The entropic imagery highlighted in 
this chapter, starting with Crusoe’s shipwreck and leading to the eventual imposition 
of ‘others’ onto his pristine isle, has up until now been conjured in the abstract: the 
storms and rough seas of human endeavour which Robinson Crusoe in particular, and 
enlightened Man in general, must brave and conquer in pursuit of the higher goal of 
rational self-mastery. But now, being clear in outlining the paradigmatic elements of 
this chapter, I wish to concentrate on disorder, in and of itself, as it relates to the 
ongoing manufacture and persistence of the figure of Man. Just as Homi Bhabha 
introduces the term ‘equivocation’ to understand the colonial relation to (dis)order, so 
the term is also used by theorist N. Katherine Hayles in a text addressing (dis)order as 
it relates to the science of thermodynamics. 239 In order to arrive at an expanded 
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definition of equivocation that draws both sides of these discourses together, I first 
need to turn explicitly to a brief history of thermodynamics. 
Thermodynamic Equivocation 
In a collaborative paper entitled Heat-Death (2000) Luciana Parisi and Tiziana 
Terranova trace the original grappling with, and definition of, thermodynamics to 
fundamental disturbances enacted on the social and human body: 
Thermodynamics is a law of nature on which industrial capitalism built a 
technological, economic and biosocial order. The centrality of thermodynamic 
principles to its technological machines and its organization of the social body 
means that the entirety of the social order constructed by industrial capitalism 
was affected by its implications. It is not only the universe which one day will 
run towards heat-death, but also the social order which builds itself on 
thermodynamic principles. The threat of entropy was real to the natural and 
political sciences of industrial capitalism, it was a problem that needed a 
solution. 240 
The female body, Parisi and Terranova argue, was one site that provided industrial 
society a temporary respite to its inevitable – and necessary 241 – heat-death. Through 
the subordination of sexual reproduction to the regulations attached to marriage and 
family the female body became a ‘fluid Outside which in turn lends energy to the 
thermodynamic cycle.’ 242 The play between entropy and negentropy / outside and 
inside is a fundamental principle of all complex systems, and in turn, all human 
societies have grappled with it at varying scales. But it is perhaps with imperialism that 
the development and maintenance of ‘fluid Outsides’ first became aligned so closely 
with the vision of the universe it sustained: a constant deferral of the exterior in lieu of 
maintaining the central, and uncontested, figure of enlightened, wilful Man. The store 
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of civilisation Crusoe brings with him on the ship can be traced to the ‘primary 
accumulation’ of enslaved, colonised, or expropriated people. In turn, the negentropic 
locality of those subjugated people was itself gleaned from readily available ‘cheap 
nature’ in the form of animal labour, the annexation of land for agriculture, or the 
nomadic tradition of taking what is available from region after region, whilst constantly 
moving to other, prosperous, elsewheres. The significance of these thermodynamic 
processes was not known until the very beginning of the industrial revolution, at which 
point they became integral to the design and uptake of ever better, more efficient 
thermodynamic machines, capable of offsetting entropy at ever greater scales and 
speeds. In relation to human affairs the negentropic, ‘whether idiom, tool, institution, 
market, desire, and so on – is always in the course of its inevitable decay.’ 243  
As according to N. Katherine Hayles, early thermodynamicists maintained an 
imperialist disposition against the inevitable heat-death of the universe, because their 
proclivities for order and progress had never before been in need of a recognition of 
outsides. Hayles further describes this with recourse to the work of early 
thermodynamicist Lord Kelvin (William Thomson): 
As the earth proceeds along this irreversible path, man must inevitably perish if 
he remains “as at present constituted.” If man is to escape this dismal 
prediction, some unimagined transformation will have to take place. 244 
It is only with the advent of thermodynamics that the human world could be shown to 
be one ‘characterized by fundamental disturbance.’ 245 A disturbance managed 
through the subordination of resources, animals, and various peoples as the rampant 
work of ‘progress’ has proceeded, but a disturbance which always offers within itself 
the promise of further transformations. Developed at the peak of the British Empire, 
thermodynamics was sometimes called ‘the science of imperialism’, as N. Katherine 
Hayles explains: 
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[T]o thermodynamicists, entropy represented the tendency of the universe to 
run down, despite the best efforts of British rectitude to prevent it from doing 
so... The rhetoric of imperialism confronts the inevitability of failure. In this 
context, entropy represents an apparently inescapable limit on the human will 
to control. 246 
The second law of thermodynamics maintains that a certain amount of energy in a 
system undergoing change will always remain unavailable for useful work. 247 The 
electric motor will produce heat and noise as an entropic by-product of its task to 
whisk air into egg whites. As the egg becomes cloudy, so the universe ‘outside’ the egg 
gains a little heat, thus affirming the first law of thermodynamics: that the amount of 
energy in the system and its environment always remain the same. The term ‘negative 
entropy’ is often applied to living organisms because they seem to be able to ‘master’ 
the process of entropy in lieu of their homeostasis, but this is as much an illusion as 
the illusion of Crusoe’s Empire: negative entropy occurs at small scales, over relatively 
small periods of time. Entropy is highly probable: the order of living beings, or island 
Empires, is most certainly not. 248  
In an 1867 letter, later revised in his Theory of Heat (1871), James Clerk Maxwell 
designed a thought experiment to test the second law of Thermodynamics. Maxwell 
imagined an ‘observant and neat-fingered [microscopic] being’ able to sort molecules 
between two vessels ‘by means of a slide without mass,’ resulting in a separation 
between fast (hot) and slow (cool) particles. 249 If such a creature did exist, he argued, 
no ‘work’ would be required to decrease the entropy of a closed system. The creature 
in Maxwell’s thought experiment comes from an old view of the universe, ‘fashioned 
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by divine intervention, created for man and responsive to his will.’ 250 By sorting a 
chaotic arrangement of particles into hot and cold compartments Maxwell’s Demon, as 
it would later become known, appeared to contradict the law Maxwell himself had 
helped to develop. One method of solving the paradox was devised by Leo Szilard, 
some 60 years later, who recognised that the Demon would have to perform 
measurements on and therefore remember where it placed the fast and slow particles. 
251 Here the apparent order of a system comes down to how ‘information’ is defined. 
As the demon decreases the entropy, or orders, its local environment, so it increases 
the entropy of its memory. For Claude Shannon, who later redefined the relationship 
between information and entropy, the more information a system contains the more 
unexpected, disorderly, noisy or entropic it is. 252 Maxwell’s Demon would require an 
infinite memory to remember every state of every particle – an event of infinite 
escalation, which would result in the absolute heat death of the universe at large. The 
laws of physics had stood up under scrutiny, resulting in a new branch of science 
known as ‘Information Theory’.  
Information Theory outlined a threshold for the growth of industrial society, a 
revelation that the ‘inhuman force of increasing entropy, [is] indifferent to man and 
uncontrollable by human will.’ 253 As N. Katherine Hayles points out, the connection 
between entropy and information (established by Shannon) also means that entropy is 
the motor of self-organising, autopoietic systems. Maxwell’s Demon shows that the 
law of entropy has only a statistical certainty, that nature orders only on small scales 
and, that despite any will to control, inertia will eventually be reached. Life, in this 
regard, can be considered as the continual renewal of a complex assemblage, winding 
down over as long a time as possible in the fight against death. In exchange for a 
production of further chaos in the wider universe the autopoietic system – whether a 
single celled protozoa, a steam train, or a churning factory of industry – is capable of 
retaining only a semblance of homeostasis:  
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Consider... the chaotic effect... of a strong wind on the innumerable grains of 
sand that compose a beach: amid this confusion, the action of a human foot on 
the surface of the beach constitutes a complex interaction of events that leads 
to the statistically very improbable configuration of a footprint. 254 
The footprint in this example from Umberto Eco is a neg-entropic event: the system of 
shifting sands is lent a temporary order by the cohesive action of the foot. Every 
footprint is a locality that opens onto greater localities – the impression of a foot into 
sand, the inclement weather of an island, the infinitesimal drift of the archipelago, or 
the slow decay of planet Earth’s atmosphere over cosmic time. These orders within 
orders, what Bernard Stiegler refers to as ‘nested spirals’, 255 are co-reliant on each 
other in the greater play of (neg)entropic tendencies. Given time, the noisy wind and 
chaotic waves will cause even the strongest footprint to fade. Consequently, negative 
entropy must always be ‘described in relation to a locality that it as such produces, and 
that it differentiates within a more or less homogeneous space’. 256 The highly ordered 
state of a footprint ‘is bought at the expense of an increased disorderliness (metabolic 
depletion)’ 257 of the figure who made it. In other words, whether an event appears 
entropic or negentropic is only definable in relation to its observer. 
As Evelyn Fox-Keller lucidly outlines in her book Refiguring Life (1995), it pays to re-
examine the capacities of Maxwell’s Demon in order to understand the implications of 
an observer-bound (neg)entropy. To do this, Keller returns to another Being with 
strange attributes, this time posited by Charles Darwin in an 1844 essay: 
Let us now suppose a Being with penetration sufficient to perceive difference 
in the outer and innermost organization quite imperceptible to man, and with 
forethought extending over future centuries to watch with unerring care and 
select for any object the offspring of an organism produced under the 
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foregoing circumstances; I can see no conceivable reason why he should not 
form a new race… adapted to new ends. 258 
Although both beings are ‘selecting agent[s]’ the one posited by Darwin perceives from 
without, selecting ‘from on high’ as it were, via an infinite capacity; preternatural and 
all encompassing. Maxwell’s Demon, on the other hand, exhibits a minuteness and 
‘worldly finitude’ from inside, or perhaps alongside, the molecules it selects. 259 The 
placement of Maxwell’s Demon at the same scale as ‘natural’ processes served to 
bolster a ‘conception simultaneously of free will and determinism, a view of living 
beings as continuous with, yet distinct from, inanimate matter.’ 260 As Keller points 
out, this aligns Maxwell’s Demon more readily with an apparently human, rather than 
Godlike, conception of mastery. Both imaginary creatures exhibit a capacity to direct 
nature towards order through the application of will. The difference between the 
quality of those wills is extremely pertinent in understanding not only the theories of 
thermodynamics and information emerging in Maxwell and Darwin’s time, but also, in 
tandem, the endless deferral implicit in the functions of imperialism explored earlier in 
this chapter. As with both Maxwell and Darwin’s beings, being positioned ‘inside’ or 
‘outside’ a system – whether of natural, technological, social, or epistemological 
organisation – does little to change the overall implication of entropic processes. The 
universe will run down regardless of how a will apparently capable of overcoming and 
channelling these forces is constituted. The collapse of thermodynamics with its 
imperial namesake provides a clearer ground for our paradigmatic reading. Whereas 
the Godlike perspective obtained by Darwin’s being is easily dismissed as a 
‘contextless’ God-trick, the internalised, and apparently self-constituted perspective of 
Maxwell’s Demon is less obviously aligned with Haraway’s figure. Yet both are equally 
constitutive of an idea of human will projected onto figural, imaginary, impossible 
beings. Man aspires to master the system at large, but can only ever project the mortal 
attributes he wishes to escape onto imaginary beings like himself, changing those 
attributes only so much as they appear to allow him to escape the system, but keeping 
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them similar enough that he also projects onto the being the something about himself 
he wishes to maintain. Again, the figure of Crusoe should be paradigmatically placed 
alongside this insight into Man’s co-constitution: both are auto-appellative figures, 
refiguring themselves in order to maintain the system of which they are the singular 
objective.   
According to N. Katherine Hayles the two ways to understand the transformation of a 
homeostatic system are understood to be the product of ‘noise’. The amount of 
change contributed by noise is an ‘equivocation’. If noise contributes to the 
reorganisation of a system in a beneficial way, for instance if a genetic mutation in an 
organism results in the emergence of an adaptive trait, then the equivocation is said to 
be ‘autonomy-producing’. 261 Too much noise is equivalent to too much information, a 
‘destructive’ equivocation, leading to chaos. An ‘autonomy-producing’ mutation will be 
blindly passed on to an organism’s offspring, catalysing the self-organisation of the 
larger system (in this case, the species). All complex, what are called ‘autopoietic’ 
systems, inhabit this fine divide between noise and inertia. Given just the right balance 
of noise recuperated by the system, and noise filtered out by the system, a state of 
productive change can be maintained, and a state of inertia can be avoided, at least, 
for a limited time. As according to N. Katherine Hayles, ’How an “autonomy-
producing” equivocation is conceived depends on where the observer is stationed.’ 262 
In line with Homi Bhabha’s use of the term equivocation in relation to the colonised 
subject, it is a particular, positioned, locatable subject who does the equivocating. As 
Hayles points out in How We Became Posthuman (1999), noise is only such a thing as it 
can be defined against a standard, or a pattern. 263 Both the coloniser and the 
thermodynamicist are like Maxwell’s Demon, creating order in their particular arena of 
the universe at the expense of their ability to conceive of their equivocal act in any 
wider schema. Both the thermodynamicist and the coloniser in working for the 
‘morphological standard’ of which they themselves are the defining example, are 
inevitably, and perhaps incurably, imperialist. The coloniser makes note of ‘the other’ 
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as ‘other’ only so much as it affirms the standard of themselves; the thermodynamicist 
notes the ‘outside’ they plunder from only to the extent that they already consider it 
to be part of the heat-death their system works to avoid.  
As with the paradigms of shipwreck and the footprint, the ambivalence of Man is 
constituted at the meeting point between the metonym and metaphor of ‘the outside’ 
or ‘other’. Noise, chaos, disorder, or any number of frontiers to be conquered, 
subjugated, and ordered are maintained in their difference only to the extent that they 
signal the renewal or transformation of the Man who is considered the morphological 
standard in the first instance. To return to the discourse around the posthuman, in 
which the idea of ‘mutation’ often plays a discursive role, this chapter recognises, in 
line with Neil Badmington, that, ‘[b]ecause every aspect of Western thought is touched 
in some way by the legacy of humanism, any claim to be writing the end of “Man” is 
bound to be written in the language of “Man”.’ 264 Crusoe’s shipwreck and the acts of 
self-maintenance which follow are told in this chapter in order to play out this 
imperialistic tendency. Crusoe’s tale is less about outward transformation than about, 
as Stanislaw Lem showed us, a figure of European assemblage ceaselessly, blindly, 
maintaining the momentum of his heritage. A myth told of internal perturbations 
which Crusoe ‘braves’ and apparently conquers through the crafting of ‘external’ 
energies into internal mechanisms of normativity and control. I wish to be clear that I 
recognise this tendency in this thesis itself: to rage against the figure of ‘Man’ in an 
appeal to overcome it through the integration of ‘outsides’ and ‘outsiders’. In referring 
to the figure Friday, of the infamous footprint in the island sand, I gesture to this 
outside(r) only so much as it benefits the discourse I engage in.  
The mutation of the human, of the standard, not only should not, but cannot be 
considered as coming from an ‘outside’, for to do so would be to affirm the subject 
position from which that transformation is conceived. If mutation as critical 
posthumanism invokes it, ‘is to be taken seriously’ R.L. Rutsky warns, ‘it cannot be 
reduced simply to a narrative of passage, shift, or break.’ The randomness, the chaos, 
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the disorder implied by mutation, ‘can be narrativized only by subordinating its 
unpredictability to a human perspective.’ 265 As Carey Wolfe points out in What is 
Posthumanism? 266 R.L. Rutsky critiques N. Katherine Hayles’ rendering of mutation in 
this regard, in which she treats it ‘as a pre-existing, external force that introduces 
change into a stable pattern (or code), and into the material world or body as well,’ 267 
noting significantly that the standards by which the human ‘mutation’ is measured 
must also be considered as a process being undergone. Rather mutation, Rutsky 
suggests, should name the ‘randomness which is always already immanent in the 
processes by which both material bodies and cultural patterns replicate themselves.’ 
268  
Once a mutation is narrativised, it necessarily becomes positioned in relation to a 
subject. Those subjects, in turn, can be isolated in relation to an act of equivocation, 
whether like Maxwell’s Demon, or imperialist Man – ordering a system to his own ends 
through an act of equivocation, or, whether an ‘other’ subject, a ‘fluid Outside’, whose 
material and cultural identity acts as the potential which drives the homeostasis of the 
imperialist who equivocates. A non-narrativised mutation – a mutation in and of itself 
– is perhaps better understood as being that equivocation in and of itself~: a 
randomness or disorder not predicated on a pre-existing standard or pattern. 
Imminent posthuman mutation, in other words, is necessarily ambivalent to the bodies 
and patterns subject to it. Imminent posthuman mutation is necessarily ambivalent to 
the human ‘we’ who posit ‘it’ through narratives predicated on ‘our’ transformation. I 
want to register then, a third definition of equivocation as a mutation uncaptured or 
unsubordinated by codes of the internal/external, inside/outside. 
To end then, I affirm this chapter not as a refiguring of Friday – the colonised, 
enslaved, and subjugated outsider yet to be fully recuperated by humanist or 
posthumanist theory alike – but as a refiguring of Crusoe, the Man of enlightenment in 
all his self-obsessed imperfections. In deferring throughout this chapter to Friday as 
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the outsider I will eventually contend with, I now end without making or allowing 
Friday to speak on my behalf. To make the other speak is as much a violent act as to 
silence the other. Both are equivocations, in that they regard the mark of the other 
only as an indication of a prior autonomy. The two figures which have so far been 
mobilised by this thesis have played out, have practiced on and through, defining 
principles of critical posthumanism relating to its delineation of inside and outside, the 
self and the other. In chapter three, I make of the next figure – The Thing – a paradigm 
of the kind of material imminence argued for by this chapter, affirming the figure of 
the ‘other’ without making of that other something about the one; the singular; the 
figure of ‘Man’, who fights for their self-same autonomy. Chapter three 
paradigmatically renders this mutational imminence – which I call ‘Thingly’ – as a 
fundamental feature of any critical posthumanist practice that has a chance of 
creatively and critically refiguring the very world of which is part, and therefore, in 
practice with, ontogenetically.  
The desire to stand outside the paradigm I have setup here – to speak of the figure of 
Crusoe as ‘Man’ from an apparent posthuman outside, already positioned ‘past’ the 
point of the human(ist) limit it registers – inevitably reinstates the posthuman as a new 
standard. The problem of equivocation – in both Hayles’ and Bhabha’s invocations – is 
the need of a subject to position itself in relation to a process being undergone, and 
make of that process something about the particular subject which names it. 
Posthumanism, rather, has to recognise its inherent inability to communicate its 
position, and to recognise this inability as an inevitable and affirmative consequence of 
its call to not totalise, or universalise itself as some new vanguard. Because, as Nina 
Lykke suggests, ‘we cannot position ourselves “outside” of the world we are analysing 
and in which we act,’ 269 within the project of establishing a posthumanism, termed by 
Rosi Braidotti, as a relocation of ‘the subject in the flow of relations with multiple 
others,’ 270 there is always the tendency for those others to become subjugated, once 
again, in lieu of a newly inaugurated ‘universal’ character, which can apparently regard 
the whole. 
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Chapter Three: The Thing 
“If a cell gets out it could imitate everything on the face of the Earth…  
and it’s not gonna stop!” 
Becoming Alien 
John Carpenter’s 1982 film, The Thing, is a claustrophobic science fiction thriller 
exhibiting many hallmarks of the horror genre. The film depicts a sinister turn for 
matter, where the chaos of the replicating, cancerous cell is expanded to the human 
scale and beyond. In The Thing we watch as an alien force terrorises an isolated 
Antarctic outpost. The creature exhibits an awesome ability to imitate, devouring any 
form of life it comes across, whilst simultaneously giving birth to an exact copy in a 
burst of bile and protoplasm. The Thing copies cell by cell in a process so perfect – at 
every level of replication – that the resultant simulacrum speaks, acts, and even thinks 
like the original. The Thing is so relentless and its copies so perfect that the outpost’s 
Doctor, Blair, is sent into a mad frenzy at the implications: 
If a cell gets out it could imitate everything on the face of the Earth… and it’s 
not gonna stop! 271 
Based on John W. Campbell’s 1938 novella, Who Goes There?, Carpenter’s film revisits 
a gothic trope, as numerous in its incarnations as are the forms the Thing is capable of 
taking. In Campbell’s original novella the biological adulteration co-inhabits its host 
alongside another type of infection: that of the Antarctic inhabitants’ inner lives. 
Plucked from an icy grave, the Thing sits frozen solid in a dark corner of the outpost, 
drip dripping towards re-animation. Before its cells begin their interstitial jump from 
alien to earthly biology, it is the dreams of the men that become infected: 
‘So far the only thing you have said this thing gave off that was catching was 
dreams. I'll go so far as to admit that.’ An impish, slightly malignant grin crossed 
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the little man's seamed face. ‘I had some, too. So. It's dream-infectious. No 
doubt an exceedingly dangerous malady.’ 272 
In Campbell’s novella, the Thing is condensed as much from the minds of the men as 
from its own horrific, defrosting bulk. A slowly surfacing nightmare that transforms 
alien matter into earthly biology also has the effect of transferring the inner, mental 
lives of the men into the resultant condensation. John W. Campbell had no doubts that 
the Thing could become viscous human flesh, but in order to truly imitate its prey, the 
creature must infect and steal inner life separately, pulling ghosts kicking and 
screaming out of their biological – Cartesian – machines. As a gothic figure, Campbell's 
Thing disrupts the stable and integral vision of human being, of self-same bodies 
housing ‘unitary and securely bounded’ 273 subjectivities, identical and extensive 
through time. John W. Campbell’s characters confront their anguish at being 
embodied: their nightmares are literally made flesh.  
According to Ernst Jentsch, the uncanny is kindled ‘when there is intellectual 
uncertainty whether an object is alive or not, and when an inanimate object becomes 
too much like an animate one.’ 274 In Campbell’s novella this principle is reversed: 
human bodies are given all the features of inanimate objects capable of being replaced 
wholesale by an alien will apparently inseparable from its own raw matter. Building on 
Martin Heidegger’s definition of a thing, in which objects are brought out of the 
background of existence through human use, theorist Bill Brown marks the emergence 
of things through the encounter:  
As they circulate through our lives… we look through objects because there are 
codes by which our interpretive attention makes them meaningful, because 
there is a discourse of objectivity that allows us to use them as facts. A thing, in 
contrast, can hardly function as a window. We begin to confront the thingness 
of objects when they stop working for us. 275 
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The Thing enacts this encounter, when an apparently human figure erupts with vicious 
alien teeth, or the Antarctic camp’s huskies sprout voluminous tentacles which writhe 
towards their next victim. The human body ceases to function as human being, its will 
having been splintered off cell by cell by the incumbent alien matter. Each resultant 
clone’s otherness is an uncanny exposure of the abject relationship humans endure 
with themselves as vicarious, entropic, fragmented forms. Once the relations we 
expect to contribute to our being ‘in the world’ are interrupted, all matter appears 
Thingly, most especially our own.  
To emphasise the ‘otherness’ of each individual character’s flesh, Campbell inhabits his 
novella exclusively with male characters. The absence of women makes the conflict 
between each of the men feel more rudimentary, but it also centres the horror of the 
novel on the growing realisation that to be human is also to be alien to oneself. 
Differences in gender, within the single species homo sapiens, are bypassed, allowing 
the alien entity to exhibit the features of human non-male ‘otherness’ alongside a 
gamut of other – horrific – bodily permutations. Perhaps, as Barbara Creed, 276 Rosi 
Braidotti, 277 and others 278 have argued, the Thing signifies the intrinsic absence of the 
mother figure: the capacity of a woman’s body to be differentiated from itself in the 
form of pregnancy; to open up and usher forth into the world a creature other to itself. 
This Thingly quality is given credence by Julia Kristeva in a passage that could equally 
refer to the Thing as to the development of a foetus during pregnancy: 
Cells fuse, split, and proliferate; volumes grow, tissues stretch, and the body 
fluids change rhythm, speeding up or slowing down. With the body, growing as 
a graft, indomitable, there is another. And no one is present, within that 
simultaneously dual and alien space, to signify what is going on. 279 
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The Thing does exhibit demeanours of copulation and fertility, but also of disease, 
fragmentation, dismemberment, and asexual fission. During a drug induced nightmare 
Dr. Copper suddenly sits bolt upright and blurts out:  
Garry – listen. Selfish – from hell they came, and hellish shellfish – I mean self – 
Do I? What do I mean? 
In turn McReady 280 turns to the other men in the cabin and says: 
Selfish, and as Dr. Copper said – every part is a whole. Every piece is self-
sufficient, and animal in itself. 281  
Like an asexually reproducing starfish or earthworm, the Thing is aberrant at a level 
more fundamental than allusions to pregnancy can convey. The collapse in Dr. 
Copper’s speech, his inability to articulate what the Thing is, indicates a categorical 
nightmare he and the men are suffering. As in the work of Mary Douglas, 282 the 
Thing’s nightmarish transformation denies the very concept of physical and categorical 
purity. The metaphysical dualism of the sexes, as Kelly Hurley concludes, is an 
inadequate paradigm of such horrific embodiment, rather any and all ‘ontological 
security’ 283 is challenged through a ‘collapsing of multiple and incompatible morphic 
possibilities into one amorphous embodiment.’ 284 The Thing is neither male nor 
female, two nor one, inside nor outside, living, nor dead. If it does settle into a form 
that can be exclaimed, screamed or defined in mutually incompatible words, it does so 
only for a moment and only in the mind of its onlooker as they scrabble to deduce its 
next amorphous conflation. The Thing is a figure performing ontogenesis (something 
coming to be) rather than ontology (something that already is). 285 But the distinction 
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between a ‘real’ ontogenetic act and a ‘performed’ one is confused once the men of 
the camp realise that the Thing is teleologically directed towards the goal of imitating 
them. ‘The very definition of the real,’ as Jean Baudrillard affirmed, has become ‘that 
of which it is possible to give an equivalent reproduction.’ 286 The question hangs as to 
whether the Thing is categorically aberrant because the process of reproducing each 
(hu)man requires it, or whether its eccentric ‘becoming’ is part of an alien-ness distinct 
from the form it eventually takes. Does the Thing ‘produce’ something other than 
human life, or ‘reproduce’ human life in its entirety, and what, if anything, would be 
the difference? 
In a text on bio and necro politics, Eugene Thacker undertakes an examination of the 
‘difference between “Life” as an ontological foundation, and “the living,” or the 
various specific instantiations of Life.’ 287 Thacker highlights a passage in Poetics where 
Aristotle speaks of mimesis giving rise to the art of poetry in human beings: 
We take delight in viewing the most accurate possible images of objects which 
in themselves cause distress when we see them (e.g. the shapes of the lowest 
species of animal, and corpses). 288 
Recognition of mimetic forms can instil a certain degree of displeasure if that form 
depicts a carcass or something considered equally abhorrent. But this is often tinged 
with what Aristotle calls the ‘extremely pleasurable’ dual capacities of recognising an 
imitation as such, whilst at the same time recognising what it is the form is imitative 
of. The horror of the Thing is bound to this endless ontogenetic re-forming, its 
apparently limitless capacity to imitate and become without necessarily settling into a 
final, stable and agreeable categorical – that is, ontological – form. The men of the 
Antarctic encampment grasp in their minds at the forms ushering from the Thing but 
can never keep up with its propensity toward the next shapeless-shape, bodiless-limb, 
or ontogenetic-extrudence. The Thing is a phenomenon, to take advantage of 
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Thacker’s words once more, that is ‘at once “above” and “below” the scale of the 
human being,’ 289 throwing, as Rosi Braidotti succinctly puts it, ‘a terminal challenge 
towards a human identity that is commonly predicated on the One.’ 290 The ‘other’ of 
the Thing never settles down, always falling outside the dialectical circle. The Thing is 
the manifestation of ‘life’ divorced from ‘the living’. As Helene Cixous remarks in The 
Newly Born Woman, with the ‘truly “other” there is nothing to say; it cannot be 
theorized. The “other” escapes me.’ 291 
The figure of the Thing bursts into popular culture at the meeting point between 
dream and flesh, and has been pursued ever since by men 292 whose individuality is 
considered inseparable from their self-same embodiment. By modifying the rules 
through which dominant norms such as gender binaries operate, the Thing can be 
conceived as an incarnation of détournement: an intervention that hijacks and 
continually modifies the rules of engagement. ‘The radical implication [being] that [all] 
meaning is connected to a relationship with power.’ 293 Considered through Michel 
Foucault’s definition of bio-power, or the bio-political, the Thing is the process of sex 
and sexuality severed from the humans who are forced to proliferate ‘through’ it. For 
Foucault, sex itself became incorporated into the technology of power in the early 20th 
Century through the eugenics movement and onwards through the horrors of World 
War II, but also stretching back into the 19th Century, where it was ‘sought out in the 
smallest details of individual existences’ 294: 
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Sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the 
species… it was tracked down in behaviour, pursued in dreams… it was traced 
back to the earliest days of childhood; it became the stamp of individuality – at 
the same time what enabled one to analyse the latter and what made it 
possible to master it.’ 295  
Above all, the men set against this propagation – this mobilisation of similes of ‘other’ 
– scramble to protect the normative image of the human they hold most dear: the 
mirage of ‘Man’.  
Becoming World 
The filmic Thing is a fictional device enabled by animatronic augmentations coated 
with fleshy stand-ins, KY Jelly, and occasionally, real animal offal. As John Carpenter 
described his rendition of the creature in a 2014 interview, ‘It’s just a bunch of rubber 
on the floor.’ 296 Bringing the Thing ‘to life’ is an activity that performs the collapse 
‘between “Life” as an ontological foundation, and “the living,” or the various specific 
instantiations of Life.’ 297 The animatronic Thing exists in the space between stable 
forms: it is vibrant, expressive technology realised by dead matter; human ingenuity 
made discernible by uncanny machinic novelty. Ontological uncertainty finds fluidity in 
the experience of language on a page, in its ability to poetically gesture to 
interstitiality. But on-screen animatronics, rubber, and KY Jelly are less fluid, more 
mimetically rooted by the aesthetic expectations of the audience revelling in, and 
reviled by, their recognition of the Thing’s many forms. Upon its 1982 release, 
reactions (from a cast of mainly male critics) to John Carpenter’s The Thing were at 
best muted and at worst downright vitriolic. As Anne Billson notes in her 2009 
reflection on the film: 
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[Critics] didn't just give it the thumbs-down; they tore into it like jackals. “This 
movie is more disgusting than frightening, and most of it is just boring,” wrote 
David Denby in New York magazine… Derek Malcolm wrote in [The Guardian] 
that the special effects were: “let loose on us by the bucketful, and satiation 
rather than horror is the result.” 298 
The special effects used to depict the creature were also the focus of an attack by 
Steve Jenkins in a critique Ian Conrich claims ‘shows his misjudgement’: 
Steve Jenkins… accuses the effects of functioning in a “modernist fashion”, 
existing “in and of themselves.” Jenkins attacks the film essentially for its 
surrealist nature… he writes that, “with regard to the effects, they completely 
fail to ‘clarify the weirdness’ of the Thing”, and that “because one is never sure 
exactly how it [the alien] functions, its eruptions from the shells of its victims 
seem as arbitrary as they are spectacular’.” 299  
In short, the reviews lingered on two opposing readings of The Thing’s shock/gore 
evocations: that they go too far and thus tend towards sensational fetishism, or that 
they can’t go far enough, depicting kitsch sensibilities rather than alien otherness. 
Jenkins’ concern that the special effects do not ‘clarify’ the Thing’s ‘weirdness’ is 
contradictory, if not oxymoronic. The implication is that Things could never be so 
weird as to defy logical function, and that all expressions should, and eventually do, 
lend themselves to being read through some parochial mechanism or other, however 
surreal they may at first seem. That the Thing’s nature could actually defy 
comprehensibility is not considered, nor how difficult – nay, impossible – the cinematic 
depiction of that defiance might be. Rather, the critical view was that every grisly 
eruption, bifurcation, and horrific permutation on screen must necessarily express an 
inner order temporarily hidden from, but not inaccessible to, its onlookers.  
This critical desire for a ‘norm’ defies the same critical desire for ‘true’ horror. Our will 
to master matter and technology through imitative forms is the same will that balks at 
                                                     
298 Anne Billson, ‘The Thing Set on Survival’, The Guardian, 27 August 2009, 
http://www.theguardian.com/film/2009/aug/27/the-thing-john-carpenter. 
299 Conrich and Woods, The Cinema Of John Carpenter, 96. 
100 
 
the idea that imitative forms could have ontologies incommensurable with our own. 
The Thing is ‘weird’: a term increasingly applied to those things defying categorisation. 
A conviction, according to Mark Fisher, ‘that this does not belong, is often a sign that 
we are in the presence of the new… that the concepts and frameworks which we have 
previously employed are now obsolete.’ 300 In reflecting on the origins of the slippery 
‘weird’ anti-category through the fiction of the misogynistic, racist, mid-20th Century 
sci-fi horror author H.P. Lovecraft, Eugene Thacker reminds us that within horror, ‘the 
threat is not the monster, or that which threatens existing categories of knowledge. 
Rather, it is the “nameless thing,” or that which presents itself as a horizon for 
thought… the weird is the discovery of an unhuman limit to thought, that is 
nevertheless foundational for thought.’ 301  
In The Thing the world rises up to meet its male inhabitants in a weird form and, by 
becoming them, throws into question the categorical foundations of the born and the 
made, of subject and object, natural and synthetic, whole and part, human and world, 
original and imitation. What remains is an ongoing process of animation rendered 
horrific by a bifurcation of ontologies: on one side the supposed human foundation of 
distinction, uniqueness and autonomy. On the other, a Thingly (alien and weird) 
propensity that dissolves differentiation, that coalesces and revels in an endless 
process of becoming. As in Mikhail Bakhtin‘s study of the grotesque, the ‘human 
horizon’ in question is that of the ‘canon,’ 302 a norm to which all aberrations are to be 
compared: 
The grotesque body... is a body in the act of becoming. It is never finished, 
never completed; it is continually built, created, and builds and creates another 
body. Moreover, the body swallows the world and is itself swallowed by the 
world. 303 
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The Thingly is neither self-same nor enclosed unto itself. It is a plethora of openings, 
conjoinings and eruptions that declare ‘the world as eternally unfinished: a world 
dying and being born at the same time.’ 304  
In The Dust of This Planet (2011) Eugene Thacker dwells on the power of genre horror 
to philosophically render worlds independent of human beings. In the introduction, he 
briefly outlines three concepts of ‘worlding’ that both horror and contemporary 
philosophy routinely engage with. They are the world-for-us, Thacker labels simply 
‘World’, the world-in-itself, labelled ‘Earth,’ and the world-without-us, labelled ‘Planet.’ 
305 The world-for-us is figured through whatever human-centric viewpoint is dominant 
at a particular time, recuperating the non-human world into something palatable to, 
and apparently predicated upon, human influence. The world-in-itself is an 
abstraction, because ‘the moment we think it and attempt to act on it, it ceases to be 
the world-in-itself and becomes the world-for-us.’ 306 In turn, the world-without-us, 
usually considered via fabulations of post-apocalyptic proportion, is a speculative 
conceit which ‘allows us to think the world-in-itself, without getting caught up in a 
vicious circle of logical paradox.’ 307 What Campbell created in his 1938 novella was a 
thought experiment in which all three of these ‘worlds’ were able to overlap without 
contradiction. The Thing is a categorical aberration, a vast mass of othering that 
proceeds, cell by cell, to become ‘everything on the face of the Earth,’ including the 
character, Blair, who makes this proclamation. 308 Wielding their guns, axes, and flame-
throwers, the men of the Antarctic encampment put up a fight in honour of their 
(biological) integrity, yet were they to fail, no living thing on Earth would be safe from 
the Thing’s voracious appetite. And yet, a Thingly world – a resulting world-without-us 
– would appear, at whatever abstract distance one cared to observe it, to be an exact 
doppelgänger of a telluric world-for-us in which the alien Thing had never crash 
landed, had never been frozen solid in the ice, and most importantly, had never been 
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defrosted by a team of grizzly faced Antarctic researchers. The bodily horror 
performed by the Thing is an allegory of this greater interstitial violation: the 
conceptual boundary between the world-for-us and the world-without-us is breached 
not as destruction, or even invasion, but ultimately through our inability to separate 
ourselves from a world that is already inherently alien and weird. 309 ‘A monstrosity’ to 
hijack the words of Claire Colebrook, ‘that we do not feel, live, or determine, but 
rather witness partially and ex post facto.’ 310 
But to think of humanity, indeed of all Earthly biology, as destroyed, subsumed and 
annihilated by the Thing is to fall back on narratives of a world-for-us. The world-
without-us can appear identical to the-world-for-us. It is only during the process of 
imitation, as bodies engorge and cells are subsumed, that any ‘difference’ can be 
perceived. A point Deleuze and Guattari, in A Thousand Plateaus, predicate on the 
affects that pass between bodies as they meet: 
We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, 
what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other 
affects, with the affects of another body… to destroy that body or to be 
destroyed by it… to exchange actions and passions with it or to join with in 
composing. 311 
How these processes are comprehended, or more precisely, how the perception of 
these processes is interpreted, is more important than the so called ‘difference’ 
between the bodies which came before and which remain after. Eugene Thacker 
clarifies this point in his analysis of the etymology of ‘monster’: 
A monster is never just a monster, never just a physical or biological anomaly. It 
is always accompanied by an interpretive framework within which the monster 
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is able to be monstrum, literally “to show” or “to warn.” Monsters are always a 
matter of interpretation. 312 
With similar etymological fervour, Jacques Derrida judges the monstrum to be a kind 
of grand revealing of what constitutes a norm. Derrida calls for (deconstructive) texts 
that are themselves monsters; texts that threaten to rupture out of the discourses in 
which they gestate: 313 
[D]iscursive norms, philosophical norms, socio-cultural norms, they have a 
history – any appearance of monstrosity in this domain allows an analysis of 
the history of the norms. But to do that, one must conduct not only a 
theoretical analysis; one must produce what in fact looks like a discursive 
monster so that the analysis will be a practical effect, so that people will be 
forced to become aware of the history of normality. 314 
For both Thacker and Derrida, monstrosity offers a discursive approach to the 
condition of conditioning. Weirding becomes a mode by which the presuppositions of 
an inquiry are exposed; are made monstrum. But as Derrida goes on to warn, ‘as soon 
as one perceives a monster in a monster, one begins to domesticate it, one begins… to 
compare it to the norms, to analyze it, consequently to master whatever could be 
terrifying in this figure of the monster. And the movement of accustoming oneself, but 
also of legitimation and, consequently, of normalization, has already begun.’ 315  
To Human is Err 
In the 44 years between John W. Campbell’s original novella and John Carpenter’s 
1982 film there were many poor clones of the Thing depicted in cinema. Films that 
collapsed the Thing’s endless capacity for ontogenesis into a sequence of specific 
‘others’, reflecting (perhaps only in retrospect) the fears and prejudices of each new 
decade. Films such as Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956 and 1978), and It Came 
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from Outer Space (1953), are replete with alien doppelgängers, abject human forms 
cast away very much as in the gothic tradition. Howard Hawk’s film, The Thing from 
Another World (1951), the first to explicitly translate Who Goes There? to the screen, 
completely congeals the fluidity of Campbell’s story. The resultant creature is nothing 
more than, what one character calls, ‘an intellectual carrot’ grown from alien cells in a 
laboratory. The film is worth considering for its Cold War undertones. Recast in an 
Arctic military base, Hawk’s Thing is a wretched individual set against a small, well 
organised army of cooperative men. 316 Howard Hawk’s ‘intellectual carrot’ is played 
by a single actor in a monster suit, a decision that completely reverses the narrative of 
a collective alien matter against a rag bag pack of discrete human individuals. Hawks 
even adds a female love interest to the tale, a character whose only purpose is to 
scream and lean provocatively on the edge of desks. Looking back at The Thing from 
Another World it is hard to view the film as anything other than a hateful parable of 
difference, in which highly trained, patriotic American soldiers gang up on a naïve 
creature whose only failing is in not adhering to the bodily canon. Faced with a 
sauntering, growling, incompetent embodiment of difference the men group together, 
fighting with a collective force greater than each man alone represents.  
The Thing’s distributed biology calls to mind Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s vision 
of the early Internet (ARPANET), designed, according to them: 
to withstand military attack. Since it has no center and almost any portion can 
operate as an autonomous whole, the network can continue to function even 
when part of it has been destroyed. The same design element that ensures 
survival, the decentralisation, is also what makes control of the network so 
difficult. 317 
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The image of mankind’s outright destruction, via totalising narratives such as nuclear 
war, viral pandemic, or meteor strike is undermined by the paradigm of a Thingly 
technological infrastructure designed to avoid ‘absolute’ assault. Decentralisation is a 
categorical horror in its capacity to highlight our self-same, constantly threatened and 
weak, embodied selves. But shift the lens away from the self-same human subject, and 
the image of a distributed, amorphous network of autonomous cells immediately 
becomes a very good description of how biological life has always been constituted. 
The Thing performs what Ray Brassier calls ‘the originary purposelessness which 
compels all purposefulness,’ that is, death understood as the cosmic indifference of 
the entropic processes which make life possible, and also make its annihilation 
inevitable. 318  
The metaphor of discrete cells coordinating into an autopoeitic organism does not 
extend to the inhabitants of the isolated Antarctic outpost in the original short story, 
nor in Carpenter’s 1982 film. Rather than unite against their foe, the men begin to turn 
on each other, never knowing who might be the Thing. In a series of enactments of 
game-theory, the characters do piece together a collective comprehension: that if the 
Thing is to eventually imitate ‘everything on the face of the Earth’ it must not show 
itself now, lest the remaining humans group together and destroy it. In opposing the 
Thing the men are forced to assemble, their individualities dissolved in the dynamic of 
a group, fighting for survival. But the Thing’s hidden nature means that cooperation 
cannot be relied on. Every human appearance could hide a Thingly nature, waiting for 
the opportune moment to express itself, to leap across permeable physical divides. 
The men’s inability to cooperate is paradigmatic of their instinct to remain contiguous, 
discrete and self-same. The features they hold dear, that they fight for, are the very 
features that render them weak and unreliable. Not even the viewer of the film knows 
from appearances alone who is human and who, at any moment, might express their 
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Thingly nature in a blast of bile and tentacles. The men need to fall back on 
abstractions, to reduce their individual subjectivities to the constitutive elements in a 
Cold War of risk and chance; a theory of games. Only at this abstract level can they 
survive, a level that even the viewer feels inculcated into, since no-one, not even the 
protagonist MacReady, is reliably human down to his material core.  
Becoming Imitation 
In a typically unsubtle scene from the 1982 film version of The Thing, the outpost’s 
Doctor, Blair, watches a crude simulation on his dusty computer. It depicts ‘Thing’ cells 
devouring ‘organic’ cells, leaving in place ‘Thingly’ imitations. This process occurs at a 
cellular level and is so complete throughout each organism that emergent properties 
are also replicated. Not only does the clone of one of the men, Norris, look, smell and 
act like Norris, it also thinks it is Norris. Out of a cellular perfect Norris brain, whatever 
it is made out of, emerges a thinking Norris that thinks it is Norris. After imitating 
Norris so perfectly, to such precise detail that even his faulty heart valve is replicated, 
that even his heart-attack and death is enacted by the Thingly Norris, only then, as the 
defibrillators are coming down to meet it on the operating table, does the Thing lash 
out. Whereas Campbell’s 1938 vision of the Thing is rooted in the mind/body dualistic 
split, John Carpenter’s 1982 Thing figures the possibility of an encounter between two 
equally abject materialities. The defensive reaction of Norris’ Thingly cadaver is an 
exemplification of this. The Thing is an interstellar 3D printer, capable of imitating 
pretty much anything so long as its programme allows it. The novella, Who Goes 
There?, and the film, The Thing, sit either side of a pivotal insight from the information 
sciences: that what an entity is made of is often inconsequential to the behaviours it 
presents to an observer. The Thing can therefore be interpreted as a fulfilment of Alan 
Turing’s ‘Imitation Game’, an ingenious thought experiment based on a popular 
parlour game in which participants disguise their gender and pass clues to other 
players underneath the door of a locked closet. 319  
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In her Prologue to How We Became Posthuman (1999), N. Katherine Hayles refers to 
the overlooked details of Turing’s imitation game, teasing at its nuances by writing it in 
2nd person narrative perspective. ‘You are alone in the room, except for two computer 
terminals’ Hayles begins, ‘If you cannot tell the intelligent machine from the intelligent 
human, your failure proves… that machines can think.’ 320 Hayles’ decision to presage 
her influential book on ‘The Posthuman’ with this narrative outlines the significance 
she places on the machine/human boundary in humanity’s passage beyond itself. But 
Hayles’ reading perpetuates a common misunderstanding of the imitation game – 
since Turing actually argued that it was impossible to tell whether either machine or 
human could think from appearances alone. In Computing Machinery and Intelligence 
(1950) Alan Turing introduced the notion that a computer is nothing more than a 
machine that functions by simulating other machines. 321 Asking the question ‘can 
machines think?’ Turing replaced the ambiguity of ‘thought’ and ‘intelligence’ with 
imitation, proposing a test that avoided the need to know what was going on inside 
the black box of the machine (or the human), in favour of merely experiencing its 
outward affects. In a lecture entitled Can Digital Computers Think?, Turing develops his 
point: 
It is not difficult to design machines whose behaviour appears quite random to 
anyone who does not know the details of their construction. Naturally enough 
the inclusion of this random element, whichever technique is used, does not 
solve our main problem, how to programme a machine to imitate a brain, or as 
we might say more briefly, if less accurately, to think. But it gives us some 
indication of what the process will be like. We must not always expect to know 
what the computer is going to do. We should be pleased when the machine 
surprises us, in rather the same way as one is pleased when a pupil does 
something which he had not been explicitly taught to do. 322 
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The Thing does not exhibit errors, mutations or adaptations. What we see when the 
Thingly cadaver of Norris protects itself is a machine winding into action. By 
transforming itself into a defensive form previously programmed and stored in its 
protoplasm the Thing performs its limits: it can only be as creative as its programming 
allows. Turing's lecture hints at the unsettling conclusion that even though a behaviour 
may be consistent with novelty, from appearances alone it is impossible to distinguish 
something ontologically novel with a behaviour which has been programmed to 
appear as such.  
There is no world-object which human subjects look upon, inhabit and assert mastery 
over. The mutability of Earthly life, its ability to err, to stumble upon novel strategies 
through random, blind chance, represents its most innate capacity. Biological life 
changes by mutation, passing those mutations on to the next generation, ad infinitum. 
The Thing, in opposition to this, can only become its other absolutely. Put more simply, 
in the words of protagonist John MacReady, ‘Somebody in this camp ain’t what he 
appears to be.’ 323 
The Thing becomes Norris absolutely, taking up his likeness and construction as if 
copying it from one material substrate to another. In addition, the Thing’s array of 
gnashing alien teeth is merely the memory – a computational echo – of an earlier 
becoming. Both expressions are brought together to create the appearance of novelty: 
two programmes, one defending the other. The Thing is a Universal Turing Machine, a 
post-digital plasma, encoded with the biological ticker tape of a thousand alien worlds. 
Is it perhaps too much of a liberty to suggest, therefore, that the Thing’s most 
terrifying, absolute other quality comes from its inability to err? As the Thing tears 
through every organism in sight its eventual form is hidden behind a veil of blood, guts, 
and mutating body parts readily associated with imperfection. But these depictions of 
cruel, cancerous blobs and swelling sacks of gaseous, oozing human matter are 
actually manifestations of a perfection being perfected; a process with one outcome: 
absolute substitution. In an aside sandwiched between definitions of seduction and 
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metamorphoses, Jean Baudrillard marks out cloning as a movement ‘from the same to 
the same without passage via the other.’ 324 This situation pushes to the extreme 
Michael Taussig’s definition of the mimetic faculty, in which ‘the copy [draws] on the 
character and power of the original, to the point whereby the representation may 
assume that character and that power.’ 325 The very existence of mimesis ‘in the 
world’, of the capacity ‘to be’ imitated, appears to dissolve any need for ontological 
contest. What is left when those powers have been completely transferred is not a 
representation, nor a simulation, but an absolute substitution. 
The characters in The Thing, then, are torn between two equally horrifying worlds. In 
one, the alien Thing clones its hosts cell by cell until, like The Ship of Theseus, an 
entirely different, but identical world remains. In the other, human being, in all 
its perceived intricacy, is the result of a billion years of noisy, messy, mutation. The 
Thing as Universal Turing Machine, as post-digital plasma, exposes the mutual 
constitution of worlds inherent in the ‘creation of artificial life’ – what Sean Cubitt calls 
the ‘postnatural’: 326 
“…the logic of Bios is being imported into machines, the logic of Technos is 
being imported into life,” 327 the assimilation of the future into the present, of 
the human into an increasingly homogeneous domain of increasingly 
meaningless difference, a shift from Darwinian to Larmarkian evolution in 
which the library of previous experience becomes the genetic code of future 
generations, such that no genuine mutation is any longer available. 328 
Confronted with the universality of the Thing – a paradigm of postnatural matter – the 
characters in The Thing stumble upon a most profound realisation. As the men of the 
camp and the Thing continue to interface, the materiality of the one has already been 
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consummated as the monstrosity of the other. It is humans who are condensed from 
contradictory categorical elements. It is this world which has always already been 
Thingly, full of spatio-temporally continuous monstrosities; of interchangeable 
imitations. The figure of the Thing exposes what Kelly Hurley calls the ‘gothicity’ of all 
matter. 329 Its parts remain undifferentiated even as they are exchanged, piece-by-
piece, for our own. As Marie Mulvey-Roberts notes in her essay A Spook Ride on Film:  
As a manifestation of both the uncanny and the abject, the monstrous body 
represents a horror of the indifferentiation of the now defamiliarised human. 
Monstrosity is also a fear of oneself, particularly of the alienation within the 
self. 330 
Pondering on the destruction of Earth, life and human consciousness in the inevitable 
death of the sun, Jean Francois Lyotard expounds a similar fear of the annihilation of 
worlds: 
Annihilation in any case is too subjective. It will involve a change in the 
condition of matter: that is, in the form that energies take. This change is 
enough to render null and void your anticipation of a world after the explosion. 
331 
In this instance the comparison between the worlds before and after any cataclysmic 
shift in status does not offer us reason enough to fear such a change. Life in its making 
has always already been a playground of mutating constituents that render each world 
anew in the process of unrepresentable becoming. What we regard as ontology is 
always already ontogenesis. To be otherwise would be to abolish any possibility of a 
future regarded by us, or our postnatural descendants. 
Thingly Theory 
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In a 1982 New York Times movie section, printed alongside a striking half-page action 
shot of Harrison Ford from the movie Blade Runner, critic Vincent Canby poured yet 
more scorn on John Carpenter’s ‘Thing’ remake: 
The Thing is a foolish, depressing, overproduced movie that mixes horror with 
science fiction to make something that is fun as neither one thing or the other… 
There may be a metaphor in all this, but I doubt it… The Thing… is too phony 
looking to be disgusting. It qualifies only as instant junk. 332 
Chiming with his critic peers, Canby expresses his desire that the monster show its 
nature – be monstrum – only in respect of some ‘norm’; 333 some ‘interpretive 
framework’, 334 that the narrative will eventually uncover. By setting up ‘junk’ as a 
kitschy opposite to this supposedly palatable logic, Canby unwittingly generates a 
point from which to disrupt the very notion of the interpretive framework itself. The 
Thing is indeed more than a metaphor. Rather, it can be read paradigmatically, and in 
so doing Canby’s appeal to ‘instant junk’ can be read as the monstrum, the revealing of 
that which constitutes the norm. The monster stands in for difference, for other, and 
in so doing normalises the subject position from which the difference is opposed: the 
canon. In the case of The Thing that canon is first and foremost the human male, 
standing astride the idea of a world-for-us. The ‘us’ is always already monopolised, as 
if all non-male ontogenetic permutations were cast out into the abject abyss of alien 
weirdness. In reclaiming ‘junk’ as a ‘register of the unrepresentable’ 335 a Thingly 
discourse shares many of the tenets of cyber-feminism – after Donna Haraway – and 
interrelated becomings. As Rosi Braidotti makes clear, referring to the work of Camilla 
Griggers: 
‘Queer’ is no longer the noun that marks an identity they taught us to despise, 
but it has become a verb that destabilizes any claim to identity, even and 
especially to a sex-specific identity. 336 
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The queer, the weird, the kitsch, are among the most powerful of orders because they 
are inherently uncategorised, un-representable and in flux. The rigid delineations of 
language and cultural heteronormativity are further joined in the figure of the Thing by 
a non-anthropic imaginary that exposes a whole range of human norms and sets into 
play a seemingly infinite variety of non-human modes of being and embodiment. 
Braidotti refers to the work of Georges Canguilhem in her further turn outwards 
towards the weird, ‘normality is, after all, the zero-degree of monstrosity,’ 337 
signalling a posthuman discourse as one which, by definition, must continually 
question – perhaps even threaten – the male, self-same, canonised, subject position: 
[A] shift of paradigm is in course, towards the teratological or the 
abnormal/anomalous/deviant… We need to learn to think of the anomalous, 
the monstrously different not as a sign of pejoration but as the unfolding of 
virtual possibilities that point to positive alternatives for us all… the human is 
now displaced in the direction of a glittering range of post-human variables. 338 
In her book The Death of The Posthuman (2014), Claire Colebrook looks to the 
otherwise, the un-representable, to destabilise the proposition of a world being for 
anyone. She begins by considering the proposed naming of the current geological era 
‘the Anthropocene,’ 339 a term that designates a theoretical as well as scientific 
impasse for human beings and civilisation, in which human activity and technological 
development have begun to become indistinguishable, and/or exceed processes 
implicit within what is considered to be the ‘natural’ world. As if registering the 
inevitable extinction of humans isn’t enough, the Anthropocene, by being named in 
honour of humans, makes monsters of those times – past and present – which do not 
contain humans. Its naming therefore becomes a writerly mechanism allowing the 
imagination of ‘a viewing or reading in the absence of viewers or readers, and we do 
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this through images in the present that extinguish the dominance of the present.’ 340 
The world ‘without bodies’ that is imaged in this move, Colebrook argues, is written 
upon by the current state of impending extinction. Humans are then able to look upon 
the future world-without-us in a state of nostalgia coloured by their inevitable 
absence. Here the tenets of the horror genre indicated by Eugene Thacker are realised 
as a feature of a present condition. The world-in-itself has already been subsumed by 
the Thingly horror that is the human species. A posthuman journey Thierry Bardini 
refers to as ‘a becoming-junk’: 
By this I mean more than a horror/science-fiction trope of rhetorical power 
over the imagination, but quite literally the production of living entities from 
human origins, but with the legal and cultural status of dead matter. 341 
For even the coming world-without-us, a planet made barren and utterly replaced by 
the Thingly junk of human civilisation, will have written within its geological record a 
mark of human activity that goes back well before the human species had considered 
itself as a Thing ‘in’ any world at all. This shift names critical theory itself as a work of 
horror that, Claire Colebrook notes, necessarily ‘follows from being exposed to a world 
that is not ourselves… without that “outside” world there could be no inner subject, no 
“we,” no agent of practice. But this existing world to which we are definitely bound is 
therefore impossible: the given world is given to us, never known absolutely.’ 342  
In an analysis of the etymology of the Anthropocene, McKenzie Wark also turns to 
theory as a necessary condition of the age of extinction: 
All of the interesting and useful movements in the humanities since the late 
twentieth century have critiqued and dissented from the theologies of the 
human. The Anthropocene, by contrast, calls for thinking something that is not 
even defeat. 343 
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As Matthew Lepori and others have argued, the ‘anthropos’ of ‘anthropocene’ 
conjoins every living or dead human being into a ‘single body… a universal subject of 
history.’ 344 This universalizing, which Lepori refers to as ‘species talk,’ is ‘the logical 
outcome of a narrative that only contains two actors: humans and nature.’ 345 It is 
crucial in handling the figure of The Anthropocene to regard the insides and outsides 
implicit in its context and use, lest it become the fabricator of further ‘others’. The 
Anthropocene, like ‘queer’ or ‘weird’, should be made into a verb, and relinquished as 
a noun, as name. Once weirded in this way it becomes a productive proposition, Wark 
goes on, quoting Donna Haraway, ‘another figure, a thousand names of something 
else.’ 346 In the 2014 lecture quoted by Wark, Haraway called for other such worldings 
through the horrific figure of capitalism, through arachnids spinning their silk from the 
waste matter of the underworld, or from the terrible nightmares evoked in the fiction 
of H.P. Lovecraft: 
The activation of the chthonic powers that is within our grasp to collect up the 
trash of the Anthropocene, and the exterminism of the Capitalocene, to 
something that might possibly have a chance of ongoing. 347 
That weird, ongoing epoch is ‘the Chthulucene’, a monstrum ‘defined by the 
frightening weirdness of being impossibly bound up with other organisms,’ 348 of what 
Haraway calls, in an earlier lecture, ‘multi-species muddles.’ 349 The horror of ‘the 
nameless thing’ is here finally brought to bear in Haraway’s Capitalocene and 
Chthulucene epochs. Haraway’s call for ‘a thousand names of something else’ is 
Thingly in its push towards the endlessly bifurcated naming, and theoretical 
subsuming. The anthro-normalisation casts out infinitely more possibilities than it 
brings into play; Haraway’s playful word play opens onto a dazzling array of potentially 
                                                     
344 Matthew Lepori, ‘There Is No Anthropocene: Climate Change, Species-Talk, and Political Economy’, 
Telos 2015, no. 172 (1 September 2015): 104. 
345 Lepori, 104–5. 
346 Wark, ‘Anthropocene Futures’. 
347 Donna Haraway, ‘Capitalocene, Chthulucene: Staying with the Trouble’ (5 September 2014), 
https://vimeo.com/97663518. 
348 Leif Haven, ‘We’ve All Always Been Lichens: Donna Haraway, the Cthulhucene, and the Capitalocene’, 
ENTROPY (blog), 22 September 2014, http://entropymag.org/weve-all-always-been-lichens-donna-
haraway-the-cthulhucene-and-the-capitalocene/. 
349 Donna Haraway, ‘SF: Sympoiesis, String Figures, Multispecies Muddles’ (24 March 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z1uTVnhIHS8. 
115 
 
unnameable variables. Although Donna Haraway makes it clear that her Chthulucene is 
not directly derivative of H.P. Lovecraft’s Cthulhu mythos, her intentional mis-naming 
and slippery non-identification exemplifies the kind of amorphous thinking and 
practice she is arguing for. Haraway’s Chthulucene counters Lovecraft’s Cthulhu with 
an array of chthonic, non-male, tentacled, rhizomatic, and web spinning figures that 
attest to the monstrum still exposed by Lovecraft’s three quarters of a century old 
work. As writer Alan Moore has attested: 
[I]t is possible to perceive Howard Lovecraft as an almost unbearably sensitive 
barometer of American dread. Far from outlandish eccentricities, the fears that 
generated Lovecraft’s stories and opinions were precisely those of the white, 
middle-class, heterosexual, Protestant-descended males who were most 
threatened by the shifting power relationships and values of the modern 
world… Coded in an alphabet of monsters, Lovecraft’s writings offer a potential 
key to understanding our current dilemma, although crucial to this is that they 
are understood in the full context of the place and times from which they 
blossomed. 350 
The continued – renewed – fascination with Lovecraft’s weird ‘others’ thus has the 
capacity to expose the dread of these times. The dominant humanistic imagination 
may no longer posit white cis-males as the figure that ‘must’ endure, but other 
uncontested figures remain in the space apparently excavated of Lovecraft’s affinities. 
To abandon what Colebrook calls ‘the fantasy of one’s endurance,’ may be to concede 
that the posthuman is founded on ‘the contingent, fragile, insecure, and ephemeral.’ 
351 But, as Drucilla Cornell and Stephen D. Seely suggest, it is dangerous to consider 
this a ‘new’ refined status for the beings that remain, since ‘this sounds not like the 
imagination of living beyond Man, but rather like a meticulous description of the lives 
of the majority of the world under the condition of advanced capitalism right now.’ 352 
The quality of the Thing that makes it most terrifying to the men of the encampment – 
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its capacity to apparently transmute, shift, and mutate as each and any situation 
proscribes it – is a quality those subjects not considered of ‘the canon’ have always 
had to adopt, to varying degrees, throughout history. To be blunt, the white western 
heterosexual male need not affirm ‘his’ identity, since it exists at ‘the zero-degree of 
monstrosity,’ 353 but those who have been enslaved, cast out, derided or castigated for 
their race, religion, sexuality or gender have always had to maintain a certain 
Thingliness to survive; to thrive. As long as the zero point of monstrosity has been 
maintained, Thingly subjects have risen up to meet it, to understand it, to counter it. 
Their capacity to survive and flourish is an equal and opposite rejoinder to the zero 
point. The human, the canon, the zero-point subject merely is (ontology is their 
weakness). Alternatively, the excluded other, the devalued outsider, the repressed 
Thingly subject must continually become (ontogenesis is their strength).  
As Claire Colebrook warns, posthumanism often relinquishes its excluded others – 
women, the colonised, nonhuman animals, or ‘life itself’ 354 – by merely subtracting 
the previously dominant paradigm of white heteropatriarchy, whilst failing to confront 
the monstrum that particular figure was indicative of: 
Humanism posits an elevated or exceptional ‘man’ to grant sense to existence, 
then when ‘man’ is negated or removed what is left is the human all too human 
tendency to see the world as one giant anthropomorphic self-organizing living 
body… When man is destroyed to yield a posthuman world it is the same world 
minus humans, a world of meaning, sociality and readability yet without any 
sense of the disjunction, gap or limits of the human. 355 
The idea of humanity as a whole, as a single consensus, with a shared history, and a 
shared future, is too stable a system. No single movement, no single charismatic 
mankind, or carefully crafted blueprint for the future can upset this metanarrative. 
Rather, the Thingly engages in recognising individual dispossessions. Of bringing to the 
centre as many of them as possible, urging them into the manufacture of further 
worlds. There is no centre, there are centres, there is no singular humanity, but neither 
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is there merely a plural: the principle of consensus is inadequate. Rather there are 
many singulars, many little Thingly narratives which must fragment the big, idealised 
whole. Posthumanism as a practice of revealing many worlds already embedded within 
the structures of the one. As in Haraway and Wark’s call for not just ‘naming, but of 
doing, of making new kinds of labor for a new kind of nature,’ 356 posthumanist theory 
and practices must be allowed to take on the form of the monsters they pursue, 
moulding and transforming critical inquiries into composite, hybrid – Thingly – figures 
that never settle in one form lest they become stable, rigid, and normalised. In fact, 
this metaphor itself is conditioned too readily by the notion of a mastery ‘Man’ can 
wield. Rather, theory must be encouraged ‘to monster’ separately, to blur and mutate 
beyond the human capacity to comprehend it, like the infinite variety of organisms 
Haraway insists the future opens onto. The very image of a posthumanism must avoid 
normalising the monster, rendering it through analysis an expression of the world-for-
us. For Thacker this is the power of the horror genre, to take ‘aim at the 
presuppositions of philosophical inquiry – that the world is always the world-for-us – 
and [make] of those blind spots its central concern, expressing them not in abstract 
concepts but in a whole bestiary of impossible life forms – mists, ooze, blobs, slime, 
clouds, and muck.’ 357 Within these ‘impossible life forms’ cultural norms are disturbed 
as monsters, and unstoppable, invisible forces battle for supremacy at the edges of 
human imagination. Because these horrors are themselves plastic, mutating forms, 
able to incorporate all manner of malleable beings and disturbances, they are ‘as 
unstoppable as the transformations [they] mirror’. 358 That is, as Rosi Braidotti argues, 
only horrific figures can keep up with, represent, and perhaps combat, the horror of 
(post)human times. Simply referring to these processes undoes some of the fluidity I 
argue this thesis, and figures, exhibits. In the following chapter this problem is 
emphasised further through a figuring of the problem of a ‘flat ontology’ which 
emerges out of aligning the human with the vibrant material world. After staging the 
‘collapse’ of the elements I paradigmatically assemble, chapter four segues into a 
conclusion by way of the portfolio of work: The 3D Additivist Manifesto. I argue that 
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the Manifesto is a principle example of the kind of posthumanist practice I argue for in 
this thesis, in that it enters into the composition of its own collapse, engendering a 
‘Thingly’ discourse as a fundamental part of a critical stance against itself. This act 
responds, once again, to Michel Foucault’s criticism of humanism’s appeal to 
anthropological universality, a dogma which therefore stops ‘short of applying [the] 
protocols and commitments [of the Enlightenment] to itself.’ 359 A critical 
posthumanist practice, in this sense, should be considered ‘post’ in a certain 
apocalyptic sense, not because it invokes a total destruction of the world, but rather 
because it engages in the ‘destruction of totalizing structures, of those universal 
notions that do not just describe ‘how things are’ but serve to prescribe and insist that 
‘this is how things must be.’ 360 
The Thing is both a process that shows (is monstrum of) the unthinkability of human 
life ‘in’ the world, whilst also addressing Braidotti’s call for theory that ‘learn[s] to 
think about processes and not only concepts… [that] represent[s] in-between zones 
and areas of experience or perception.’ 361 These aberrations should be considered not 
as differences opposed to norms, but as actions in process, as the ontogeny of 
mutation and discursion. With this conceit in process the Thing becomes a writerly 
mechanism; a runaway philosophical framework wont to take on the appearance of 
whatever figure(s) are placed alongside it. The power to ‘become’ the monstrum of 
Man under refreshed circumstances is necessary if any central figure is to be 
overcome. The ability to perform self-effacement and subsequent renewal at every 
moment, from programmes previously stored in its memory, is the Thing’s most 
enduring quality. The zone of transition from human to posthuman is, then, a Thingly 
mass of eruptions and bifurcations that is always being undergone. If the paradigm of 
posthumanism is to be understood as a discourse of this monstrum, then it must be 
rendered as a monstrous paradigm, lest posthumanism become normalised, stable, 
and thus, not ‘post’ human(ist) anymore. 
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Chapter Four: Kipple and the Collapse of the Hoard 
“He heard the kipple coming, the final disorder of all forms,  
the absence which would win out.” 
Kipple and 
Living at the very limit of his means, Philip K. Dick, a two-bit, pulp sci-fi author, was 
having a hard time maintaining his livelihood. It was the 1950s and Dick was living with 
his second wife, Kleo, in a run-down apartment in Berkley, California, surrounded by 
library books Dick later claimed they ‘could not afford to pay the fines on.’ 362 In 1956 
Dick had a short story published in a brand-new pulp magazine: Satellite Science 
Fiction. Entitled, Pay for the Printer, 363 the story contained a series of themes that 
would come to dominate his work. 
On an Earth gripped by nuclear winter, humankind has all but forgotten the skills of 
invention and craft. An alien, blob-like species known as the Biltong co-habit Earth 
with the humans. They have an innate ability to ‘print’ things, popping out copies of 
any object they are shown from their formless bellies. The humans are enslaved not 
simply because everything is replicated for them, but, in a twist Dick was to use again 
and again in his works, as the Biltong grow old and tired, each copied object resembles 
the original less and less. Eventually everything emerges as an indistinct, black mush. 
Saved from the wreckage of the nuclear apocalypse, a host of original items – lawn 
mowers and woollen sweaters and cups of coffee – are in short supply. Nothing ‘new’ 
has been made for centuries. The Biltong must produce copies from copies made of 
copies, seeding each facsimile with errors passed down along an imperfect replicative 
chain. Not only do the Biltong ‘prints become blurred and lose definition,’ 364 the 
entire human social order has blurred beyond recognition, lingering as a poor image of 
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the golden era the populous nostalgically yearns for. An ‘object-world tend[ing] to 
disintegrate under its own momentum.’ 365 The short story ends with the Biltong 
themselves decaying, leaving humankind alone again on their degraded planet, 
surrounded by collapsed houses and cars with no doors and bottles of whiskey that 
taste like anti-freeze. 
In his 1968 novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? Philip K. Dick gave a name to 
the crumbling, ceaseless, junk-disorder that often engulfed his science fiction: kipple. A 
vision of a pudding-like universe, in which obsolescent objects merge, featureless and 
identical, flooding every apartment complex from here to the pock-marked surface of 
Mars. Kipple is obsolescence incarnate. An inescapable tendency of matter applied, 
with typical Dickian humour, to the fused toaster and melted kettle, to umbrella stands 
that topple over and malfunctioning typewriters no longer supported by their 
manufacturers. Kipple extends from mass-production and the commodity fetish 
through a scathing parody of inbuilt obsolescence, all the while exemplifying the 
power entropic processes have over everything in the larger scheme of fundamental 
physical laws. By playfully transforming the second law of thermodynamics into a 
principle of the human object world, Dick suggests that the entire universe would one 
day succumb to the ravages of capitalist processes. For behind the lively order of 
human civilisation lurked the formless shadows of entropy and waste, the former – in 
conjunction with capitalist consumerism – inevitably turning base materiality into the 
latter: 
No one can win against kipple… it’s a universal principle operating throughout 
the universe; the entire universe is moving toward a final state of total, 
absolute kippleization. 366 
Captured by film director Ridley Scott under the title Blade Runner (1982), Philip K. 
Dick’s vision of kipple abounds in a world where mankind lives alongside shimmering, 
partly superior, artificial humans. For Dick, human and android efficacy was suspended 
somewhere between pure vitality and base matter, a fact brought to the fore by the 
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preponderance of complex mass-produced things like calculators and washing 
machines, little understood by the humans who use and discard them. The vibrancy of 
things, and the thingness of the vibrant, came crashing together in the drive Dick’s 
fictional androids exhibit to avoid their own kippleisation. For how would the world of 
matter exhibit its own autonomy, when humans were so busy using it up in lieu of 
their own? The animating principle of the world Dick envisions can be considered as 
the ‘immanent force of zoe’ named by Rosi Braidotti as ‘life in its nonhuman aspects.’ 
367 As Wisam Kh. Abdul Jabbar points out, Philip K. Dick spoke publically on this liminal 
force some four years after the publication of Do Androids Dream…: 368 
The greatest change growing across our world these days is probably the 
momentum of the living toward reification, and at the same time a reciprocal 
entry into animation by the mechanical. We hold now no pure categories of the 
living versus the non-living; this is going to be our paradigm… In a very real 
sense our environment is becoming alive, or at least quasi-alive, and in ways 
specifically and fundamentally analogous to ourselves. 369 
This vision of mankind merging with a burgeoning ecosystem of ‘quasi-alive’ machines 
marked, for Dick, an anxious quality of the world. Negotiating with an android, a 
vending machine, a pocket calculator, a drone, or any number of vibrant interactive 
automatons is to encounter a world exhibiting ‘life’ with uncanny human and 
nonhuman simultaneity. M. Keith Booker and Anne-Marrie Thomas read Do Androids 
Dream… as ‘a complete breakdown of the opposition between natural and artificial… 
call[ing] the definition of “human” into question by blurring the boundaries between 
human and android.’ 370 A consummation of human vitality and base materiality, 
brought into being by engineered, ‘synthetic’ processes. 
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On a physiological level, Dick’s androids cannot fake empathy, yet their quasi-aliveness 
is exhibited with a synthetic virulence that appears to far exceed the fragile 
corporeality of human beings. When Roy Batty, the enigmatic leader of the replicants, 
introduces himself he performs this status, seeming to predestine works by Donna 
Haraway and N. Katherine Hayles via a munificent belief in the merit of materiality: 
‘We’re not computers, Sebastian. We’re physical.’ 371 
Kipple is a significant step along the line that all matter fashioned for human use 
passes through on its way to waste – eventually being disseminated into what many 
still consider the ‘natural’ world. But kipple can also be understood as a celebration of 
matter’s potential to affect – a potential that all junk and crap and detritus retains in 
abundance as it leaches from landfills, or gets broken down by raging ocean currents. 
In his Exegesis 372 Dick wrote: ‘Premise: Things are inside out… therefore the right 
place to look for the almighty is in the trash in the alley.’ 373 
This brief aside is remarkable in its prescience of the work of contemporary 
materialists, not least Jane Bennett, who in her 2010 book Vibrant Matter turns to a 
particular experience she had with an arrangement of things in a Baltimore storm 
drain to explore ‘the “excruciating complexity and intractability of nonhuman bodies.”’ 
374 For Bennett the very idea of a ‘dead or thoroughly instrumentalized matter’ 375 is in 
fact the result of a hyperconsumptive civilisation overburdened with commodities and 
driven to ‘junk’ them ‘to make room for new ones.’ 376 We see matter as dead and 
innocuous today because the efficacy of a thing is predicated almost entirely on its use 
value. Kipple marks the transition of base matter through capitalism, and is thus the 
perfect figure to explore the inhuman vibrancy of the material world, leading back to a 
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refiguring of human beings as themselves being composed of flowing and expressive 
and mutating constituents. 
Junk and Trash and Garbage and Waste and 
Junk and trash and garbage and waste. Though these terms can be defined by their 
nuances and distinct cultural significations, they are commonly used when referring to 
things which are unusable or worthless to human purposes. ‘As such,’ Myra J. Hird 
observes, ‘no entity is in its essence waste, and all entities are potentially waste.’ 377 
Digging through landfill middens produced by capitalist accumulation over the last 
century, our archaeologist descendants will peel at layer beneath layer of plastic food 
packaging and baby pacifiers and unfixable kitchen appliances in a journey back 
through our times. Human detritus indicates and organises the fashions of each 
decade, not only in testimony to what consumers once valued, but ‘as a material 
enactment of forgetting.’ 378 Hird continues: 
Landfills swell with things we once wanted and now do not want, once valued 
and no longer value. What remains after our disgorgement is what we (want 
to) consider our real self. 379 
The capitalist obsession with forgetting is ritualised through the separation, 
organisation and eventual dumping of waste. Calling on Mary Douglas’ work on 
impurity and pollution, Greg Kennedy defines waste as that which ‘settles outside the 
ruled lines of our conceptual schema,’ 380 remarking further that ‘a society 
preoccupied with concealing its wastes must have something important to hide from 
itself.’ 381 Kippleized things are similarly defined by a status at the edge of 
categorisation. Kipple retains the form of original functioning objects, but also attains a 
conceptual ambiguity founded on the unlikely chance of it ever functioning again. A 
desktop printer need not be broken in order for it to become kipple, rather, the object 
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in question may have lain forgotten for so long that the technosocial order has moved 
on, plunging it into obsolescence by proxy. In booby-trapped cupboards and 
cobwebbed loft spaces kipple accumulates, driving out non-kipple until the day it is 
ritually discarded, at which point it becomes waste.  
Alongside its unusability, the thing that appears to define waste is its powerful 
repulsive capacity. That is, not only the affect rotten, decaying and putrid matter has 
on the human bodies that disguise, hide, and dispose of it, but in waste’s incredible 
ability to propel itself to the echelons of an apparently considered, organised society: 
‘Waste is the scrub between city and country. Garbage is all that anonymous stuff 
falling between valued objects and simple dust.’ 382 Today perhaps the most iconic 
testament to forgetting and the anonymity of waste is the Great Pacific Garbage Patch. 
‘The creation,’ Jane Bennett explains, ‘of the conjoint actions of water currents, 
capitalist accumulation, a fervent ideology of economic growth and free markets, and 
the trillions of plastic bags, toys, packagings, machines, tools, bottles that humans 
manufacture, use and discard every minute.’ 383 In the Great Pacific Garbage Patch the 
ritualistic enactment of forgetting becomes monumentalised at a scale difficult for us 
to comprehend. It is what Timothy Morton refers to as a ‘hyperobject’, 384 an entity of 
such size and magnitude that it dwarfs our perceptual schema. For Morton, 
hyperobjects like the Great Pacific Garbage Patch and the Anthropocene and the 
nuclear catastrophe at Fukushima and the Gulf Oil Spill of 2010, are catacylsms that 
close the beyond. 385 There is no ‘away’ anymore, no ‘Outside’ into which we can 
ritually cast those things we wish to rule out of the schema of ourselves; into which 
garbage eventually propels itself. The Great Pacific Garbage Patch is a distributed 
testimony of forgetting that will remain etched into the geological record long long 
after we are gone.  
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Building an epistemology of ‘junk’, Thierry Bardini notes the etymology of ‘juncus’ as 
‘the prime agent of conjunction, of joining together.’ 386 From Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus Bardini expands this genus of junk further: 
A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, 
interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, 
uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb “to be,” but the fabric of the 
rhizome is the conjunction, “and…and…and…” This conjunction carries enough 
forces to shake and uproot the verb “to be.” 387 
The Great Pacific Garbage Patch as hyperobject rests uneasily between the 
classifications provided by Deleuze and Guattari. The Great Pacific Garbage Patch is a 
seemingly endless series of things, divested of value and usefulness; a rhizomatic 
interbeing made to conjoin and reconjoin by a swirling mass of indifferent ocean 
currents. But the Great Pacific Garbage Patch becomes a singular ‘thing’, in Morton’s 
definition, a figure of sublime contemplation that towers large enough to place even 
‘the beyond’ into question. It is therefore imperative to maintain the conjunction AND 
as a means of separation as well as connection. The flat ontology of the hyperobject 
renders difference meaningless, and re-centres the affirmation of the hyperobject 
back onto the human subject. Objects and kipple and nature and waste, rather, enable 
a chain of endless becomings that productively uproots the categorical particularities 
imposed by (human) language. 
The Object and The Collection and 
In his book Genesis, Michel Serres, argues that objects are specific to the human 
lineage. Specific, not because of their utility, but because they indicate our drive to 
classify and categorise and order: ‘The object, for us, makes history slow.’ 388 Before 
things become kipple, become waste, they stand distinct from one another. Nature 
seems defined in a similar way, between a tiger and a zebra there appears a broad gap, 
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indicated in the creatures’ inability to mate with one another; indicated by the claws of 
the tiger and the hooves of the zebra. But this gap is an illusion, as Michel Foucault 
neatly points out in The Order of Things, ‘all nature forms one great fabric in which 
beings resemble one another from one to the next.’ 389 The dividing lines indicating 
categories of difference are always abstracted from the ‘great fabric’ of nature, and 
understood through human categories isolated in language and mediated through the 
conjunction ‘and’. Two orders of order are exposed here, starting with what Jean-Luc 
Nancy calls the ‘artificial order’ which completes the ‘natural order.’ 390 The order of 
the one, single, great fabric of nature becomes reordered via language through ‘every 
conceivable mode of creation for noninherent orders, which are constituted by 
humans and constructed deliberately.’ 391 Humans themselves are constituted by this 
great fabric: culture and language are a deeply woven bind. Human’s apparent 
mastery over creation comes from one simple quirk of being: the tendency we exhibit 
to categorise, to cleave through the fabric of creation. As Erik Swyngedouw 
persuasively argues, we cannot even escape, ‘“producing nature”… [forcing] us to 
make choices about what socio-natural worlds we wish to inhabit… a qualitative 
transformation of BOTH society AND nature has to be envisaged.’ 392  
In his essay, The System of Collecting, Jean Baudrillard makes a case for the profound 
subjectivity produced by the categorical world view. Once things are divested of their 
function and placed into a collection, they, ‘constitute themselves as a system, on the 
basis of which the subject seeks to piece together [their] world, [their] personal 
microcosm.’ 393 The use-value of objects gives way to the passion of systematization, 
of order and sequence and the projected perfection of the complete set. As the 
collector buys another pretty trinket and carefully stows it in the Wunderkammer of 
their home they enact one of the most primitive of human drives to capture and 
classify the messy, entropic world around them. Sifting through an abandoned family 
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loft, or watching in awe as television crews crawl through the kippleized home of a 
hoarder, the overwhelming emotion can be one of displacement. How such descript 
objects, contrived into micro-collections, then jumbles of memory, then scattered 
heaps, can feel so essential to one person, and so repellent, impossible – even, dare 
we admit it, insane – to everyone else.  
In her writings on collecting, Susan Stewart makes a distinction between the 
collections of ‘the hobbyist’ and ‘the miser’. 394 Differentiation is the key distinction 
between their assemblages of things, whereas the hobbyist collects in order to 
systematise, the miser’s collection ‘refuses the very system of objects and thus 
metonymically refuses the entire political economy that serves as the foundation for 
that system.’ 395 The miser relies on an acquisition of objects that, once entered into 
their collection, are removed from the economy of use. Whereas the hobbyist 
instigates a new value upon an object by its very entrance into the system, the miser 
removes all value, and all chance of value. Homogeny is the miser’s art, each object 
becoming equally useless. Whereas the hobbyist relies on differentiation, between 
classes of flowers and pocket-watches and butterflies, the miser allows only one class 
to determine their system: things are either in it, or they are not. The miser, as 
opposed to the hobbyist, values kipple. Removing objects from their intended use, or 
collecting objects that have already become kippleized – and thus are now useless – 
the miser transgresses the market’s primary intention, that all objects should be used 
until they break or become obsolete; that, in essence, all objects are designed in order 
to be replaced. 
Hobbyist collectors gather things about them in order to exert mastery over, what 
Michel Serres has termed, ‘the abundance of the Creation’. 396 For the obsessive 
collector, each object in a series marks out the collection’s proposed finality. Abundant 
creation is reduced to a manageable expression of class and sequence: from red and 
yellow through to blue, each shade of butterfly placed alongside one another is a 
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complete collection. The collector enacts a primitive writing into place, locating 
themselves, at what Alan Bourassa terms ‘the position of masters who control a circus 
of unruly signs.’ 397 For the hobbyist collector, every red butterfly in existence is 
necessarily repeatable, an iteration of its class. In the collection, function is replaced by 
exemplification. The limits of the collection dictate a paradigm of finality; of 
perfection. Once the blue butterfly is added to the collection it stands, alone, as an 
example of the class of blue butterflies to which the collection dictates it belongs. Only 
one red butterfly is needed to measure every red butterfly in its class, so long as the 
class containing all butterflies is limited by a similar, arbitrary, list of features. Placed 
alongside the yellow and green and blue butterflies, the red butterfly exists to 
constitute all four as a series. The entire series itself then becomes the example 
of all butterflies. A complete collection: a perfect catalogue. Cosmic disorder re-
constituted and classified as a finite catalogue, arranged for the grand collector’s 
singular pleasure. The collector lives in the knowledge that differentiation necessitates 
a closure to every collection. If the collection is a metonym for the collector, then 
positioning the final iteration in the series denotes – according to Baudrillard – the 
death of the subject: ‘It could indeed be added that the point where a collection closes 
in on itself and ceases to be orientated towards an unfilled gap is the point where 
madness begins.’ 398 
Bill Brown references Cornelius Castoriadis in this regard, who disavows the idea of 
representation as ‘a projection screen which unfortunately separates the “subject” 
and the “thing.”’ 399 The hobbyist collector collects and collates and aggregates and 
names and curates not merely because they desire, but because without these 
nominative acts the pivot of desire – the illusionary subject – could not be sustained as 
the centre of their ‘index of reality.’ 400 The collection and the world are simultaneous: 
in order to maintain their mastery over creation, then, a collector must sequence 
increasingly arbitrary lists of classes, ad infinitum. This overlap veils an important 
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distinction for those who envisage the collection: is the collector ‘mad’, for insisting on 
so many arbitrary conditions of order? Or is the Creation itself the madness the 
collector’s cleaving disqualifies? A question echoing Michel Foucault’s suggestion in 
Madness and Civilization that, ‘[t]here is nothing that the madness of men invents 
which is not either nature made manifest or nature restored.’ 401 
An answer to this question may be glimpsed upon examining Susan Stewart’s ‘miser’ 
collector: a figure we may more considerately term ‘the hoarder’. In psychological 
studies of hoarding disorder, families and friends cite an inability to make rational 
decisions, or a general lack of insight, as the defining feature of their relative’s 
condition. 402 In psychiatric circles, the compulsive quality of hoarding provokes fierce 
debate. 403 At base, is it the hoarder’s drive to collect, or their inability to classify that 
defines them as social outsiders? According to Randy O. Frost, a professor of 
psychology at Smith College, Massachusetts, hoarders ‘see more connections between 
things, which leads them to value those things much more than the rest of us do.’ 404 
At its most extreme, hoarding disorder is a debilitating condition that sees its sufferers 
inhabit the confines of living spaces enclosed with kipple. This enclosure often makes 
daily activities such as washing, cooking and sleeping next to impossible, as boxes, 
piles and muddle spill onto work surfaces, or engulf beds and doorways. 405 In this 
state hoarders enact their daily rituals regardless, but have to refine each activity to an 
extremely particular algorithm. Utility and compulsion and ritual oppress each other in 
these instances to such a degree that it is hard to distinguish one from the other. 
Something strange happens when the meaningful limits of collections and classes are 
put under so much pressure. Grey disorder seeps back when too many conditions of 
order are imposed. When the act of collecting comes to take precedence over the 
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microcosm of the collection, when the differentiation of things begins to break down, 
collectors shift between Stewart’s definitions. The hoarder’s stash exemplifies chaos, 
the very thing the hobbyist builds their catalogues in opposition to. As William H. Gass 
explains, true chaos is a cold, final entropic state impossible to differentiate: 
[W]e must think of chaos not as a helter-skelter of worn-out and broken or 
half-heartedly realised things, like a junkyard or potter’s midden, but as a fluid 
mishmash of thinglessness in every lack of direction as if a blender had run 
amok. ‘AND’ is that sunderer. It stands between. It divides light from darkness. 
406 
At these limits of classification, the outsider finds neither light nor darkness in the 
miser’s stash. In the hoard ‘and’ has no particular place, yet, pick up one rotten 
remnant in isolation and ask the hoarder to choose its fate, the conjunction ‘and’ wins 
out again. Without ‘and’ the Creation would function as nothing but pudding, each 
class, condition or thing leaking into its partner, in an endless flattened mush. But the 
problem with ‘and’, with classes and categories and order is that they can be cleaved 
anywhere. Jorge Luis Borges exemplified this perfectly in a series of fictional lists he 
produced throughout his career. The most infamous list, which Michel Foucault 
claimed influenced him to write The Order of Things, refers to a ‘certain Chinese 
encyclopaedia’ in which animals are divided into categories of the frenzied and the 
embalmed and the tame and the innumerable and the fabulous and those that from a 
long way off look like flies. 407 In writing about his short story The Aleph, Borges also 
remarked: 
In the Aleph… [m]y chief problem in writing the story lay in… setting down of a 
limited catalog of endless things. The task, as is evident, is impossible, for such 
a chaotic enumeration can only be simulated, and every apparently haphazard 
                                                     
406 William H. Gass, ‘“AND”’, in Habitations of the Word: Essays (Simon & Schuster, 1986), 183. 
407 Jorge Luis Borges, ‘The Analytical Language of John Wilkins’, in Other Inquisitions 1937-1952 
(University of Texas Press, 1964), 101–5. 
 
131 
 
element has to be linked to its neighbour either by secret association or by 
contrast. 408 
No class of things, no collection, no cleaving of kipple into non-kipple can escape the 
functions of either ‘association or by contrast’. Kipple can be cleaved anywhere, even 
the hoarder themself lives in danger of having their distinct identity erased by the grey 
goo of the hoard.  
The Hoard and The Hoarder and 
Brothers Homer and Langley Collyer lived in a mansion at 2078, Fifth Avenue, 
Manhattan. Sons of wealthy parents – their father was a respected gynaecologist, their 
mother a renowned opera singer – the brothers both attended Columbia University, 
where Homer studied law and Langley engineering. In 1933 Homer suffered a stroke 
which left him blind and unable to work at his law firm. As Langley began to devote his 
time to looking after his helpless brother both men became inseparable from the 
mansion their family’s wealth and prestige had delivered. 409 Over the following 
decade or so Langley would leave the house only at night. Wandering the streets of 
Manhattan, collecting water and provisions to sustain his needy brother, Langley’s 
routines became ritualised, giving his life a meaning above and beyond the streets of 
Harlem that were fast becoming run-down and decrepit. Langley’s clutter only went 
one way: into the house.  
On March 21st 1947 the New York Police Department received an anonymous tip-off 
that there was a dead body in a Harlem mansion. Attempting to gain entry, police 
smashed down the front-door, only to be confronted with a solid wall of newspapers. 
Finally, after climbing in through an upstairs window, a patrolman found the body of 
65-year-old Homer Collyer, slumped dead in his kippleized armchair. In the weeks that 
followed, police removed one hundred and thirty tons of rubbish from the house. On 
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Saturday the 22nd of March 1947 a New York newspaper headline read: ‘One Collyer 
Dead, Second Hunted in 5th Ave. Palace of Junk.’ 410 
The body of Langley Collyer was eventually discovered crushed and decomposing 
under an enormous mound of crap, lying only a few feet from where his brother had 
starved to death. Crawling through the detritus to reach his blind and ailing brother, 
Langley had triggered one of his own booby traps, set in place to catch any robbers 
who attempted to steal their clutter. The list of objects pulled from the brother’s 
house reads like a Jorge Luis Borges original: 
solid walls of baby carriages and plaster statues and garden baskets and 
Christmas trees and picture frames and chandeliers and bundles of sheet music 
and dressmakers' dummies and everywhere, everywhere, the stacks of 
newspapers; every issue of every New York paper since 1918, waiting for the 
day when Homer Collyer would see again. 411 
In a final ironic twist of kippleization, the brothers became mere examples of ‘human’ 
within the system of clutter they had amassed. Langley especially had hoarded himself 
to death. His body, gnawed by rats, was hardly distinguishable from the kipple that fell 
on top of it. A Time Magazine obituary from April 1947 said of the Collyer brothers: 
‘They were shy men, and showed little inclination to brave the noisy world.’ 412 
At the precise moment the Langley hoard collapsed the noisy world was supplanted by 
the noise of the hoard: a collection so impossible to conceive and to cleave and to 
order, that it had dissolved into pure, featureless kipple. Today, the compulsion to 
hoard is sometimes referred to as ‘Collyer syndrome’. Also named in their honour, is 
the ‘Collyer’s Mansion’, a modern firefighting term for a hoarder’s dwelling. Collyer’s 
Mansions can become so overrun with trash and debris that they endanger not only 
those who amass them, but the firefighters who stumble upon them. Poorly 
maintained, and spilling over with refuse, the hoarder’s residence can be a serious fire 
hazard, a place where disease and dust accumulate on top of one another. The danger 
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for hoarders is to achieve a similar fate to the Collyer brothers: their clutter eventually 
wiping them out in one final collapse of systemic disorder.  
For the purposes of this chapter, the ‘collapse’ of the hoard should be understood in 
more than a physical sense, as a description from a 2015 article on hoards and the 
teams that clean them indicates:  
Bleak as the place was, they had seen worse. An apartment so swollen with 
belongings that the tenant, a woman, died standing up, unable to collapse to 
the floor. 413 
Bodies and beings lose distinction, and categories of object and use collapse as hoard 
and hoarder finally meld into one congealed muddle of thinglessness. The co-
internment of object and human, of thing qua thing, occurs in mutual encounter. The 
hoarder, unable to carry out the rituals that sustain their existence amongst their 
aching edifice of things, is all at once overcome and entangled by hoard. As the final 
ritual runs down and is extinguished the hoarder becomes kipple, a simultaneous 
becoming complete and final and enclosed of the hoard; the ultimate consummation 
of Jean Baudrillard’s proclamation on the death of the collector who has finally parsed 
the entire universe into their wunderkammer.  
Speaking on what she calls the ‘inorganic sympathy’ between hoarders and their 
clutter, Jane Bennett turns to Sigmund Freud’s description of ‘the death drive’ in 
which, ‘the human body longs to return to the indeterminacy of the inorganic.’ 414 The 
hoarder’s impulse to agglomerate things and mingle among stuff, Bennett explains, ‘is 
a distinctive form of relationality, a peculiar associational logic, a subterranean 
sympathy, between bodies that we normally assign to different categories: life, matter, 
person, thing, animal, vegetable, mineral.’ 415 It is possible that the closure of the 
hoard marks an apocalyptic becoming that ‘weaves all beings into the interdependent 
context of the manifest world.’ 416  
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The moment that hoard and hoarder become ‘one’ exhibits a type of universality I 
wish to affirm: a universality inducted as the abolishment of the same in a cacophony 
of difference. It is a noise to which the posthuman always aims, and by being manifest 
only once all (human) categories have coalesced, it is a noise that may drown out even 
the exclusive moan of the posthuman imperative that calls for it in the first place. In 
the case of the hoarder whose body was found propped, standing up, amongst her 
clutter, the collapse of the human qua hoard / hoard qua human is not a momentary 
event. To aggregate the entire universe is a slow process, replete in the rituals that 
make it possible for a hoarder to exist amongst that ordered disorder in a sense we 
term ‘human’. But in that figure of the hoarder stood upright I find a strong indicator 
of what the posthuman might ‘look’ like, of how one might single it out from its 
equivocal becoming.  
This image is, no doubt, a troubling one, manifest by the dead body of a woman I have 
mobilised for my own, figural, purposes. But I want to reaffirm the constitution of this 
figure in some very posthuman sense which escaped the Collyer brother, found 
crushed under his collapsed hoard. Unable to collapse to the floor, because of a new 
universe she had conferred around herself, this macabre figure retains her humanness, 
even as she lingers at the edges of the categories of living lively flesh and dead inert 
matter. This contradictory status is one posthumanism is always in practice with, as 
this thesis has shown in each chapter, and across each of its figural constructions. It is 
a liminal state that posthumanism cannot simply refer to, but must become as a mode 
of its own practice, a practice I argue this thesis is paradigmatically constitutive of. 
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Portfolio of Work / Conclusion 
“a fantasmagoric and unrepresentable repertoire  
of actual re-embodiments of the most hybrid kinds” 
Through the figures of The Phantom Zone, Crusoe, The Thing and the Hoard(er) this 
dissertation delineates the boundaries of the human and posthuman; boundaries that 
meet and overlap and coalesce and mingle and affirm and deny and destroy one 
another. I wish to end this dissertation at the point of this amalgamation, leading into 
my portfolio of work. The dissertation text and portfolio of work make a whole which 
can be considered the thesis. The following description of the portfolio offers some 
background to the work, but it is in the work itself that the thesis should be considered 
as ‘concluded’. My portfolio of art work underscores the critical posthumanist practice 
my dissertation argues for, wavering on the boundary between a critical posthumanist 
practice and practice-based research. The 3D Additivist Manifesto is a critical 
posthumanist work in its own right, it is a call for others to submit posthumanist works 
to a larger collective, and it also stands as the culmination of the work of this thesis. 
The 3D printer can be considered as a figure, designed to sit alongside the others 
figures of this thesis. 
The 3D Additivist Manifesto was released in March 2015, a collaborative project 
conceived and created with artist and activist Morehshin Allahyari. The manifesto 
would not have become what it was without both of us working together, but for the 
purposes of this thesis it is important to note how much of the posthumanist critical 
work of my own particular research went into its writing. The Manifesto is a call to 
push creative technologies beyond their breaking point, into the realm of the 
speculative, the provocative, and the weird. The resulting 3D Additivist Cookbook – 
composed of work by over 100 artists, designers and theorists submitted to our ‘call’  – 
was published in December 2016. #Additivism is a portmanteau of additive and 
activism: a movement concerned with critiquing ‘radical’ new technologies in fablabs, 
workshops, and classrooms; at social, ecological, and global scales.  
Read and watch The 3D Additivist Manifesto at additivism.org/manifesto 
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Download and browse The 3D Additivist Cookbook at additivism.org/cookbook 
 ‘Plastic,’ theorist Heather Davis suggests, ‘is the ultimate material of tempophagy, or 
time-eating, one that consumes the compressed bodies of ancient plants and animals, 
a process that took thousands of years, only to be transformed into a single-use take-
out container.’ 417 One of many precocious children conceived by crude oil and 
industrial capitalism, plastic is composed of long strings of organic polymers separated 
by fractioning processes. Oil itself is what Amanda Boetzkes and Andrew Pendakis call 
‘fossilized death;’ 418 a fluid, concentrated remainder of entire ecosystems, coalescing 
over millions of years into the lifeblood of capitalist causes. Calling out Roland Barthes’ 
obsession with plastic as a substance of instantaneity, Heather Davis regards oil and its 
plastic miscellany as a form of slow violence of inexplicable, drawn out, material 
consequence. Once disposed of and disregarded, plastic enters into a further, 
distended relationship with microscopic flora and fauna. Broken down into 
microplastic fragments by exposure to the sun and tidal forces, plastic become an 
ecosystem for bacterial colonies and viruses, locking themselves to its smooth 
surfaces. As it disperses even further, plastics leach their chemical constituents, 
perhaps most infamously Bisphenol A, which mimics the effects of the hormone 
oestrogen, and has been shown to impact on the fertility of fish, amphibians, and 
some evidence suggests, human beings.  
Once we are confronted with the ubiquitous and globally calamitous material affects 
of materials like plastic, ‘nature’ collapses as a conceit. We can argue that the Garbage 
Patch – and other so-called hyperobjects that swirl and coalesce around the figure of 
the Anthropocene – are more the responsibility of Western, industrialised nations than 
humankind as a whole. But, as Dipesh Chakrabarty outlines in his Four Theses on 
climate change, the ‘crises cannot be reduced to a story of capitalism.’ 419 They point 
to a universal, common catastrophe which can only be understood at a geological, 
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planetary scale – far above and beyond that of any particular or generalised 
conception of the human. A scale that demands approaches to politics and identity 
that touch at the edge of deep timescales, stretching both behind and ahead of every 
living thing on the planet. #Additivism takes into consideration Bronislaw Szerszynski’s 
analysis that: 
Geology may be our fate, but our encounter with it disrupts our understanding 
both of geology and of the human. So if we are to discern a ‘geoethics’ for the 
Anthropocene, it cannot take the form of a good, pure writing, enclosed in and 
stabilised by the volume of the book of nature, or by the self-present human 
subject. It will take place in and be conditioned by the much more unstable 
volume opened up by this multiple dispersal of the human. 420 
This proposal of a ‘geoethics’ sets into play several key factors for #Additivism. Firstly, 
how the ethical imperatives of human beings are partly inconsequential on grand 
geological timescales. Secondly, a more obvious, but nuanced feature of the geological 
sciences: geology is a stratigraphic science that understands time through the 
preponderance of layers of rock. And lastly, the connection between these two factors, 
the 'semiotic' character of both geological activity and human behaviour: what does it 
mean to ‘write’ our existence into a future we will never see? 
The 3D Printer, and its related technologies, are a perfect figure for these factors, 
being a technology that proceeds by the layering of material over time, much like a 
geological process. What is more, the politics of 3D printing is a material one, being 
that the plastics used in many additive processes are composed of petrochemical 
derivatives. Deep time is inherent in all 3D printing, because crude oil is itself a 
substance from ancient geological epochs processed for the machines of tech-
capitalism, and plastic is a substance that decays relatively slowly over grand 
timescales, thus acting as one of the definitive markers of The Anthropocene. 
Szerszynski’s concept of a ‘pure writing’ – and ways to disrupt, and oppose it – sit at 
the heart of the practice of #Additivism. In devising The 3D Additivist Manifesto we 
                                                     
420 Bronislaw Szerszynski, ‘The End of the End of Nature: The Anthropocene and the Fate of the Human’, 
Oxford Literary Review 34, no. 2 (2012): 181. 
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were confronted with a writerly dilemma: how to gesture to an unbounded Outside, 
without limiting what may exist there through our all-too-human words and deeds. We 
wanted to instil into The Manifesto all the malleability and monstrosity of waste 
plastic, deep futures, and dark, ancient, crude oil. Only then could it possibly succeed 
us, its writers, and begin working of its own accord. The language we chose, and the 
forms we injected into the video, are science fictional, ironic, contradictory, humorous, 
and ‘weird’ in form and intent. But it is perhaps the list form of The Manifesto that 
does the majority of the posthuman weirding. In attempting to set down, what Jorge 
Luis Borges called ‘a limited catalog of endless things,’ 421 our concern was to gesture 
to the unheard, and the disempowered, by way of the unspoken, and the unthinkable. 
A posthuman yearning for what we call in The Manifesto – mutating the words of Rosi 
Braidotti – ‘a fantasmagoric and unrepresentable repertoire of actual re-embodiments 
of the most hybrid kinds.’ 422 The list keeps growing until it descends/ascends to 
monstrous proportions. Until it exceeds language, and grows bigger than words can 
signal. For every object, tool, weapon or poetic conceit we packed into The Manifesto 
there are an infinite remainder that did not, and perhaps could not, make it in. 
The 3D Additivist Manifesto was extended by the publication of The 3D Additivist 
Cookbook in December 2016: a compendium of imaginative, provocative works from 
over 100 world-leading artists, activists and theorists. The 3D Additivist Cookbook 
contains 3D .obj and .stl files, critical texts, templates, recipes, (im)practical designs 
and methodologies for living in this most contradictory of times. Speculative forms and 
interventions that take into account the deep history and global impact of material 
practices. Ideas and objects that do not propose to ‘fix’ problems, but instead (re)align 
the natural, the human, and the technological with the fluid Outside cast off by 
Anthropogenic processes. The 3D Additivist Cookbook asks the question of how to 
reconcile shifts in ethical and ontological frameworks with a future that humans may 
never see. Is it possible to 'write' into, to ‘design’ that future, without limiting what it 
(and we) might become? #Additivism gestures towards the mutations in bodies, 
identities and minds that will be necessary if any such practice is possible. 
                                                     
421 Borges, The Aleph and Other Stories 1933-1969. 
422 Braidotti, Metamorphoses, 195. 
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